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This article, part of an annual series, weaves together Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act and related developments from 2013 into a 
coherent narrative of value to anyone who seeks an informed base of 
knowledge regarding the FCPA, its enforcement, and related legal and 
policy issues. Specifically, this article uses FCPA enforcement action 
data to highlight perennial issues associated with this new era of 
enforcement and otherwise discusses top FCPA or related 
developments from 2013. Although this article focuses on one statute 
and its enforcement, reference is made throughout to other significant 
developments in 2013 relevant to the FCPA as such references best 
facilitate an appreciation for many of the controversial aspects of 
FCPA enforcement.
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and Exchange Commission, and the resolution vehicles typically used to 
resolve FCPA scrutiny. Interested readers can learn more about these topics, 
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INTRODUCTION
This article, part of an annual series, weaves together Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act and related developments from 2013 into a 
coherent narrative of value to anyone who seeks an informed 
base of knowledge regarding the FCPA, its enforcement, and 
related legal and policy issues. Specifically, this article uses 
FCPA enforcement action data to highlight perennial issues 
associated with this new era of FCPA enforcement and otherwise 
discusses top FCPA or related developments from 2013.
Although this article focuses on one statute and its enforcement, 
reference is made throughout to other significant developments 
in 2013 relevant to the FCPA as such references best facilitate an
appreciation for many of the controversial aspects of FCPA 
enforcement. 
Part I of this article highlights various FCPA enforcement 
statistics from 2013 and places the statistics in a proper and 
historical perspective.
Part II of this article uses certain statistics to highlight 
perennial issues associated with this new era of FCPA 
enforcement. The following issues will be discussed: (i) the 
prominent role non-prosecution, deferred prosecution 
agreements, and administrative settlements have in corporate 
FCPA enforcement and how criticism of these resolution 
vehicles continues to mount; (ii) the wide gap between corporate 
and individual FCPA enforcement actions and a relevant data 
point that helps explain the gap; and (iii) how the financial 
consequences of corporate FCPA scrutiny and FCPA 
enforcement continue to rise, how FCPA settlement amounts 
have come a long way in a short amount of time, and how certain 
excesses have come to define FCPA scrutiny.
Part III of this article highlights other top FCPA or related 
developments from 2013 and uses these developments to 
spotlight the following issues: (i) certain alarming enforcement 
actions and why anyone who values the rule of law should be 
concerned by these actions; (ii) actual judicial scrutiny of FCPA 
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enforcement agency theories as well as how non-FCPA legal 
developments should cause pause as to certain FCPA 
enforcement theories; (iii) FCPA enforcement agency speeches 
and policy positions; and (iv) certain uncomfortable truths and 
double standards regarding the U.S. fight against bribery and 
corruption.
I. 2013 FCPA ENFORCEMENT OVERVIEW
Part I of this article highlights various FCPA enforcement 
statistics from 2013 and places the statistics in a proper and
historical perspective.
This section begins by highlighting various corporate FCPA 
enforcement statistics from 2013.
A. DOJ Corporate FCPA Enforcement
As demonstrated in Table I, in seven corporate FCPA 
enforcement actions1 in 2013, the DOJ collected approximately 
$420 million in settlement amounts.
1. Corporate FCPA enforcement statistics in this article use the “core” 
approach. The core approaches focuses on unique instances of corporate 
conduct regardless of whether the conduct at issue involves a DOJ or SEC 
enforcement action or both (as is frequently the case), regardless of whether the 
corporate enforcement action involves a parent company, a subsidiary or both 
(as is frequency the case), and regardless of whether the DOJ and/or SEC bring 
any related individual enforcement actions (as is occasionally the case). For 
additional information on this method of quantifying FCPA enforcement, see
What is an FCPA Enforcement Action?, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 7, 2013), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/what-is-an-fcpa-enforcement-action. This 
method of computing FCPA statistics is consistent with the DOJ’s approach, 
and it is a commonly accepted method used by other scholars in other areas. 
See Friday Roundup, FCPA PROFESSOR (Mar. 22, 2013), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/friday-roundup-72 (quoting DOJ’s FCPA Unit 
Chief). See, e.g., Michael Klausner & Jason Hegland, THE HARVARD LAW 
SCHOOL FORUM ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL REGULATION,
SEC Practice In Targeting and Penalizing Individual Defendants (Sept. 3, 
2013), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/09/03/sec-practice-in-target
ing-and-penalizing-individual-defendants/.
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Table I
2013 DOJ Corporate FCPA Enforcement Actions
Company Fine Resolution 
Vehicle2
Origin3 Related Individual 
Action4
Arthur 
Daniels 
Midland5 $17.7 million Plea / NPA
6 Voluntary 
Disclosure No
Bilfinger7 $32 million DPA
Voluntary 
Disclosure8 No
2. DPA refers to a deferred prosecution agreement and NPA refers to 
a non-prosecution agreement. To learn more about these agreements in the 
FCPA context, see The Façade, supra note *.
3. Refers to the event or events that initially prompted the scrutiny 
that resulted in the FCPA enforcement action.
4. Refers to employees of the corporate entity resolving the FCPA 
enforcement action.
5. Press Release, ADM Subsidiary Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to 
Violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Dec. 20, 
2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/December/13-crm-1356.html.
6. Id. (the enforcement action involved a criminal information against 
Alfred Toepfler International Ukraine, an indirectly owned subsidiary of ADM, 
as well as an NPA with ADM).
7. Press Release, German Engineering Firm Bilfinger Resolves 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Charges and Agrees to Pay $32 Million 
Criminal Penalty, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Dec. 11, 2013), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/December/13-crm-1297.html.
8. The enforcement action was the direct result of the 2008 Willbros 
enforcement action, which was the result of a voluntary disclosure. See German 
Company Resolves FCPA Enforcement Action Based On Conduct From 
“Distant Past,” FCPA PROFESSOR (Dec. 10, 2013), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/german-company-resolves-fcpa-enforcement-
action-based-on-conduct-from-the-distant-past.
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Weatherford9
International $87.2 million Plea / DPA
10
Iraq Oil for 
Food Action11 No
Diebold12 $25.2 million DPA
Voluntary 
Disclosure No
Total13 $245.2 million DPA
Industry 
Sweep14 No
Ralph 
Lauren15 $882,000 NPA
Voluntary 
Disclosure No
9. Press Release, Three Subsidiaries of Weatherford International 
Limited Agree to Plead Guilty to FCPA and Export Control Violations, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/
November/13-crm-1260.html.
10. Id. The enforcement action involved a criminal information against 
Weatherford Services Ltd, a subsidiary of Weatherford International, as well as 
a DPA with Weatherford International.
11. In 2005, the so-called Volcker Report on the United Nations Iraq 
Oil for Food Program was published and it served as a ready-made list of 
FCPA enforcement actions. Among other things, the Volcker report detailed 
illicit payments in connection with oil transactions under the Oil for Food 
Program and illicit payments in connection with humanitarian goods under the 
Program. See INDEP. INQUIRY COMM. INTO THE UNITED NATIONS OIL-FOR-FOOD
PROGRAMME, MANIPULATION OF THE OIL- FOR- FOOD PROGRAMME BY THE IRAQI 
REGIME (Oct. 27, 2005), available at http://www.foxnews.com/projects/pdf
/final_off_report.pdf.
12. Press Release, Diebold Incorporated Resolves Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay $25.2 Million Criminal Penalty,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Oct. 22, 2013),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/October/13-crm-1118.html.
13. Press Release, French Oil and Gas Company, Total, S.A., Charged 
in the United States and France in Connection with an International Bribery 
Scheme, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (May 29, 2013), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/May/13-crm-613.html.
14. Prior to the enforcement action, Total disclosed: “In 2003, the SEC 
followed by the DOJ issued a formal order directing an investigation in 
connection with the pursuit of business in Iran by certain oil companies, 
including among others, total.” Total S.A., Form 20-F, 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/879764/000119312513131274/d48056
5d20f.htm.
15. Press Release, Ralph Lauren Corporation Resolves Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay $882,000 Monetary 
Penalty, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Apr. 22, 2013), http://www.justice.gov
/opa/pr/2013/April/13-crm-456.html.
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Parker 
Drilling16 $11.8 million DPA
Industry 
Sweep17 No
TOTAL $420 million
B. SEC Corporate FCPA Enforcement
As demonstrated in Table II, in eight corporate FCPA 
enforcement actions in 2013, the SEC collected approximately 
$300 million in settlement amounts.
Table II
2013 SEC Corporate FCPA Enforcement Actions
Company Settlement 
Amount
Resolution 
Vehicle
Origin Related Individual 
Action
Archer 
Daniels 
Midland18
$36.5 
million
Settled Civil 
Complaint VoluntaryDisclosure No
Weatherford 
International19
$65.6 
million
Settled Civil 
Complaint
Iraq Oil for 
Food Action No
16. Press Release, Parker Drilling Company Resolves FCPA 
Investigation and Agrees to Pay $11.76 Million Penalty, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 
(Apr. 16, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/April/13-crm-431.html.
17. Id. In 2010, several oil and gas companies that utilized the services 
of freight-forwarder Panalpina resolved an FCPA enforcement action which 
focused, in large part, on payments made by Panalpina to Nigerian customs 
officials on behalf of the companies. The Parker Drilling enforcement action 
was connected to this enforcement action. Id.
18. Press Release, SEC Charges Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. With 
FCPA Violations, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 20, 2013),
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370540535139.
19. Press Release, SEC Charges Weatherford Int’l With FCPA 
Violations, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Nov. 26, 2013), 
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370540415694.
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Stryker20 $13.2 million
Administrative 
Cease and 
Desist Order
Industry 
Sweep21 No
Diebold22 $22.9 million
Settled Civil 
Complaint Voluntary Disclosure No
Total23 $153 million
Administrative 
Cease and 
Desist Order
Industry 
Sweep No
Ralph 
Lauren24 $735,000 NPA
Voluntary 
Disclosure No
Parker 
Drilling25 $4 million
Settled Civil 
Complaint Industry Sweep No
20. Press Release, SEC Charges Stryker Corp. With FCPA Violations,
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Oct. 24, 2013), 
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370540044262.
21. The company had previously disclosed: “In October 2007, the 
company disclosed that the SEC has made an informal inquiry of the Company 
regarding possible violations of the FCPA in connection with the sale of 
medical devices in certain foreign countries.” SEC Enforcement Of The FCPA 
– Year In Review, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan 6, 2014) 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/sec-enforcement-of-the-fcpa-year-in-review-3.
This inquiry is commonly associated with the FCPA scrutiny of other 
healthcare-related companies, scrutiny that has resulted in several other FCPA 
enforcements. See, e.g., Year In Review Roundups, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 11, 
2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/year-in-review-roundups (noting that in 
2012, 50% of corporate FCPA enforcement actions were against 
pharmaceutical or health care related companies).
22. Press Release, SEC Charges Diebold With FCPA Violations, U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Oct. 22, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/Press
Release/Detail/PressRelease/1370539977273.
23. Press Release, SEC Charges Total S.A. for Illegal Payments to 
Iranian Official, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (May 29, 2013),
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171575006.
24. Press Release, SEC Announces Non-Prosecution Agreement With 
Ralph Lauren Corp. Involving FCPA Misconduct, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N
(Apr. 22, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/
1365171514780.
25. Litigation Release, SEC Charges Parker Drilling Co. with Violating 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Apr. 16, 2013), 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2013/lr22672.htm.
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Philips 
Electronics26 $4.5 million
Administrative 
Cease and 
Desist Order
Foreign Law 
Enforcement 
Investigation27
No
TOTAL $300 million
Analyzing DOJ and SEC FCPA enforcement data separately 
in Tables I and II above is useful and informative given that the 
DOJ and SEC are separate law enforcement agencies and 
different issues may arise in DOJ and SEC FCPA enforcement 
actions.28 On the other hand, analyzing DOJ and SEC FCPA 
26. Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V, S.E.C. 3-15265 (Apr. 5, 2013), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2013/34-69327.pdf.
27. As disclosed by the company, a Polish law enforcement 
investigation prompted the company to conduct an internal investigation, which 
it then disclosed to the DOJ and SEC.
28. As evident from Tables I and II, there is substantial overlap 
between DOJ’s and SEC’s FCPA enforcement programs. FCPA enforcement 
actions against issuers typically involve related and coordinated enforcement 
actions by the DOJ for criminal FCPA violations (whether anti-bribery 
violations or books and records and internal control violations) and by the SEC 
for civil FCPA violations (whether anti-bribery violations or books and records 
and internal control violations). Enforcement actions from 2013 fitting this 
pattern include: ADM, Weatherford Int’l, Diebold, Total, Ralph Lauren, and 
Parker Drilling. The overlap, however, between DOJ’s and SEC’s FCPA 
enforcement programs is not complete. As a general matter, the SEC has 
jurisdiction over “issuers” (companies – domestic and foreign – with shares 
registered on a U.S. exchange or otherwise required to make filings with the 
SEC). In other words, the SEC generally does not have jurisdiction over private 
companies or foreign companies that are not issuers. Thus, certain FCPA 
enforcement actions from 2013, such as Bilfinger, did not have an SEC 
component. As a general matter, the DOJ has criminal jurisdiction over 
“issuers,” “domestic concerns,” (i.e. any business entity with a principal place 
of business in the U.S. or organized under U.S. law), and non-U.S. companies 
and persons to the extent a bribery scheme involved conduct “while in the 
territory of the U.S.” In addition, the DOJ has a higher burden of proof in a 
criminal prosecution. As a result, and given the DOJ’s prosecutorial discretion, 
certain FCPA enforcement actions in 2013 such as Stryker and Philips 
Electronics only included an SEC component. As to the DOJ’s discretion, the 
DOJ has stated that it “has declined to prosecute both individuals and corporate 
entities in numerous cases based on the particular facts and circumstances 
presented in those matters, taking into account the available evidence.” See THE 
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enforcement data in the aggregate is also useful and informative 
in that it provides a comprehensive view of FCPA enforcement.
C. Aggregate Corporate FCPA Enforcement
In 2013, the DOJ and SEC jointly collected approximately 
$720 million in nine corporate enforcement actions. The average 
settlement amount was approximately $80 million and the 
median was approximately $32 million. The range of settlements 
was, on the high end, $398 million (Total), and on the low end, 
$1.6 million (Ralph Lauren).
As in most years, certain FCPA enforcement actions 
significantly skewed yearly enforcement statistics. For instance, 
one enforcement action (Total) represented approximately 55% 
of the total settlement amount and two enforcement actions 
(Total and Weatherford Int’l) represented approximately 77% of 
the total settlement amount.
A popular issue, or so it seems, is to analyze whether FCPA 
enforcement is up or down in any given year. Such year-to-year 
FCPA enforcement statistics, and the arbitrary cutoffs associated 
with them, are of marginal value however given that many non-
substantive factors can influence the timing of an actual 
corporate FCPA enforcement action.29
CRIMINAL DIV. OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & THE ENFORCEMENT DIV. OF THE 
U.S. SEC. AND EXCHANGE COMM’N, FCPA: A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 75 (Nov. 14, 2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf. Based on information in 
the DOJ and SEC authored Guide, it appears that factors motivating a so-called 
declination include voluntary disclosure and cooperation, effective remedial 
measures, and small improper payments. Id. at 77-79. In addition, the DOJ has 
separately stated that it has declined prosecutions when, among other things, a 
single employee, and no other employee, was involved in the improper 
payments at issue; and the improper payments at issue involved minimal funds 
compared to the overall business revenues. See DOJ Declines to Get Specific in 
Declination Responses, FCPA PROFESSOR (Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.fcpa
professor.com/doj-declines-to-get-specific-in-declination-responses.
29. Because FCPA enforcement actions that involve both a DOJ and 
SEC component are typically announced on the same day, and because the DOJ 
and SEC are separate enforcement agencies, it is common for FCPA 
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Nevertheless and accepting year-to-year FCPA statistics for 
what they are, the issue remains: how best to analyze and 
interpret FCPA statistics over time? As demonstrated by the 
below tables, arguments can be made that corporate FCPA 
enforcement was down and up in 2013 compared to 2012 and 
prior years. 
The below tables use the “core” approach and demonstrate 
that both DOJ and SEC corporate enforcement in 2013 was 
down from historical averages.30
Table III
Corporate DOJ FCPA Enforcement Actions (2010 – 2013)
Year Core Actions
2013 7
2012 9
2011 11
2010 17
Table IV
Corporate SEC FCPA Enforcement Actions (2010 – 2013)
Year Core Actions
2013 8
2012 8
enforcement actions to be delayed while one agency waits for the other to 
finish its investigation of the conduct at issue and to finish its negotiation of a 
resolution with a company. Additional non-substantive factors that can 
influence the timing of an FCPA enforcement action, although far from an 
exclusive list, include DOJ and SEC staffing issues (including employee 
departures or leaves), as well as securing corporate board approval for 
resolving an FCPA enforcement action. 
30. Corporate FCPA Enforcement Was Down In 2013, Or Was It Up, 
Or Was It Down? FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.fcpa
professor.com/corporate-fcpa-enforcement-was-down-in-2013-or-was-it-up-or-
was-it-down. 
972 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 22.3
2011 13
2010 19
However, if one analyzes corporate FCPA enforcement
statistics based on settlement amounts, corporate FCPA 
enforcement was up in 2013 compared to the two previous years.
Table V
Corporate DOJ FCPA Enforcement Action Settlement Amounts
(2010 – 2013)
Year Settlement Amounts
2013 $420 million
2012 $142 million
2011 $355 million
2010 $870 million
Table VI
SEC FCPA Enforcement Action Settlement Amounts 
(2010 – 2013)
Year Settlement Amounts
2013 $300 million
2012 $118 million
2011 $148 million
2010 $530 million
What is the best way to analyze and interpret these statistics? 
Consider the following analogy. In year 1, a city issues 100 
speeding tickets and collects $20,000 in fines on those tickets. In 
year 2, a city issues 90 speeding tickets; however, because 
certain drivers were going really fast, the city collects $25,000 in 
fines on those tickets. Was there less enforcement in year 2 
compared to year 1? Most, it is assumed, would say that 
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enforcement in year 2 was less than in year 1 even though in 
year 2 the city collected more money from speeding tickets.
The some logic applies to year-to-year FCPA statistics and 
for this reason it is more accurate and reliable to analyze FCPA 
enforcement statistics by focusing on unique instances of FCPA 
scrutiny (and not settlement amounts) and tracking enforcement 
actions using the “core” approach. Using this approach, 
corporate FCPA enforcement in 2013 was down compared to 
historical averages, and indeed, 2013 saw the lowest number of 
core enforcement actions since 2007.
This point is best demonstrated by the below table which 
aggregates DOJ and SEC enforcement statistics over time and 
highlights notable circumstances which significantly skewed 
enforcement data statistics in any particular year.
Table VII
Corporate FCPA Enforcement Actions (2007 – 2013)
Year Core 
Actions
Settlement 
Amounts Of Note
2007 15 $149 million Six enforcement actions 
involved Iraq Oil for Food 
conduct and these 
enforcement actions 
comprised 40% of all 
enforcement actions and 
approximately 50% of the 
$149 million amount.
2008 10 $885 million The $800 million Siemens 
enforcement action 
comprised approximately 
90% of the $885 million 
amount.
2009 11 $645 million The $579 million KBR / 
Halliburton Bonny Island, 
Nigeria enforcement action 
comprised approximately 
90% of the $645 million 
amount.
2010 21 $1.4 billion Six enforcement actions, all 
resolved on the same day, 
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involved various oil and gas 
companies use of Panalpina 
in Nigeria. Panalpina also 
resolved an enforcement 
action on the same day.
Two enforcement actions 
(Technip and Eni / 
Snamprogetti) involved 
Bonny Island conduct.
In other words, there were 
14 unique corporate 
enforcement actions in 
2010. Of further note, the 
two Bonny Island 
enforcement actions, 
Technip ($338 million) and 
Eni/Snamprogetti ($365 
million) comprised 
approximately 50% of the 
$1.4 billion amount.
2011 16 $503 million The $219 million JGC Corp. 
enforcement action involved 
Bonny Island conduct and 
comprised approximately 
44% of the $503 million 
amount.
2012 12 $260 million No enforcement actions 
significantly skewed the 
statistics.
2013 9 $720 million
The $398 million Total 
enforcement action 
comprised approximately 
55% of the $720 million 
amount.
TOTALS 94 $4.63 billion
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D. Individual FCPA Enforcement
In 2013 the DOJ filed or announced FCPA criminal charges 
against 12 individuals as demonstrated in Table VII. In 2013, the 
SEC did not bring any FCPA civil charges against individuals.
Table VII
2013 Individual FCPA Enforcement Actions
Individual Employer / Former Employer
Related Corporate 
Enforcement 
Action
Alain Riedo31 Maxwell Technologies
Yes, in 2011 
Maxwell 
Technologies 
resolved an FCPA 
enforcement action 
based on the same 
core conduct.32
Lawrence Hoskins
Frederic Pierucci
David Rothschild
William Pomponi33
Alstom, S.A.
No, although Alstom 
remains the subject 
of FCPA scrutiny.
Tomas Clark
Alejandro Hurtado
Lujana Ernesto34
Direct Access 
Partners No
31. Indictment, United States v. Riedo, NO. 13CR3789JM (S. D. Cal. 
Oct. 15, 2013), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/reidoa/Riedo_Indictment.pdf.
32. Maxwell Technologies is the First Corporate Enforcement Action 
of 2011, FCPA PROFESSOR (Feb. 2, 2011), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/maxwell-technologies-is-the-first-corporate-
enforcement-action-of-2011.
33. Press Release, Former Senior Executive of French Power Company 
Charged in Connection with Foreign Bribery Scheme, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE
(July 30, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/July/13-crm-862.html.
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Bernd Kowalewski
Jald Jensen
Peter DuBois
Neal Uhl35
BizJet International
Yes, in 2012 BizJet 
resolved an FCPA 
enforcement action 
based on the same 
core conduct.36
Tables VIII and IV provide a historical overview of DOJ and 
SEC individual FCPA enforcement actions between 2007 and 
2013. As indicated in the tables, DOJ individual FCPA 
enforcement actions in 2013 were up from the previous two 
years, yet below the number of individual actions in 2010, 2009, 
and 2008. SEC individual FCPA enforcement actions in 2013 
were down from the previous year and significantly below 
historical averages.
Table VIII
DOJ Individual FCPA Enforcement Actions37
Year Individuals Charged With Criminal FCPA 
Offenses
2013 12
2012 2
2011 10
2010 33
34. Press Release, Managing Partner of U.S. Broker-Dealer Charged 
in Manhattan Federal Court with Participating in Massive International 
Bribery Scheme, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (June 12, 2013),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/June/13-crm-670.html.
35. Press Release, Four Former Executives of Lufthansa Subsidiary 
Bizjet Charged with Foreign Bribery, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Apr. 5, 2013),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/April/13-crm-388.html.
36. BizJet FCPA Enforcement Action Involves Executive Conduct,
FCPA PROFESSOR (Mar. 15, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/bizjet-fcpa-
enforcement-action-involves-executive-conduct.
37. A Focus On DOJ FCPA Individual Prosecutions, FCPA PROFESSOR
(Jan. 20, 2014), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/a-focus-on-doj-fcpa-individual-
prosecutions-2.
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(including 22 in the Africa Sting case)
2009 18
2008 14
2007 7
Table IX
SEC Individual FCPA Enforcement Actions38
Year Individuals Charged With Civil FCPA 
Offenses
2013 0
2012 4
2011 12
2010 7
2009 5
2008 5
2007 7
With a proper foundation in FCPA statistics, both in 2013 and 
over time, this article next uses certain statistics to highlight 
perennial issues associated with this new era of FCPA 
enforcement.
II. ISSUES HIGHLIGHTED BY THE STATISTICS
Part II of this article uses certain FCPA statistics from 2013 to 
highlight perennial issues associated with this new era of FCPA 
enforcement. The following issues are discussed: (i) the 
prominent role non-prosecution and deferred prosecution 
agreements, as well as administrative settlements, have in 
corporate FCPA enforcement and how criticism of these 
resolution vehicles continues to mount; (ii) the wide gap between 
38. A Focus On SEC FCPA Individual Prosecutions, FCPA PROFESSOR
(Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/a-focus-on-sec-fcpa-individual-
actions-2.
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corporate and individual FCPA enforcement actions and a 
relevant data point that helps explain the gap; and (iii) how the 
financial consequences of corporate FCPA scrutiny and FCPA 
enforcement continue to rise, how FCPA settlement amounts 
have come a long way in short amount of time, and how certain 
excesses have come to define FCPA scrutiny.
A. NPAs / DPAs, Administrative Settlements, and 
Mounting Criticism
As indicated in Table I, in 2013 100% of corporate DOJ 
enforcement actions involved, in whole or in part, an NPA or a 
DPA. As indicated in Table II, in 2013 the SEC also used an 
NPA for the first time in the FCPA context, and several other 
enforcement actions were resolved through administrative cease 
and desist orders. The common thread in all of these resolution 
vehicles was the absence of meaningful judicial scrutiny of 
FCPA enforcement theories and in 2013 criticism of such 
resolution vehicles continued to mount.
1. DOJ Resolution Vehicles
For most of the FCPA’s history, the DOJ had two choices 
when faced with conduct that might implicate the FCPA:
prosecute or do not prosecute. In 2004, the DOJ used, for the 
first time in the FCPA context, a third option – an NPA.39 NPA’s 
and related DPAs (together “alternative resolution vehicles”) are 
now a prominent feature of corporate FCPA enforcement.40
NPAs and DPAs are used in other areas of law, but the most 
prominent use of such resolution vehicles is in FCPA 
enforcement actions. According to the law firm Gibson Dunn, of 
39. Press Release, Invision Technologies, Inc. Enters Into Agreement 
with the United States, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Dec. 6, 2004), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2004/December/04_crm_780.htm.
40. For an extensive description of NPAs and DPAs and the 
controversial issues associated with them, see, e.g., The Facade, supra note *;
Corrupt Practices, supra note *.
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the 28 NPAs or DPAs the DOJ (or SEC) entered into in 2013, 8 
(28%) were in FCPA enforcement actions and the FCPA was the 
single largest source of NPAs and DPAs in 2013 in terms of 
primary allegation.41
Criticism of NPAs and DPAs mounted in 2013. For instance, 
Judge Jed Rakoff, an influential judge in the Southern District of 
New York, criticized various common aspects of corporate 
criminal law enforcement, including DPAs, as “both technically 
and morally suspect.”42 Although Judge Rakoff’s comments 
were not FCPA specific, his concerns apply equally to the FCPA 
context.
In a speech titled “Why Have No High Level Executives 
Been Prosecuted in Connection with the Financial Crisis,” Judge 
Rakoff hit on many issues relevant to FCPA enforcement actions 
resolved through alternative resolution vehicles.43 In answering 
his own question, Judge Rakoff offered that “one possibility … 
is that no fraud was committed. This possibility should not be 
discounted.”44
Rhetorically asking “so … what’s really going on here,” 
Judge Rakoff offered various “influences” which “have had the 
effect of limiting such [individual] prosecutions” including the 
“most important” which he said was the “shift that has occurred 
41. GIBSON DUNN, 2013 Year-End Update on Corporate Non-
Prosecution Agreements (NPAs) and Deferred Prosecution Agreements 
(DPAs), (Jan. 7, 2014), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/2013-
Year-End-Update-Corporate-Non-Prosecution-Agreements-and-Deferred-
Prosecution-Agreements.aspx. According to previous Gibson Dunn reports on 
this subject, in 2012 (a year which saw a large number of trade sanctions, 
export controls, and money laundering enforcement actions resolved via NPAs 
or DPAs) 23% of all NPAs and DPAs were in FCPA enforcement actions; in 
2011, approximately 40% of DOJ NPAs or DPAs were in FCPA enforcement 
actions; and in 2010, approximately 50% of DOJ NPAs or DPAs were in FCPA 
enforcement actions.
42. Hon. Jed S. Rakoff, Why Have No High Level Executives Been 
Prosecuted In Connection With The Financial Crisis?, at 13 (Nov. 12, 2013),
http://im.ft-static.com/content/images/cb1e43f2-4be6-11e3-8203-
00144feabdc0.pdf.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 3.
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over the past 30 years or more from focusing on prosecuting 
high-level individuals to focusing on prosecuting companies and 
other institutions.”45
Judge Rakoff stated:
It is true that prosecutors have brought criminal charges 
against companies for well over a hundred years, but, until 
recently, such prosecutions were the exception, and 
prosecutions of companies without simultaneous prosecutions 
of their managerial agents were even rarer. These reasons 
were obvious. Companies do not commit crimes; only their 
agents do […] so why not prosecute the agent who actually 
committed the crime?
In recent decades, however, prosecutors have been 
increasingly attracted to prosecuting companies, often even 
without indicting a single individual. This shift has often been 
rationalized as part of an attempt to transform ‘corporate 
cultures,’ so as to prevent future such crimes; and, as a result, 
it has taken the form of ‘deferred prosecution agreements; or 
even ‘non-prosecution agreements,’ in which the company, 
under threat of criminal prosecution, agrees to take various 
prophylactic measures to prevent future wrongdoing. But in 
practice, I suggest, it has led to some lax and dubious behavior 
on the part of prosecutors, with deleterious results.46
In contrast to a situation in which a prosecutor attempts to 
discover the individuals responsible for alleged misconduct, 
Judge Rakoff stated that if a prosecutor’s “priority is prosecuting 
a company,” the following scenario occurs.
Early in the investigation, [the prosecutor] invites in counsel 
to the company and explains to him why [the prosecutor] 
suspects fraud. [Counsel] responds by assuring [the 
prosecutor] that the company wants to cooperate and do the 
right thing, and to that end the company has hired a former 
Assistant U.S. Attorney, now a partner at a respected law firm, 
45. Id. at 9, 10, 14.
46. Id. at 14-15.
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to do an internal investigation. The company’s counsel asks 
[the prosecutor] to defer [the prosecutor’s] investigation until 
the company’s own internal investigation is completed, on the 
condition that the company will share its results with [the 
prosecutor]. In order to save time and resources, [the 
prosecutor] agrees. Six months later the company’s counsel 
returns, with a detailed report showing that mistakes were 
made but that the company is now intent on correcting them. 
[The prosecutor] and the company then agree that the 
company will enter into a deferred prosecution agreement that 
couples some immediate fines with the imposition of 
expensive but internal prophylactic measures. For all practical 
purposes the case is now over. [The prosecutor] is happy 
because [he/she] believes that [he/she] has helped prevent 
future crimes; the company is happy because it has avoided a 
devastating indictment; and perhaps the happiest of all are the 
executives, or former executives, who actually committed the 
underlying misconduct, for they are left untouched.
I suggest that this is not the best way to proceed. Although it is 
supposedly justified in terms of preventing future crimes, I 
suggest that the future deterrent value of successfully 
prosecuting individuals far outweighs the prophylactic 
benefits of imposing internal compliance measures that are 
often little more than window-dressing. Just going after the 
company is also both technically and morally suspect. It is 
technically suspect because, under the law, you should not 
indict or threaten to indict a company unless you can prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that some managerial agent of the 
company committed the alleged crime; and if you can prove 
that, why not indict the manager? And from a moral 
standpoint, punishing a company and its many innocent 
employees and shareholders for the crimes committed by 
some unprosecuted individuals seems contrary to elementary 
notions of moral responsibility.47
In addition to Judge Rakoff’s valid criticisms of various 
common aspects of corporate criminal law enforcement 
47. Id. at 16-18.
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including DPAs, 2013 also witnessed much needed development 
of the contested issue of whether the judiciary has any actual 
authority over the approval or rejection of such alternative 
resolution vehicles.
In a notable case, albeit outside the FCPA context, U.S. 
District Court Judge John Gleeson (E.D.N.Y) stated that a 
pending federal criminal case is “not window dressing” nor is the 
court “a potted plant” in concluding that a federal court does 
indeed have supervisory authority over the DPA process.
By way of background, the DOJ filed a criminal information 
charging HSBC Bank USA with violations of the Bank Secrecy 
Act for willfully failing to maintain an effective anti-money 
laundering program as well as willfully facilitating financial 
transactions on behalf of sanctioned entities in violation of the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act and the Trading 
with the Enemy Act.48 The charges were resolved via a DPA in 
which HSBC agreed to forfeit approximately $1.3 billion and the 
company further agreed to pay $665 million in civil penalties.49
Soon thereafter, Judge Gleeson noted at a status conference 
that the court had authority to accept or reject the DPA and 
requested that the parties respond to the question of whether the 
DPA would yield a result consistent with the goals of the federal 
sentencing scheme.
Judge Gleeson approved the DPA, but that is not what is 
notable from this case.50 What is notable is that Judge Gleeson 
rejected the DOJ’s position (and HSBC’s position) that the court 
lacked authority to approve of the DPA. Judge Gleeson stated:
This Court has authority to approve or reject the DPA 
pursuant to its supervisory power. The supervisory power . . . 
permits federal courts to supervise ‘the administration of 
48. Press Release, HSBC Holdings Plc. and HSBC Bank USA N.A. 
Admit to Anti-Money Laundering and Sanctions Violations, Forfeit $1.256 
Billion in Deferred Prosecution Agreement, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Dec. 11, 
2012), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/December/12-crm-1478.html.
49. Id.
50. U.S. v. HSBC Bank, No. 12-CR-763 (E.D.N.Y. 2012), 
http://www.wlrk.com/docs/HSBC.PDF.
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criminal justice’ among the parties before the bar. […] One of 
the primary purposes of the supervisory power is to protect the 
integrity of judicial proceedings. […] Both parties assert that 
the Court lacks any inherent authority over the approval or 
implementation of the DPA. They argue that the Court’s 
authority is limited to deciding, in the present, whether to 
invoke an exclusion of time under the Speedy Trial Act and, in 
the distant future, whether to dismiss the charges against 
HSBC. I conclude that the Court’s authority in this setting is 
not nearly as cabined as the parties contend it is.
The government has absolute discretion to decide not to 
prosecute. Even a formal, written agreement to that effect, 
which is often referred to as a ‘non-prosecution agreement,’ is 
not the business of the courts. In addition, the government has 
near-absolute power under Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(a) to 
extinguish a case that it has brought. In my view, if the 
government were now moving to dismiss this case, it would be 
an abuse of discretion to deny that motion.
The government has chosen neither of those paths. Rather, it
has built into the DPA with HSBC a criminal prosecution that 
will remain pending (assuming all goes well) for at least five 
years. Just as a non-prosecution agreement is perceived as a 
public relations benefit to a company, perhaps the filing and 
maintenance of criminal charges was intended to produce a 
public relations benefit for the government. But for whatever 
reason or reasons, the contracting parties have chosen to 
implicate the Court in their resolution of this matter. There is 
nothing wrong with that, but a pending federal criminal case is 
not window dressing. Nor is the Court, to borrow a famous 
phrase, a potted plant. By placing a criminal matter on the 
docket of a federal court, the parties have subjected their DPA 
to the legitimate exercise of that court’s authority.
The courts ‘are not concerned with law enforcement practices 
except in so far as courts themselves become instruments of 
law enforcement.’ The inherent supervisory power serves to 
ensure that the courts do not lend a judicial imprimatur to any 
aspect of a criminal proceeding that smacks of lawlessness or 
impropriety. ‘The court protects itself.’ The parties have asked 
the Court to lend precisely such a judicial imprimatur to the 
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DPA, by arranging for its implementation within the confines 
of a pending case. The Court will therefore exercise its 
supervisory authority over the DPA.
I recognize that the exercise of supervisory power in this 
context is novel. In the typical supervisory power case, the 
defendant raises a purported impropriety in the federal 
criminal proceeding and seeks the court’s redress of that 
impropriety. In the deferred prosecution context, the defendant 
is presented with the opportunity for diversion from the 
criminal proceeding altogether. For obvious reasons, a 
defendant in these circumstances is less likely to raise a 
purported impropriety with the process, let alone seek the 
court’s aid in redressing it, given the risk of derailing the 
deferral of prosecution.
Nevertheless, it is easy to imagine circumstances in which a 
deferred prosecution agreement, or the implementation of such 
an agreement, so transgresses the bounds of lawfulness or 
propriety as to warrant judicial intervention to protect the 
integrity of the Court.
[...]
I do not intend to catalog all of the possible situations that
might implicate the Court’s supervisory power in this case. I 
couldn’t even if I wanted to; the exercise would amount to 
looking through a glass, darkly, at five years of potential 
future developments in the case. What I can say with certainty 
is that by placing the DPA on the Court’s radar screen in the 
form of a pending criminal matter, the parties have submitted 
to far more judicial authority than they claim exists.51
Judge Gleeson’s conclusion that courts have inherent 
supervisory authority over the DPA process was welcome and 
time will tell whether his analysis will be followed by other 
federal court judges who have DPAs placed on their dockets.
51. Id. at 6-13.
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At the same time, Judge Gleeson’s observation that NPAs are 
“not the business of the courts” was disappointing. It elevated 
form over substance and gives the DOJ a green light – indeed a 
further incentive – to use NPAs to resolve alleged instances of 
corporate criminal liability and thereby bypass the judicial 
system altogether and insulate its enforcement theories from 
judicial scrutiny. At the very least, Judge Gleeson’s order, along 
with Judge Rakoff’s comments, started a conversation as to the 
judiciary’s role in the alternate reality that the DOJ has created 
and championed through its use of alternative resolution 
vehicles.
To be sure, it is an important legal and policy conversation to 
have. Use of alternative resolution vehicles to resolve alleged 
corporate criminal liability in the FCPA context presents two 
distinct, yet equally problematic, public policy issues. The first is 
that such vehicles, because they do not result in any actual 
charges filed against a company – and thus do not require the 
company to plead guilty to any charges – allow egregious 
instances of corporate conduct to be resolved too lightly without 
adequate sanctions and without achieving maximum deterrence.
The second is that such vehicles, because of the same factors 
discussed above, nudge companies to agree to the vehicles for 
reasons of risk-aversion and efficiency and not necessarily 
because the conduct at issue actually violates the FCPA.52
Use of alternative resolution vehicles in the FCPA context 
thus contribute both to “over-prosecution” of business conduct 
while at the same time allowing “under-prosecution” of 
egregious instances of corporate bribery.” Moreover, NPAs and 
DPAs insulate DOJ’s FCPA enforcement theories from judicial 
scrutiny in all but the rarest of circumstances and allow the DOJ 
to play prosecutor, judge, and jury all at the same time.
Indeed, in 2013 former U.S. Attorney General Alberto 
Gonzales openly criticized various aspects of DOJ FCPA 
enforcement. Asked whether the original motivations Congress 
had in passing the FCPA are being served by the current 
52. See infra, sec. IIB & IIIA.
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enforcement environment or whether the current enforcement 
environment has “lost sight of the [FCPA’s] end point,” 
Gonzales said that it is “hard to tell quite frankly” because many 
FCPA enforcement actions are resolved via NPAs and DPAs and 
that these resolution vehicles do not necessarily reflect instances 
of companies violating the FCPA, but rather companies feel 
compelled to agree to the agreements.53 Equally problematic, 
Gonzales said, is that enforcement actions resolved via NPAs 
and DPAs mean that “legitimate wrongdoing is not being 
prosecuted as it should.”54 “Gonzales said it is ‘easy, much easier 
quite frankly’ for the DOJ to resolve FCPA inquiries with NPAs 
and DPAs, that such resolution vehicles have ‘less of a toll’ on 
the DOJ’s budget and that such agreements ‘provide revenue’ to 
the DOJ.”55 As Gonzales stated, it is all “unfortunate.”56
Despite the increasing controversy surrounding the use of 
alternative resolution vehicles, the DOJ continues to champion 
use of the vehicles to resolve alleged instances of corporate 
crime. Among other unpersuasive defenses, in 2013 the DOJ’s 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Denis McInerney stated that 
NPAs and DPAs are “a product of the reasoned judgment 
developed over time by prosecutors.”57 However, as Professor 
David Uhlmann (a former DOJ prosecutor) stated, the DOJ’s 
defense of NPAs and DPAs in a “policy is search of a 
rationale”58 and “the widespread use of deferred prosecution and 
. 53. Former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales Criticizes Various 
Aspects of DOJ FCPA Enforcement, FCPA PROFESSOR (Apr. 4, 2013), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/former-attorney-general-alberto-gonzales-
criticizes-various-aspects-of-doj-fcpa-enforcement.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. McInerney Defends Deferred and Non Prosecution Agreements,
CORP. CRIME REP. (May 7, 2013),
http://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/news/200/mcinerneydefendsdpas0507
2013/. 
58. “Our Stellar FCPA Unit Continues To Go Gangbusters, Bringing 
Case After Case ,” FCPA PROFESSOR (May 6, 2013), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/our-stellar-fcpa-unit-continues-to-go-
gangbusters-bringing-case-after-case.
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non-prosecution agreements erodes corporate criminal liability 
and undermines the rule of law.”59
Indeed, for the reasons stated above, NPAs and DPAs do 
undermine the rule of law on both ends of the spectrum and there 
is no data to suggest that they achieve any deterrent effect.60 For 
these reasons, NPAs and DPAs ought to be abolished in the 
FCPA context because they contribute to a “façade” of FCPA
enforcement.61
So too do certain SEC FCPA resolution vehicles as 
highlighted next.
2. SEC Resolution Vehicles
In recent years, the SEC has had some notable struggles in the 
FCPA context and otherwise when put to its burden of proof in 
litigated actions or otherwise having to defend its settlement 
policies to federal court judges.
For instance, Judge Shira Scheindlin (S.D.N.Y.) dismissed the 
SEC’s FCPA enforcement against former Siemens executive 
Herbert Steffen.62 In another FCPA enforcement action, Judge 
Keith Ellison (S.D.Tex.) granted without prejudice Mark Jackson 
and James Ruehlen’s motion to dismiss the SEC’s claims that 
59. David M. Uhlmann, Deferred Prosecution and Non-Prosecution 
Agreements and the Erosion of Corporate Criminal Liability, 72 MD. L. REV.
1295, 1301-02 (2013).
60. Do NPAs And DPAs Deter?, FCPA PROFESSOR (Mar. 12, 2013), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/do-npas-and-dpas-deter (quoting U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-110, CORPORATE CRIME: DOJ HAS TAKEN 
STEPS TO BETTER TRACK ITS USE OF DEFERRED AND NON-PROSECUTION 
AGREEMENTS, BUT SHOULD EVALUATE EFFECTIVENESS 20 (2009)).
61. See The Façade, supra note *.
62. “Far Too Attenuated” – Judge Grants Herbert Steffen’s Motion To 
Dismiss In SEC FCPA Enforcement Action, FCPA PROFESSOR (Feb. 20, 2013), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/far-too-attenuated-judge-grants-herbert-steffens-
motion-to-dismiss-in-sec-fcpa-enforcement-action (citing SEC v. Sharef, 924 
F.Supp.2d 539, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (this case is discussed in more detail in 
Section IIIB)).
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sought monetary damages.63 In Gabelli, the Supreme Court 
unanimously rejected the SEC’s statute of limitations position.64
In FCPA enforcement actions against Tyco and IBM, Judge 
Richard Leon (D.D.C.) expressed concerns regarding the terms 
of the SEC’s settlement and approved the settlements only after 
imposing additional reporting requirements on the companies.65
In addition, the SEC’s neither admit nor deny settlement policy 
has been questioned by several judges (most notably Judge Jed 
Rakoff) and the merits of this policy is currently before the 
Second Circuit.66
The SEC’s response to this judicial scrutiny has been, as 
strange as it may sound, to bypass the judicial system altogether
when resolving many of its enforcement actions including in the 
FCPA context.
By way of background, in 2010 the SEC announced a series 
of measures including introduction of NPAs and DPAs “to 
further strengthen its enforcement program by encouraging 
greater cooperation from individuals and companies in the 
63. Judge Grants Jackson and Ruehlen’s Motion to Dismiss SEC’s 
Monetary Claims, FCPA PROFESSOR (Dec. 12, 2012), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/judge-grants-jackson-and-ruehlens-motion-to-
dismiss-secs-monetary-claims-finds-that-sec-was-not-diligent-in-bringing-case-
and-that-sec-failed-to-negate-facilitation-payments-exception-however (citing 
SEC v. Jackson, 908 F. Supp. 2d 834, 874-75 (S.D. Tex. 2012)).
64. Supreme Court Unanimously Rejects SEC’s Statute Of Limitations 
Position, FCPA PROFESSOR (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/
supreme-court-unanimously-rejects-secs-statute-of-limitations-position (citing 
Gabelli v. SEC, 133 S. Ct. 1216, 1224 (U.S. 2013) (this case is discussed in 
more detail in Section IIIB)).
65. Christopher M. Matthews, Judge Inserts Court Into SEC Deals,
WALL ST. (July 26, 2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2013/07/
26/judge-inserts-court-into-sec-settlements/?mod=wsj_rchome_rcreport.
66. Second Circuit As To SEC Settlement Policy – “It Is Not … The 
Proper Function Of Federal Courts To Dictate Policy To Executive 
Administrative Agencies ,” FCPA PROFESSOR (Mar. 16, 2012), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/second-circuit-as-to-sec-settlement-policy-it-is-
not-the-proper-function-of-federal-courts-to-dictate-policy-to-executive-
administrative-agencies.
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agency’s investigations and enforcement actions.”67 This 
development was a blow to the rule of law which values 
enforcement of the law in an open, transparent matter and in the 
context of an adversarial proceeding. 
The SEC previously used a DPA in 2011 to resolve a 
corporate FCPA enforcement action,68 but 2013 saw the SEC’s 
first use of an NPA to resolve a corporate FCPA enforcement 
action. The enforcement action involved Ralph Lauren Corp. 
(“RLC”) and this action is discussed more substantively in 
Section IIIA below. What made the RLC enforcement action 
notable was not only the SEC’s first use of an NPA in the FCPA 
context, but the enforcement action also involved a DOJ NPA as 
well.69 It was thus the first “double NPA” in the history of FCPA 
enforcement.
As to the NPA, the SEC’s release stated:
The SEC has determined not to charge [RLC] with violations 
of the [FCPA] due to the company’s prompt reporting of the 
violations on its own initiative, the completeness of the 
information it provided, and its extensive, thorough, and real-
time cooperation with the SEC’s investigation. [RLC’s] 
cooperation saved the agency substantial time and resources 
ordinarily consumed in investigations of comparable 
conduct.70
67. Press Release, SEC Announces Initiative to Encourage Individuals 
and Companies to Cooperate and Assist in Investigations, U.S. SEC. &
EXCHANGE COMM’N (Jan. 23, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010
/2010-6.htm.
68. Tenaris Resolves FCPA Enforcement – SEC Uses a DPA For the 
First Time, FCPA PROFESSOR (May 18, 2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/
tenaris-resolves-fcpa-enforcement-sec-uses-a-dpa-for-the-first-time.
69. Ralph Lauren Resolves FCPA Enforcement Action Via Double 
NPAs Based On Subsidiary Conduct In Argentina, FCPA PROFESSOR (Apr. 23, 
2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/ralph-lauren-resolves-fcpa-enforcement-
action-via-double-npas-based-on-subsidiary-conduct-in-argentina.
70. Press Release, SEC Announces Non-Prosecution Agreement With 
Ralph Lauren Corporation Involving FCPA Misconduct, U.S. SEC. &
EXCHANGE COMM’N (Apr. 22, 2013),
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171514780.
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The factors the SEC identified however were hardly 
distinguishing factors as many SEC FCPA enforcement actions 
are the result of corporate voluntary disclosures in which 
companies are likewise commended on the information and 
cooperation provided. 
In the SEC’s NPA, RLC agreed to resolve the enforcement 
action without admitting or denying liability. At the same time, 
the NPA states as follows. “This agreement should not … be 
deemed exoneration of RLC or to be construed as a finding by 
the Commission that no violations of the federal securities laws 
have occurred.”71 Elsewhere, the NPA states that the “facts set 
forth are made pursuant to settlement negotiations and are not 
binding against RLC or its directors, officers or employees, or 
any other person or entity in any other legal proceeding.”72 Like 
DOJ NPAs and DPAs, the SEC NPA also contained a so-called 
“muzzle clause” in which RLC agreed “not to take any action or 
to make or permit any public statement through present or future 
attorneys, employees, agents, or other persons authorized to 
speak for it, except in legal proceedings in which the 
Commission is not a party, denying, directly or indirectly, the 
factual basis of any aspect of this Agreement.”73
Notwithstanding the alarming features of the RLC 
enforcement action discussed in Section IIIA below, the SEC’s 
NPA received praise in some circles. A Society of Corporate 
Compliance & Ethics representative released a statement 
praising the DOJ and SEC for its handling of the RLC action. It 
stated:
[T]he government has made it clear that companies who take 
compliance seriously and are committed to finding, fixing, and 
solving legal and regulatory problems are in a far better 
position than those who do not invest in real, robust, and 
effective compliance programs. I can think of no better proof 
71. Press Release, Non-Prosecution Agreement, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE 
COMM’N (2013), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2013/2013-65-npa.pdf.
72. Id.
73. Id. For more on “muzzle clauses,” see The “Muzzle” Clause, FCPA
PROFESSOR (Apr. 23, 2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/the-muzzle-clause.
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of the value of strong compliance and ethics programs than the 
DOJ’s and SEC’s recent actions’ . . . .’When the government 
visibly acknowledges and credits internal compliance efforts, 
Boards and management take note of their tangible value and 
are reminded of the need to support empowered, independent 
compliance officers and functions.74
However, when the SEC and DOJ use resolution vehicles that 
are not subjected to one ounce of judicial scrutiny, this is not 
something to praise, it is something to lament. When the DOJ 
and SEC bring an enforcement action against a company (one of 
the world’s most admired companies)75 that had an isolated 
instance of alleged misconduct within one of its many 
subsidiaries and holds the parent corporation liable for such 
alleged misconduct on a theory contrary to black-letter law (see 
section IIIA below), this is not something to praise, it is 
something to lament. When the DOJ and SEC extract 
approximately $1.6 million from a company that acted like a 
responsible corporate citizen upon learning of an issue, and then 
imposes annual government reporting obligations on that 
company, and otherwise “muzzles” the company, this is not 
something to praise, it is something to lament.
The RLC enforcement action was not the only SEC corporate 
enforcement action from 2013 that bypassed the judicial system.
As highlighted in Table II above, another notable feature from 
2013 SEC FCPA enforcement is that three of the eight corporate 
enforcement actions (38%) were resolved through administrative 
74. SCCE Chief Executive Officer Praises US Securities & Exchange 
Commission, SOC’Y OF CORP. COMPLIANCE & ETHICS (April 24, 2013, 2:45:31 
PM), http://www.corporatecompliance.org/Resources/View/ArticleId/935/
SCCE-Chief-Executive-Officer-praises-U-S-Securities-Exchange-Commission-
and-Department-of-Justice-re.aspx.http://www.corporatecompliance.org/
Resources/View/ArticleId/935/SCCE-Chief-Executive-Officer-praises-U-S-
Securities-Exchange-Commission-and-Department-of-Justice-re.aspx.
75. See World’s Most Admired Companies, CNN MONEY,
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/most-admired/2013/list/ (last visited 
Feb. 25, 2014).
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cease and desist orders likewise not subjected to any judicial 
scrutiny.
As noted by FCPA practitioners:
The use of administrative proceedings is noteworthy in an 
environment in which federal judges are increasingly 
questioning the merits of proposed settlements submitted by 
the SEC and defendants for approval. . . . As judicial review 
continues to inject uncertainty into the once perfunctory 
settlement approval process, the use of administrative 
proceedings to resolve FCPA violations may become a 
preferred forum for SEC settlements.76
As noted, among other concerns with the increase in SEC 
administrative settlements is that SEC administrative law judges 
“are full-time Commission employees, and, as a result, are 
perceived by some to be less independent than federal judges” 
and thus the “Commission is conducting a proceeding that, had it 
been brought in federal court, would have been protected by the 
right to a jury trial.”77
SEC administrative settlements in the FCPA context were 
rare prior to 2010 largely because the SEC could not impose 
monetary penalties in such proceedings absent certain 
exceptions. However, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act 
granted the SEC broad authority to impose civil monetary 
penalties in administrative proceedings in which the SEC staff 
seeks a cease-and-desist order.78 However, Congress’ grant of 
76. The Total S.A. Action: Are Administrative Orders the SEC’s FCPA 
Resolution of Choice for the Future?, DEBEVOISE & PLIMPTON LLP FCPA
UPDATE, July, 2013, at 2-3, available at http://www.debevoise.com/files/
Publication/3e511c8c-de2b-414d-91e1-
f2efbf339f0a/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/0fe134c8-4fd1-4061-b22d-
00bdc48bceb9/FCPA_Update_July_2013.pdf.
77. Id. at 6.
78. Kenneth Winer & Manda Sertich, Assessing the Power of the SEC 
to Impose Monetary Penalties In Administrative Proceedings Charging 
Violations of the FCPA, FCPA PROFESSOR (July 13, 2011), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/assessing-the-power-of-the-sec-to-impose-
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such authority to the SEC – no doubt politically popular in the 
aftermath of the so-called financial crisis – has directly resulted 
in less judicial scrutiny of SEC enforcement theories including in 
the FCPA context.
In short, SEC administrative settlements, as well as SEC 
DPAs and NPAs, place the SEC in the role of regulator, 
prosecutor, judge and jury all at the same time and a notable 
feature from 2013 SEC FCPA corporate enforcement is that 4 (1 
NPA and 3 administrative orders) of the 8 corporate enforcement 
actions (50%) were not subjected to one ounce of judicial 
scrutiny. Like DOJ NPAs and DPAs, the SEC’s use of such 
vehicles, as well as administrative orders, in FCPA enforcement 
actions often nudge companies to agree to the vehicles for 
reasons of risk-aversion and efficiency and not necessarily 
because the conduct at issue actually violates the FCPA.
Indeed, new SEC Chairman Mary Jo White commented early 
in her tenure that she ‘“realized just how much leverage the SEC 
has[]”‘ and that many public companies acquiescence to various 
SEC demands rather than engage in a long-running dispute with 
the SEC.79 As White stated: ‘“[y]ou don’t want to be at war with 
your main regulator.’”80
The irony of the SEC’s increased use of resolution vehicles 
that bypass the judicial system is that they have occurred early in 
Chairman White’s tenure. As a private practitioner, White was a 
vocal critic of the DOJ’s use of such alternative resolution 
vehicles and stated that: the ‘“deferred prosecution trend may be 
sweeping too broadly” that DPAs are becoming almost “an 
automatic reaction in many cases beyond those where it should 
be used; and that “prosecutors are thinking – before we close out 
monetary-penalties-in-administrative-proceedings-charging-violations-of-the-
fcpa.
79. Andrew Ackerman, Revolving Door Helps SEC, Chairman says,
WALL ST. J MONEY BEAT (Oct. 3, 2013, 11:41 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
moneybeat/2013/10/03/revolving-door-helps-sec-chairman-says/?mod=wsj_n
view_latest. 
80. Id.
994 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 22.3
this case that involves any kind of corporate crime, we should 
get something from the companies.”81
In short, White stated,”[p]rosecutors are like anybody else –
when they devote a lot of time and effort to a case, they want 
something to show for it. And so I fear the deferred prosecution 
is becoming a vehicle to show results.”82
A further irony is that even as SEC Chairman, White has 
extoled the virtue of trials and the adversarial system. In a speech 
titled “The Importance of Trials to the Law and Public 
Accountability,” White stated that trials “put our system of 
justice … on display for all to see” and observed: “The public 
airing of facts, literally in open court, creates accountability for 
both defendants and the government. How we resolve disputes 
and how we decide the guilt or innocence of an accused are the 
true measure of our democracy.”83
In the speech, White noted that trials are the “‘crown jewel’ 
of our system of justice” and she focused on two “of the [more] 
important roles that trials play in our administration of justice: 
how they foster development of the law, and perhaps even more 
importantly how they create public accountability for both 
defendants and the government through the public airing of 
charges and evidence.”84
As to the former, White stated that “[t]rials allow for more 
thoughtful and nuanced interpretations of the law in a way that 
settlements and summary judgments cannot.”85
As to the later, White stated:
81. An informed And Forceful Critique of NPA’s and DPA’s by … 
Guess Who?, FCPA PROFESSOR (April 25, 2013), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/an-informed-and-forceful-critique-of-npas-and-
dpas-by-guess-who.
82. Id.
83. Mary Jo White, The Importance of Trials to the Law and Public 
Accountability, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Nov. 14, 2013),
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370540374908.
84. Id.
85. Id.
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The death of trials would … remove a source of disciplined 
information about matters of public significance. … It would 
mean the end of an irreplaceable public forum and would 
mean that more of the legal order would proceed behind 
closed doors. And it would deprive us, as American citizens, 
of an important source of knowledge about ourselves and key 
issues of public concern.86
Although White’s speech was general in nature, the topics 
addressed are obviously relevant to FCPA enforcement in a year 
in which 50% of SEC corporate FCPA enforcement were not 
subjected to one ounce of judicial scrutiny. As White rightly 
noted, such a system of justice “deprives us, as American 
citizens, of an important source of knowledge about ourselves 
and key issues of public concern.”
B. The Gap Between Corporate and Individual FCPA 
Enforcement
FCPA enforcement in 2013 once again demonstrated the wide 
gap between corporate and individual FCPA enforcement 
actions. This section highlights the gap, how individual 
enforcement actions in 2013 followed the historical cluster 
approach, and spotlights a relevant data point that helps explain 
the gap between corporate and individual FCPA enforcement.
Key to achieving deterrence in the FCPA context is 
prosecuting individuals to the extent the individual’s conduct 
legitimately satisfies the elements of an FCPA violation. For a 
corporate employee with job duties that provide an opportunity 
to violate the FCPA, it is easy to dismiss corporate money being 
used to pay corporate FCPA fines and penalties. On the other 
hand, it is not easy to dismiss hearing of an individual with a 
similar background and job duties being criminally indicted and 
sent to federal prison for violating the FCPA.
The enforcement agencies have long recognized that an 
FCPA enforcement program based solely on corporate fines is 
86. Id.
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not effective and does not adequately deter future FCPA 
violations.87 For instance in 2013, Daniel Suleiman (DOJ Deputy 
Chief of Staff, Criminal Division) stated, consistent with prior 
enforcement agency statements, that “[t]here is no greater 
deterrent to corporate crime that the prospect of prison time . . . 
if people don’t go to prison, then enforcement can come to be 
seen as merely the cost of doing business.”88 Likewise, SEC 
Chairman White stated that a “core principle of any strong 
enforcement program is to pursue responsible individuals 
wherever possible [and that] is something our enforcement 
division has always done and will continue to do.”89
However, despite enforcement agency rhetoric about the
importance of individual enforcement actions, FCPA 
enforcement in this new era is largely corporate enforcement 
only. For instance, in 2013 0 of 8 DOJ corporate FCPA 
enforcement actions (0%) have resulted (at least yet) in any 
related charges against company employees.90 Going back to 
2012, only 1 of 9 DOJ corporate FCPA enforcement actions 
(11%) in 2012 have resulted (at least yet) in any related charges 
against company employees.91 Likewise, in 2013 0 of 8 SEC 
corporate FCPA enforcement actions (0%) have resulted (at least 
yet) in any related charges against company employees.92 Going 
back to 2012, 0 of 8 (0%) of SEC corporate FCPA enforcement 
87. See Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Crime and Drugs, 111th Cong. 14 (2010) 
(prepared statement of Mike Koehler, Assistant Professor of Business Law at 
Butler Univ.).http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1739134.
88. Daniel Suleiman, Deputy Chief of Staff for the Criminal Div., 
Remarks to the Minnesota State Bar Association’s 37th Annual Internal
Business Law Institute (May 9, 2013), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2013/crm-speech-1305091.html.
89. Mary Jo White, Chairman, Council of Institutional Investors, 
Address at fall conference in Chicago, Illinois: Deploying the Full Enforcement 
Arsenal (Sept. 26, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/
Detail/Speech/1370539841202.
90. A Focus On DOJ FCPA Individual Prosecutions, supra note 37.
91. Id.
92. SEC Enforcement Of The FCPA – Year In Review, supra note 21.
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actions have resulted (at least yet) in any related charges against 
company employees.93
A key qualifier in the above analysis of corporate FCPA 
enforcement actions compared to related individual enforcement 
actions is “at least yet” as history instructs that there can be a lag 
time between resolution of a corporate enforcement action and 
any related individual enforcement actions. Indeed, as 
highlighted in Table VII, 5 of the 12 individual FCPA 
enforcement actions from 2013 relate back to corporate FCPA 
enforcement actions from 2012 or 2011. Nevertheless, the 
statistics are what they are at the present moment and certain
facts and figures concerning the DOJ’s prosecution of 
individuals for FCPA offenses are presented below.
Since 2000, the DOJ has charged 123 individuals with FCPA 
criminal offenses. The breakdown is as follows.
x 2000 – 0 individuals 
x 2001 – 8 individuals 
x 2002 – 4 individuals 
x 2003 – 4 individuals 
x 2004 – 2 individuals 
x 2005 – 3 individuals 
x 2006 – 6 individuals 
x 2007 – 7 individuals 
x 2008 – 14 individuals 
x 2009 – 18 individuals 
93. Id.
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x 2010 – 33 individuals (including 22 in the Africa Sting 
case) 
x 2011 – 10 individuals 
x 2012 – 2 individuals 
x 2013 – 12 individuals94
An analysis of the numbers reveals some interesting points.
Most of the individuals – 89 (or 72%) were charged since 2008. 
Thus, on one level the DOJ is correct when it states that 
individual prosecutions are a hallmark of its FCPA enforcement 
program at least as measured against the historical average given 
that between 1978 and 1999, the DOJ charged 38 individuals 
with FCPA criminal offenses.
Yet on another level, a more meaningful level given that there 
was much less overall enforcement of the FCPA between 1978 
and 1999, DOJ statements about its focus on individuals 
represents hollow rhetoric as demonstrated by the below figures.
Of the 89 individuals criminally charged with FCPA offenses 
by the DOJ since 2008:
x 22 individuals were in the Africa Sting case; 
x 9 individuals (minus the “foreign officials” charged) were 
in the Haiti Teleco case; 
x 8 individuals were in the Control Components case; 
x 8 individuals were in the Siemens case; 
x 4 individuals were in the Lindsey Manufacturing case; 
x 4 individuals were in the LatinNode / Hondutel case; 
94. A Focus On DOJ FCPA Individual Prosecutions, supra note 37.
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x 4 individuals were in the Nexus Technologies case; 
x 4 individuals were in the BizJet case; and 
x 4 individuals were associated with Alstom (the company’s 
FCPA scrutiny is still ongoing).95
When there are individual FCPA enforcement actions related 
to a corporate enforcement action, 2013 witnessed a continuation 
of the above clustering phenomenon as Table VII indicates that 
11 of the 12 individual enforcement actions (92%) were in just 
three cases. In short, 53% of the individuals charged by the DOJ 
with FCPA criminal offenses since 2008 have been in just four 
cases and 75 of the individuals charged by the DOJ since 2008 
have been in just nine cases.96
Considering that there have been 60 core corporate DOJ 
FCPA enforcement actions since 2008, this is a rather 
remarkable statistic. Of the 60 corporate DOJ FCPA 
enforcement actions, 44 (or 73%) have not (at least yet) resulted 
in any DOJ charges against company employees.97
A very interesting and significant picture also emerges when 
analyzing DOJ individual prosecution data based on whether the 
corporate entity employing or otherwise involved with the 
individual charged was a public or private entity. For instance, of 
the 12 individuals criminally charged with FCPA offenses in 
2008, 7 (58%) were employed by private entities.98 This is 
consistent with the historical average. Of the 89 individuals 
charged by the DOJ with FCPA criminal offenses since 2008, 61 
of the individuals (69%) were employees or otherwise affiliated 
with private business entities.99 This is a striking statistic given 
that 48 of the 60 corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement actions since 
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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2008 (80%) were against publicly traded corporations.100 In the 
12 private entity DOJ FCPA enforcement actions since 2008, 
individuals were charged in connection with 7 of those cases 
(58%).101 In contrast, in the 48 public entity DOJ FCPA 
enforcement actions since 2008, individuals were charged in 
connection with 9 of those cases (19%).102 In short, and based on 
the data, a private entity DOJ FCPA enforcement is 
approximately three times more likely to have a related DOJ 
FCPA criminal prosecution of an individual than a public entity 
DOJ FCPA enforcement action.
Next, certain facts and figures concerning the SEC’s 
prosecution of individuals for FCPA offenses are presented 
below. Since 2000, the SEC has charged 59 individuals with 
FCPA civil offenses. The breakdown is as follows.
x 2000 - 0 individuals
x 2001 - 3 individuals
x 2002 - 3 individuals
x 2003 - 4 individuals
x 2004 - 0 individuals
x 2005 – 1 individual
x 2006 – 8 individuals
x 2007 – 7 individuals
x 2008 – 5 individuals
x 2009 – 5 individuals
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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x 2010 – 7 individuals
x 2011 – 12 individuals
x 2012 - 4 individuals
x 2013 - 0 individuals103
Similar to the DOJ figures, most of the individuals charged –
33 (or 56%) were charged since 2008. Thus, on one level the 
SEC is correct when it states that individual prosecutions are a 
focus of its FCPA enforcement program at least as measured 
against the historical average given that between 1978 and 1999 
the SEC charged 22 individuals with FCPA civil offenses.
Yet on another level, a more meaningful level given that there 
was much less overall enforcement of the FCPA between 1978 
and 1999, the SEC’s statements (like the DOJ’s statements about 
its focus on individuals) represent hollow rhetoric as 
demonstrated by the below figures.
Of the 33 individuals charged with civil FCPA offenses by 
the SEC since 2008:
x 7 individuals were in the Siemens case;
x 4 individuals were in the Willbros Group case;
x 4 individuals were in the Alliance One case;
x 3 individuals were in the Maygar Telekom case; and
x 3 individuals were in the Noble Corp. case.104
In other words, 64% of the individuals charged by the SEC 
with FCPA civil offenses since 2008 have been in just five cases.
103. A Focus on SEC FCPA Individual Actions, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 
22, 2014), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/a-focus-on-sec-fcpa-individual-
actions-2.
104. Id.
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Considering that there have been 65 core corporate SEC FCPA 
enforcement actions since 2008, this is a rather remarkable 
statistic. Of the 65 corporate SEC FCPA enforcement actions, 53 
(or 82%) have not (at least yet) resulted in any SEC charges 
against company employees.105 This figure is thus higher than 
the 73% figure regarding the DOJ, a notable statistic given that 
the SEC, as a civil law enforcement agency, has a lower burden 
of proof in an enforcement action.
The above statistics regarding the gap between corporate 
FCPA enforcement and related individual enforcement action 
should cause alarm, including at the enforcement agencies, given 
the DOJ and SEC policy positions highlighted above. During the 
Senate’s 2010 FCPA hearing, it was noted that the absence of 
individual FCPA charges in most corporate FCPA enforcement 
actions causes one to legitimately wonder whether the conduct 
giving rise to the corporate enforcement action was engaged in 
by ghosts.106 However, it was also noted that there is an equally 
plausible reason why no individuals have been charged in 
connection with many corporate FCPA enforcement actions. The 
reason has to do with the quality and legitimacy of the corporate 
enforcement action in the first place.
The prevalence of NPAs and DPAs in the FCPA context was 
highlighted above, including how these agreements, not 
subjected to any meaningful judicial scrutiny, are often agreed to 
by companies for reasons of ease and efficiency, and not 
necessarily because the conduct at issue violates the FCPA. 
Individuals, on the other hand, face a deprivation of personal 
liberty, and are more likely to force the DOJ to satisfy its high 
burden of proof as to all FCPA elements. In other words, perhaps 
the more appropriate question is not “but nobody was charged,” 
but rather do NPA and DPAs always represent provable FCPA 
violations?
105. Id.
106. Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practice Act
Before the S. Subcomm. on Crime & Drugs of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
111th Cong. 16 (2010) (statement of Mike Koehler), http://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1739134.
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Consider the following working hypothesis.
x Instances in which the DOJ brings actual criminal charges 
against a company or otherwise insists in the resolution 
process that the corporate entity pleads guilty to FCPA 
violations, represent a higher quality FCPA enforcement 
action (in the eyes of the DOJ) and is thus more likely to result 
in related FCPA criminal charges against company employees.
x Instances in which the DOJ resolves an FCPA enforcement 
action solely with an NPA or DPA, represent a lower quality 
FCPA enforcement action and is thus less likely to result in 
related FCPA criminal charges against company employees 
given that an individual is more likely to put the DOJ to its 
high burden of proof.
The below statistics provide a compelling datapoint 
concerning the quality and legitimacy of many corporate DOJ 
FCPA enforcement actions. Since NPAs and DPAs were first 
introduced to the FCPA in 2004, there have been 76 core 
corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement actions.107
x 12 of these corporate enforcement actions were the result 
of a criminal indictment or resulted in a guilty plea by the 
corporate entity to FCPA violations. 10 of these corporate 
enforcement actions – 83% – resulted in related criminal 
charges of company employees.108
x 51 of these corporate enforcement actions were resolved 
solely with an NPA or DPA. In only 5 instances – 9.8% – was 
there related criminal charges of company employees.109
x A third type of corporate FCPA enforcement action is 
where the resolution includes a guilty plea by some entity in 
107. DOJ Prosecution of Individuals- Are Other Plays at Factor?,
FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 21, 2014), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/a-focus-on-
sec-fcpa-individual-actions-2.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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the corporate family – usually a foreign subsidiary – and an 
NPA or DPA against the parent company. Since the 
introduction of NPAs and DPAs to the FCPA context, there 
have been 13 such corporate enforcement actions. In 4 of these 
actions - 31% - there was related criminal charges of company 
employees.110 This percentage is what one might expect 
compared to the two types of corporate FCPA enforcement 
actions discussed above, although it is interesting to note the 
following regarding 3 of these 4 instances. The DOJ ended up 
dismissing the charges against Si Chan Wooh (Schnitzer 
Steel), John O’Shea (ABB) was not found not guilty, and 
Bobby Elkin (Alliance One) received a probation sentence 
after the sentencing judge questioned many aspects of the 
enforcement action.111
If the above statistics do not cause one to question the quality 
and legitimacy of many corporate FCPA enforcement actions, no 
empirical data ever will. For those who believe NPAs and DPAs 
always represent provable FCPA violations, the ball is now in 
your court to offer credible explanations for the following 
datapoints.
x If a corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement action is the result 
of a criminal indictment or resulted in a guilty plea by the 
corporate entity to FCPA violations, there is a 83% chance 
that related criminal charges will be brought against a 
company employee. If a corporate DOJ FCPA enforcement 
action is resolved solely with an NPA or DPA, there is only a 
9.8% chance that criminal charges will be brought against a 
company employee.
In 2013, then-current numbers concerning the above gap were 
presented to Denis McInerney (DOJ, Deputy Assistant Attorney 
General) at a public conference and he was asked to explain the 
110. Id.
111. Id.
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gap.112 McInerney described two enforcement actions resolved 
via an NPA or DPA in which there were indeed related 
individual prosecutions, but otherwise said that he did not know 
where the numbers are coming from.113 As described above, it is 
really quite easy to calculate the numbers. One simply takes all 
DOJ corporate enforcement actions since 2004, tracks how those 
enforcement actions were resolved, and then looks to see if there 
have been related individual actions against company employees.
Regarding the gap between corporate FCPA enforcement 
actions and related individual enforcement actions, it is also 
tempting to ask the “but nobody was charged” question in 
connection with the above SEC statistics. Yet, like with the DOJ 
figures, there is an equally plausible reason why so few 
individuals have been charged in connection with most corporate 
SEC FCPA enforcement actions. The reason likewise has to do 
with the quality and legitimacy of the corporate enforcement 
action in the first place.
With the SEC, the issue is not so much NPAs or DPAs 
(although in the two instances in which the SEC has used such 
vehicles to resolve corporate FCPA enforcement actions there 
have not yet been any related individual actions), but rather the 
SEC’s neither admit nor deny settlement policy, including the 
SEC’s frank admission that a settled SEC enforcement action 
“do[es] not necessarily reflect the triumph of one party’s [] 
position over the other.”114 Individuals in an SEC FCPA 
enforcement, even if only a civil action, and even if allowed to 
settle on similar neither admit nor deny terms, have their 
personal reputation at stake and are thus more likely than 
corporate entities to challenge the SEC and force it satisfy its 
burden of proof at trial as to all FCPA elements.
112. “Our Stellar FCPA Unit Continues To Go Gangbusters, Bringing 
Case After Case ,” FCPA PROFESSOR (May 6, 2013),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/our-stellar-fcpa-unit-continues-to-go-gang
busters-bringing-case-after-case.
113. Id.
114. See The Façade, supra note *, at 925.
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More recently, as highlighted above, the SEC has been keen 
on resolving corporate FCPA enforcement in the absence of any 
judicial scrutiny and a notable statistic from 2013 is that 50% of 
SEC corporate enforcement actions were not subjected to one 
ounce of judicial scrutiny either because the action was resolved 
via a NPA or through an administrative order.
In other words, and like in the DOJ context, perhaps the more 
appropriate question is not “but nobody was charged,” but rather 
do SEC corporate FCPA settlements necessarily represent 
provable FCPA violations.
C. The Financial Consequences of Corporate FCPA 
Scrutiny and Certain Excesses
This section uses certain 2013 FCPA enforcement actions and 
related instances of FCPA scrutiny to highlight the growing 
financial consequences of FCPA scrutiny as well as to spotlight 
certain excesses that have come to define FCPA scrutiny in this 
new era.
With each passing year, FCPA settlement amounts seem to 
grow bigger and bigger for no apparent reason other than just 
because. This a significant public policy issue as even alleged 
wrongdoers have due process rights and fine and penalty 
amounts ought to be transparent and bear a direct relationship to 
the severity of the conduct alleged. While settlement amounts in 
an actual FCPA enforcement action tend to get the most public 
attention, pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses 
are often the most expensive aspect of FCPA scrutiny and 
enforcement in this new era. Here too, with each passing year, 
pre-enforcement action professional fees and expenses seem to 
grow bigger and bigger for no apparent reason other than just 
because. While such fees and expenses are of course welcomed 
by FCPA Inc., the industry needs to exhibit greater restraint in 
investigating instances of FCPA scrutiny. In this regard, a 
welcome development from 2013 was various industry 
participants calling attention to certain excesses associated with 
FCPA scrutiny.
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1. FCPA Settlements Amounts Have Come A 
Long Way In a Short Amount of Time
Two corporate FCPA enforcement actions from 2013 (Total -
$398 million and Weatherford International - $153 million) 
joined the list of the top ten FCPA settlements of all-time.115
However, this in-and-of-itself is not notable. What is notable is 
that in 2013 seemingly routine FCPA enforcement actions were 
resolved for amounts that were record-setting just a few years 
ago. Indeed, as FCPA practitioners from Gibson Dunn rightly 
observed: “[a]n unmistakable characteristic of [2013] FCPA 
enforcement is that the market rate for resolving a corporate 
FCPA enforcement action spiked precipitously in 2013.”116
Indeed, FCPA settlement amounts have come a long way in a 
short amount of time. Consider that in 2007 Baker Hughes 
resolved the largest FCPA enforcement action of all-time by 
agreeing to pay a combined $44 million in DOJ and SEC 
enforcement actions.117 According to the DOJ criminal 
information, the company made approximately $4.1 million in 
improper payments – via an agent – in connection with the 
Karachaganak Project in Kazakhstan, a “giant gas and oil field” 
according to the DOJ.118 The DOJ’s sentencing guidelines 
115. For the complete top ten list, see FCPA 101, FCPA PROFESSOR
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-101#q17 (last visited Feb. 17, 2014).
116. 2013 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON DUNN (Jan. 6, 2014),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Pages/2013-Year-End-FCPA-
Update.aspx.
117. Baker Hughes Subsidiary Pleads Guilty to Bribing Kazakh Official 
and Agrees to Pay $11 Million Criminal Fine as Part of Largest Combined 
Sanction Ever Imposed in FCPA Case, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Apr. 26, 2007), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/April/07_crm_296.html; SEC Charges 
Baker Hughes with Foreign Bribery and with Violating 2001 Commission 
Cease-and-Desist Order, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-77.htm (last updated Apr. 26, 2007) 
[hereinafter SEC Charges Baker Hughes].
118. Information at 7, 19-20, United States v. Baker Hughes Servs. Int’l, 
Inc., No. H-07-129 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2007), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/baker-hughs/04-11-
07bakerhughesintl-info.pdf.
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calculation stated that the “benefit received or to be received 
[from the alleged improper conduct was] approximately $19 
million.”119
The SEC enforcement action against Baker Hughes was based 
on the same core conduct and the SEC’s release stated:
Baker Hughes paid approximately $5.2 million to two agents 
while knowing that some or all of the money was intended to 
bribe government officials, specifically officials of State-
owned companies, in Kazakhstan. . . . Baker Hughes engaged 
the agent and was awarded an oil services contract in the 
Karachaganak oil field in Kazakhstan that generated more 
than $219 million in gross revenues from 2001 through 
2006.120
In addition, the SEC release stated:
x from 1998 to 2004, Baker Hughes authorized commission 
payments of nearly $5.3 million to an agent (who worked in 
Kazakhstan, Russia and Uzbekistan) under circumstances in 
which the company failed to determine whether such 
payments were, in part, to be funneled to government officials 
in violation of the FCPA; 
x in Indonesia, between 2000 and 2003, Baker Hughes paid 
certain freight forwarders to import equipment into Indonesia 
using a “door-to-door” process under circumstances in which 
the company failed to adequately assure itself that such 
payments were not being passed on, in part, to Indonesian 
customs officials; 
x in Nigeria, between at least 2001 and 2005, Baker Hughes 
authorized payments to certain customs brokers to facilitate 
the resolution of alleged customs deficiencies under 
119. Plea Agreement at 9, United States v. Baker Hughes Servs. Int’l, 
Inc., No. H-07-129 (S.D. Tex. April 11, 2007), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/baker-hughs/04-11-
07bakerhughes-plea.pdf.
120. SEC Charges Baker Hughes, supra note 117.
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circumstances in which the company failed to adequately 
assure itself that such payments were not being passed on, in 
part, to Nigerian customs officials; and 
x in Angola, from 1998 to 2003, Baker Hughes paid an agent 
more than $10.3 million in commissions under circumstances 
in which the company failed to adequately assure itself that 
such payments were not being passed on to employees of 
Sonangol, Angola’s state-owned oil company, to obtain or 
retain business in Angola.121
In 2013, comparatively minor FCPA enforcement actions –
per the enforcement agencies’ own allegations – were resolved 
for amounts larger than what was a record-setting amount just a 
few years ago.
For instance, the Diebold enforcement action focused 
primarily on excessive travel and entertainment and the DOJ 
alleged that company subsidiaries provided various things of 
value (such as Las Vegas sightseeing, a dance show, a Grand 
Canyon tour, a Universal Studios tour and a Napa Valley tour) 
totaling approximately $1.75 million to alleged Chinese and 
Indonesian “foreign officials” at state-owned banks over a five 
year period.122 As to the core conduct, the DOJ’s sentencing 
guidelines calculation referenced a “value of benefit received 
[from the alleged improper conduct] more than $7 million.”123
The SEC enforcement action against Diebold was based on 
the same core conduct and alleged that Diebold subsidiaries in 
121. Id.
122. Information at 3-4, United States v. Diebold, Inc., No. 5:13CR464 
(N.D. Ohio Oct. 22, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/
fcpa/cases/diebold/information.pdf. The enforcement action also contained 
non-specific monetary allegations concerning relationships with private 
business customers in Russia. However, the DOJ’s sentencing guidelines 
calculation makes clear that the Russia conduct was a minor factor in 
determining the fine and penalty amount. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement 
at 5-7, United States v. Diebold, Inc. No. 513:CR464 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 22, 
2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/diebold/
combined_dpa.pdf. 
123. Id. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 122, at 5-7; Id.
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China and Indonesia spent approximately $1.8 million on travel, 
entertainment, and other improper gifts for senior officials with 
the ability to influence the alleged state-owned bank purchasing 
decisions.124
Thus, per the enforcement agencies’ own allegations, the 
Diebold enforcement action involved significantly less egregious 
conduct than the Baker Hughes enforcement action. Yet, the 
combined fine and penalty amount in the Diebold action ($48 
million) was more than the record-setting $44 million Baker 
Hughes enforcement action from just a few years ago.125
The $32 million DOJ enforcement action against German 
engineering company Bilfinger S.E. is another instructive 
example from 2013 that demonstrates how FCPA settlement 
amounts have come a long way in a short amount of time. The 
DOJ criminal information alleged, in pertinent part, that 
Bilfinger conspired with others to obtain and retain contracts 
related to the Eastern Gas Gathering System (EGGS) project in 
Nigeria through the promise and payment of over $6 million in 
bribes to officials of the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC), National Petroleum Investment 
Management Services - a subsidiary of NNPC, the dominant 
political party in Nigeria, an official in the executive branch of 
the Government of Nigeria, and others.126 As noted in the DOJ’s 
release, the enforcement action was directly related to a prior 
124. Complaint at 2, SEC v. Diebold, Inc. (D.D.C. Oct. 22, 2013), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2013/comp-pr2013-
225.pdf. The SEC further alleged that Diebold falsified books and records to 
hide approximately $1.2 million of bribes paid to employees at privately owned 
banks in Russia.
125. Of course, factors beyond the core conduct at issue – such as 
voluntary disclosure, cooperation and a company’s past history – can influence 
settlement amounts in an FCPA enforcement action. However, the Baker 
Hughes and Diebold enforcement actions were substantively identical in these 
regards (i.e. both companies had a past history, both companies voluntarily 
disclosed and both companies cooperated).
126. Information at 7, United States v. Bilfinger SE (S.D. Tex. Dec. 9, 
2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/bilfinger
/bilfinger-information.pdf. 
2014] A Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Narrative 1011
2008 FCPA enforcement against Willbros Group, Bilfinger’s 
joint venture partner in connection with the EGGS project.127
The DOJ’s DPA in the previous Willbros enforcement action 
did not set forth a detailed advisory Sentencing Guidelines 
calculation as is the norm in most current FCPA DPAs including 
the Bilfinger DPA. Nevertheless, the DOJ settlement amount in 
the Willbros enforcement action was $22 million.128 This $22 
million settlement amount was in connection with not only the 
EGGS project, but also DOJ allegations that “certain Willbros 
employees based in South America agreed to make 
approximately $300,000 in corrupt payments to Ecuadoran 
government officials of the state-owned oil company 
PetroEcuador and its subsidiary, PetroComercial, to assist in 
obtaining a gas pipeline project.”129
In short, the Bilfinger enforcement action involved the same 
EGGS project at issue in the Willbros enforcement. Moreover, 
the Willbros enforcement action was broader in scope than the 
Bilfinger action as it involved alleged corrupt payments in 
connection with other projects in other countries. Yet, the 2013 
Bilfinger enforcement action was resolved for $32 million 
whereas the 2008 Willbros enforcement action was resolved for 
$22 million. The key difference between the two enforcement 
actions seems to be merely the passage of time.
The above examples demonstrate how FCPA settlement 
amounts have come a long way in a short amount of time and 
raise the question: have FCPA settlement amounts increased just 
because? To be sure, the escalation in DOJ and/or SEC 
127. German Engineering Firm Bilfinger Resolves Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act Charges and Agrees to Pay $32 Million Criminal Penalty, U.S. 
DEP’T JUST. (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/December/13-
crm-1297.html.
128. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 9, United States v. Willbros 
Group, Inc., No. H-08-287 (S.D. Tex. May 14, 2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/willbros-group/05-14-
08willbros-deferred.pdf.
129. Willbros Group Inc. Enters Deferred Prosecution Agreement and 
Agrees to Pay $22 Million Penalty for FCPA Violations, U.S. DEP’T JUST.
(May 14, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/May/08_crm_417.html.
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settlement amounts is not FCPA specific as 2013 also saw SAC 
Capital resolve an insider trading enforcement action for $1.2 
billion; Johnson & Johnson resolve an off-label marketing 
enforcement action for $2.2 billion; and JPMorgan resolve a 
mortgage lending enforcement action for $13 billion.130
Such settlement amounts have been questioned even by the 
regulators. In a speech, SEC Commissioner Daniel Gallagher 
noted:
“[T]he amounts of the penalties that the SEC imposes against 
corporations today are eye-popping and likely would have 
shocked the legislators who voted for the Remedies Act and 
the Commission that sought penalty authority from 
Congress.”131
As to the JPMorgan action, the company’s top lawyer asked 
at a public event “[a]t what point does this [record-setting fines] 
stop.”132 At the same event, a government official acknowledged 
130. Brady Dennis, Johnson & Johnson Agrees to Pay $2.2 Billion in 
Drug-Marketing Settlement, WASH. POST (NOV. 4, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/johnson-and-johnson-
agrees-to-pay-22-billion-in-drug-marketing-settlement/2013/11/04/a7092342-
456a-11e3-b6f8-3782ff6cb769_story.html; Neil Irwin, Everything You Need to 
Know About JPMorgan’s $13 Billion Settlement, WASH. POST (Nov. 19, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/10/21/everything-
you-need-to-know-about-jpmorgans-13-billion-settlement/; Peter Lattman & 
Ben Protess, SAC Capital Agrees to Plead Guilty to Insider Trading, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 4, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/11/04/sac-capital-
agrees-to-plead-guilty-to-insider-trading/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_php=true
&_type=blogs&_r=1. 
131. Daniel M. Gallagher, Remarks at Columbia Law School 
Conference (Hot Topics: Leading Current Issues in Securities Regulation and 
Enforcement.), U.S. SEC.& EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Nov. 15, 2013), 
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370540386071. 
132. Dan Fitzpatrick & Devlin Barrett, J.P. Morgan Lawyer Criticizes 
Big Bank Fines, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 24, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/
articles/SB100014240527023042810045792183420
39403918.
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that the government’s application of fines in legal settlements “is 
more art than science.”133
Against this backdrop, Professor Peter Henning rightly noted:
A standard part of enforcement actions against companies 
these days is the multimillion-dollar – or even multibillion-
dollar – penalty. What can be perplexing is figuring out how 
those penalties were determined, and whether they have much 
if any direct relationship to either the gains realized from the 
violations or the harm inflicted.134
Indeed, in many corporate FCPA enforcement actions there 
appears to be little rhyme or reason to how FCPA settlement 
amounts are calculated. For instance, certain SEC FCPA 
settlements include a civil penalty, disgorgement and 
prejudgment interest; whereas other enforcement actions include 
only disgorgement and prejudgment interest; whereas other 
enforcement actions include only disgorgement and a civil 
penalty; whereas other enforcement actions include only 
disgorgement; whereas other enforcement actions include only a 
civil penalty.135
When a NPA is used to resolve an FCPA enforcement action, 
the ultimate fine amount and how it as calculated is not 
transparent.136 Even with corporate DPAs and plea agreements, 
there remains little transparency regarding FCPA criminal fine 
amounts, particularly as to the value of the benefit allegedly 
received through the improper payment. The DOJ simply cites a 
number.
133. Id.
134. Peter J. Henning, Fines, Without Explaining How They Were 
Calculated, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/
12/02/a-fine-without-explaining-how-it-was-calculated/?_r=0.
135. SEC Enforcement Of The FCPA – Year In Review, supra note 21.
136. See, e.g., Letter from U.S. Dep’t of Justice Criminal Div. to 
Thomas A. Hanusik, White Collar & Regulatory Enforcement Group, Crowell 
& Moring LLP (Apr. 22, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/
criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/ralph-lauren/Ralph-Lauren.-NPA-Executed.pdf. 
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Moreover, double-dipping is also a common feature of 
corporate FCPA enforcement actions and this dynamic further 
increases settlement amounts. Double-dipping refers to an issuer 
company repaying an alleged improper benefit amount twice –
first to the DOJ in a criminal enforcement action and then again 
to the SEC in a civil enforcement action.
For instance, the $398 million Total enforcement action 
involved a DOJ component ($245 million) and an SEC 
component ($153 million). It is clear from the enforcement 
agency documents that approximately $150 million of the 
aggregate $398 million settlement amount represented a double-
dip. The DOJ DPA set forth the Sentencing Guidelines 
calculation and noted that the base fine was $147 million “which 
corresponds to the value of the benefit received in return for the 
unlawful payments.”137 This base fine amount is the most 
significant factor determining the fine amount after the 
culpability score multiplier is added to it. The SEC’s order stated 
that Total’s improper payments “netted Total approximately 
$150 million in profits.”138 Based on this figure, the SEC ordered 
Total to pay $153 million in disgorgement and prejudgment 
interest. In other words, Total repaid the approximate $150 
million benefit it received from the alleged improper payments 
twice – first to the DOJ and then to the SEC. This dynamic is not 
unique to the Total enforcement action. Nearly every FCPA 
enforcement action in this new era that involves a DOJ and SEC 
component, in which the SEC seeks disgorgement, involves the 
same dynamic.
Among the most vocal critics of this common feature of 
FCPA enforcement actions is Philip Urofsky (a former high-
137. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 5, United States v. Total, S.A., 
No. 1:13CR239, (E.D. Va. 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/
fraud/fcpa/cases/totalsa/2013-05-29-total-dpa-filed.pdf.
138. Total, S.A., Exchange Act Release No. 69654, para. 19 (May 29, 
2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2013/34-69654.pdf.
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ranking DOJ FCPA enforcement attorney) who has argued that 
the SEC “get out of the anti-bribery business.”139 Urofsky stated:
The SEC’s enforcement of the anti-bribery provisions raises a 
fundamental matter of fairness. Take two companies, one 
public and one private, and assume that both violate the FCPA 
and realize the same illicit gain from the violation. The private 
company will be subject only to DOJ’s jurisdiction and will 
therefore be exposed to a criminal fine of up to twice its gain. 
The public company, on the other hand, will be subject both to 
that criminal fine and to a civil fine and disgorgement of the 
illicit proceeds, thus potentially paying a third more in fines 
than the private company for the same conduct.140
Should the SEC be removed from enforcing the FCPA’s anti-
bribery provisions, it could be called “granting the wish” because 
the SEC never wanted any part in enforcing the FCPA’s anti-
bribery provisions.141
The largest FCPA enforcement action of all time in terms of 
aggregate DOJ and SEC settlement amount is the $800 million 
action against Siemens in 2008.142 With “market rates” for 
resolving FCPA enforcement actions trending higher with each 
passing year, it is only a matter of time before there is an FCPA 
enforcement action in the billions. If a billion dollar FCPA 
enforcement action is what the conduct at issue warrants, this is 
acceptable. However, if a billion dollar FCPA enforcement 
139. Philip Urofsky et. al, How Should We Measure the Effectiveness of 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act? Don’t Break What Isn’t Broken—The 
Fallacies of Reform, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1145, 1177 (2012); See also Barbara 
Black, The SEC and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Fighting Global 
Corruption is Not Part of the SEC’s Mission, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1093, 1095
(2012), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2013/02/73.5.Uro
fsky.pdf.
140. Id.
141. See Mike Koehler, The Story of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
73 OHIO ST. L.J. 929 (2012).
142. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Siemens AG and Three 
Subsidiaries Plead Guilty to Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Violations and 
Agree to Pay $450 Million in Combined Criminal Fines (Dec. 15, 2008), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/December/08-crm-1105.html.
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action happens just because, and because of double-dipping, this 
a significant public policy issue as even alleged wrongdoers have 
due process rights and fine and penalty amounts ought to be 
transparent and bear a direct relationship to the severity of the 
conduct alleged.
While settlement amounts in an actual FCPA enforcement 
action tend to get the most public attention, pre-enforcement 
action professional fees and expenses are often the most 
expensive aspect of FCPA scrutiny and enforcement in this new 
era. Here too, with each passing year, pre-enforcement action 
professional fees and expenses seem to grow bigger and bigger 
for no apparent reason other than just because.
2. Escalating Pre-Enforcement Professional 
Fees and Expenses
Wal-Mart has been under intense FCPA scrutiny for several 
years, most notably after a 2012 New York Times article 
suggested that Wal-Mart Mexico “orchestrated a campaign of 
bribery to win market dominance” and that the entity “paid 
bribes to obtain permits in virtually every corner” of Mexico.143
Following the article, Wal-Mart’s FCPA scrutiny has followed a 
typical pattern in that the company’s internal review expanded 
beyond Mexico and the company’s pre-enforcement action 
professional fees and expenses began to skyrocket.
During 2013, the company made various disclosures 
regarding its FCPA scrutiny including the following.
On FCPA, we continue to work closely with anticorruption 
compliance experts to review and to assess our programs and 
help us implement concrete steps for each particular market. 
143. David Barstow, Vast Mexico Bribery Case Hushed Up by Wal-Mart 
After Top-Level Struggle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2012, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/22/business/at-wal-mart-in-mexico-a-bribe-
inquiry-silenced.html?_r=1&hp.
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In the various markets, these experts have spent tens of 
thousands of hours on anti-corruption support and training.144
Each quarter of 2013 Wal-Mart disclosed its pre-enforcement 
action professional fees and expenses and quarterly totals 
equated to the company spending approximately $1.25 million 
per working day on its FCPA scrutiny.145 It is not just large 
multinationals the subject of high-profile FCPA scrutiny that are 
spending millions of dollars in pre-enforcement action 
professional fees and expenses every year. For instance, 
beverage company Beam Inc. disclosed approximately $4.2 
million in one year for “legal, forensic accounting, and other fees 
related to [its] internal investigation into FCPA compliance in 
[its] India operations.”146
The question ought to be asked – does it really need to cost 
this much or has FCPA scrutiny turned into a boondoggle for 
many involved? An article titled “Lawyers Need to Brake Their 
Bribe-Case Gravy Train” observed:
Lawyers need to pull the brake on their bribery-probe gravy 
train. Wal-Mart Stores shelled out about $80 million last 
quarter alone – some $1.25 million per working day – on an
internal corruption investigation. [...] Wasteful scorched-earth 
legal tactics inflate costs, while potentially ruinous U.S. 
penalties make companies scared to skimp. Smarter lawyering 
could slow the runaway spending. Scrutiny under the FCPA 
typically throws multinationals into attorney-hiring overdrive. 
Having legal eagles delve into corporate innards helps a 
company look cooperative and thereby win leniency from the 
government. [...] There is a better way. A records search at a 
multinational’s headquarters can quickly reveal how and, 
144. Fourth Quarter Fiscal Year 2013 Earnings Call, WAL-MART, 30 
(Feb. 21, 2013), http://cdn.corporate.walmart.com/63/1a/461d1fa2470fa596b4
6198e72886/management-earnings-call-transcript.pdf.
145. Further To Wal-Mart’s Pre-Enforcement Action Professional Fees 
And Expenses, FCPA PROFESSOR (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.fcpapro
fessor.com/further-to-wal-marts-pre-enforcement-action-professional-fees-and-
expenses.
146. Beam Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 74-75 (Feb. 26, 2013).
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generally, where and to whom bribes are being paid, according 
to veterans of the Siemens case and others. Investigations in 
just a few countries can then ferret out the details of a global 
scheme. That’s often enough to reach a reasonable settlement 
with Uncle Sam. Yet unnecessarily far-flung and costly probes 
persist. Not only does the prospect of enormous fees 
encourage lawyers running an investigation to engage in 
overkill. A company’s officers also don’t want to be seen to
cut corners or get in the attorneys’ way. The usual healthy 
corporate tendency to police costs carefully doesn’t apply. For 
big companies the waste may not show, either. Even a legal 
bill of, say, $500 million is a drop in the bucket for a company 
like Wal-Mart with revenue nearly 1,000 times that figure 
every year. That shouldn’t, however, let lawyers off the hook. 
Ethics rules require their fees to be reasonable. In bribery 
cases, that standard is at risk of becoming corrupted.147
Not surprisingly, certain FCPA Inc. participants took offense 
to criticism of Wal-Mart’s pre-enforcement professional fees and 
expenses. Writing on an industry sponsored site, a commentator 
stated:
[Wal-Mart’s] FCPA compliance costs are less than one third 
of one percent of its sales. And with profits last year of about 
$17 billion, Wal-Mart will survive its FCPA spending spree. 
The world’s largest retailer is finally investing in FCPA 
compliance in proportion to its size. It’s playing catch up for a 
decade of what appears to be FCPA neglect.148
The implication by the commentator seemed to be that the 
necessity and legitimacy of FCPA pre-enforcement action 
professional fees and expenses ought to be measured by a 
company’s profitability or overall sales, and that a large 
company with large profits ought to spend more on FCPA 
compliance than a smaller company with smaller profits.
147. Koehler, supra note 141.
148. Michael Scher, Wal-Mart is no numbers game (Part Two), FCPA
BLOG (Aug. 22, 2013, 3:08 AM), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2013/8/22/
wal-mart-is-no-numbers-game-part-two.html.
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However, FCPA risk is unique to specific industries, and even 
within the same industry, often to specific companies and it is 
not hard to imagine a small company with smaller profits having 
a higher FCPA risk profile than a large company with larger 
profits.
The commentator further stated that Wal-Mart’s pre-
enforcement action professional fees and expenses can “be 
looked at like accumulated liability for a toxic waste site: First a 
determination of the origin, size and places of the contamination, 
then the costs of the clean up and damages.”149 This analogy was 
particularly inept as Superfund and other environment clean-up 
costs frequently turn into boondoggles as well.150
A root cause that contributes to eye-popping pre-FCPA 
enforcement action professional fees and expenses is the “where 
else” question. The “where else” question generally works as 
follows. A company voluntarily discloses to the enforcement 
agencies specific conduct that occurred in country x that could 
implicate the FCPA. Before the enforcement agencies will agree 
to resolve any enforcement action concerning conduct in country 
x, the enforcement agencies will often ask “where else.” In other 
words, if the conduct giving rise to FCPA scrutiny occurred in 
country x, how do the enforcement agencies know that similar 
conduct did not also occur in countries a, b, c, d, etc. In short, the 
“where else” question asked in instances of FCPA scrutiny often 
results in a company conducting a world-wide compliance 
review of its entire operations.
Because cooperation with the government’s investigation is 
an important factor the enforcement agencies weigh in deciding 
whether to bring an enforcement action, business organizations 
invariably, yet reluctantly, accept FCPA counsel’s 
recommendation to broaden the internal investigation to 
demonstrate cooperation to the enforcement agencies. The next 
thing the company knows, it is paying for a team of lawyers 
149. Id.
150. See, e.g., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OTA-BP-ITE-51, ASSESSING 
CONTRACTOR USE IN SUPERFUND—A BACKGROUND PAPER 39-44 (1989), 
available at http://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk1/1989/8903/890309.PDF.
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(accompanied by forensic accountants and other specialists) to 
travel around the world to answer the “where else” question even 
though the voluntary disclosure that got the whole process 
started involved only specific conduct in a specific country.
Where an instance of FCPA scrutiny is prompted by board of 
director or senior executive conduct that raises the possibility of 
a culture of corruption within a company, the “where else” 
question would seem like a legitimate law enforcement question.
However, the “where else” question is asked in nearly every 
instance of FCPA scrutiny as evidenced by FCPA resolution 
documents.151 That the “where else” question is asked in the 
absence of any meaningful check or judicial oversight raises a 
host of problematic issues. For instance, FCPA attorneys to 
whom the “where else” question is posed have little incentive to 
pushback as the question often leads to multi-year, multi-country 
billing bonanzas.
In this regard, it was notable that in 2013 Charles Duross (at 
the time the DOJ’s FCPA Unit Chief) called out the industry at 
an American Bar Association event.
As to the “where else” question, Duross suggested that often 
company lawyers are seeking to over-do-it through a global 
search of operations for FCPA issues. He discussed a case in 
which a company and its professional advisors came to a 
meeting with a global search plan and he said “no, no, no, that is 
not what I want.” He indicated that the lawyers and other 
professional advisors in the room ‘looked unhappy,’ but that the 
general counsel of the company was happy.152
151. A Q&A With Claudius Sokenu On “Where Else,” FCPA PROFESSOR
(April 4, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/a-qa-with-claudius-sokenu-on-
where-else.
152. Friday Roundup, FCPA PROFESSOR (Sept. 20, 2013),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/fridayfridaya-qa-with-claudius-sokenu-on-
where-elsefriday.
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3. A Call For Greater Restraint From the 
Industry Itself
While eye-popping pre-enforcement action professional fees 
and expenses are welcomed by FCPA Inc., the industry needs to 
exhibit greater restraint in investigating instances of FCPA 
scrutiny. In this regard, a welcome development from 2013 was 
various industry participants calling attention to certain excesses 
associated with FCPA scrutiny.
Citing, among other examples Wal-Mart’s pre-enforcement 
action investigative fees and expenses, Homer Moyer (a dean of 
the FCPA bar) noted that “such reports raise the question 
whether the cost of FCPA investigations should become an issue 
for companies’ boards of directors.”153 Likewise, FCPA 
practitioner David Simon stated:
While I understand that each case is different and that it is 
often necessary for investigating counsel to respond to outside 
forces that drive up costs, some of the eye-popping numbers 
can’t help but make one question the FCPA 
investigation/compliance value proposition. This dynamic is 
especially troubling because, I fear, it drives the perception 
among many smaller and mid-sized companies that anti-
bribery compliance is simply out of reach financially.154
Both practitioners offered sound, practical advice for 
containing excessive pre-enforcement professional fees and 
expenses including the following:
153. Costs of FCPA Investigations – A Board Issue?, FCPA PROFESSOR
(Dec. 9, 2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/costs-of-fcpa-investigations-a-
board-issue.
154. Can We Bring Quality FCPA Compliance and Investigative 
Services to the Underserved Middle Market?, FCPA PROFESSOR (May 21, 
2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/can-we-bring-quality-fcpa-compliance-
and-investigative-services-to-the-underserved-middle-market.
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x Retain an efficient law firm as a firm with “limited 
[FCPA] experience may innocently over-staff, over-
investigate, and charge for steep learning curves;”
x Be cautious when hiring forensic accounts as they often 
“come in teams” and can “sometimes [be] unnecessary” 
because “some payment schemes, once exposed, can readily 
be understood and remediated without a separate forensics 
teams, or with a small one;” 
x Know when to stop because a credible FCPA investigation 
“may not require turning over every proverbial rock;”
x Give strong but practical compliance advice and not allow 
“perfect [to be] the enemy of the good;” 
x Disaggregate services in an internal investigation because 
“it is not necessary to have high-priced lawyers conduct every 
aspect of every investigation”155
The above industry calls for greater restraint may not be well-
received in some FCPA Inc. circles, but they were nevertheless a 
welcome and needed development in 2013.
III. OTHER TOP FCPA OR RELATED DEVELOPMENTS FROM 2013
Part III of this article highlights other top FCPA or related 
developments from 2013 and uses these developments to 
spotlight the following issues: (i) certain alarming enforcement 
actions and why anyone who values the rule of law should be 
alarmed by these actions; (ii) actual judicial scrutiny of FCPA 
enforcement agency theories as well as how non-FCPA legal 
developments should cause pause as to certain FCPA 
enforcement theories; (iii) FCPA enforcement agency speeches 
and policy positions; and (iv) certain uncomfortable truths and 
double standards regarding the U.S. fight against bribery and 
corruption.
155. Id.; See also Friday Roundup, supra note 152. 
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A. Alarming Enforcement Actions
Given the extensive use of NPAs, DPAs and administrative 
settlements in the FCPA context, few enforcement theories are 
ever subject to any meaningful judicial scrutiny. Yet just because 
such resolution vehicles are used, it remains incumbent upon the 
enforcement agencies to plead or describe facts to establish 
every element of the FCPA violation at issue.
Indeed, like all statutes, the FCPA has specific elements that 
must be met in order for there to be a violation. Moreover, 
general black-letter legal principles such as regard for the 
corporate form and its limited liability are also relevant to FCPA 
enforcement. However, with increasing frequency in this new era 
of FCPA enforcement, it appears that the DOJ and SEC have 
transformed FCPA enforcement into a free-for-all in which any 
conduct the enforcement agencies find objectionable is fair game 
to extract a multi-million dollar settlement from a risk-averse 
corporation.
This section spotlights four such enforcement actions from 
2013 and analyzes actual legal authority relevant to these 
enforcement actions. Although such an exercise seems old-
fashioned in this new era of FCPA enforcement, the rule of law 
demands such an analysis. Before highlighting the details of 
these enforcement actions, a brief overview of FCPA legal 
authority relevant to the enforcement theories in these actions is 
set forth below.
1. Anti-Bribery Provisions
Corruptly
As noted in the FCPA’s legislative history, “the word 
‘corruptly’ connotes an evil motive or purpose.”156
156. H.R. Rep. No. 95-640, sec. 2, at 4 (1977).
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“Obtain or Retain Business”
The FCPA states that a payment to a foreign official must be 
“in order to assist … in obtaining or retaining business for or 
with, or directing business to, any person.”157 Although in the 
FCPA Guidance the enforcement agencies, consistent with its 
prior enforcement theories, literally re-wrote the FCPA’s text to 
include payments made to “foreign officials” to secure “any 
improper advantage,” the notion that the anti-bribery provisions 
cover payments to “foreign officials” to secure “any improper 
advantage” has been rejected by courts. For instance, in U.S. v. 
Kay, the Fifth Circuit specifically rejected the DOJ’s broad 
interpretation of the “obtain or retain business” element and 
stated:
When Congress amended the language of the FCPA … rather 
than inserting ‘any improper advantage’ immediately 
following ‘obtaining or retaining business’ within the business 
nexus requirement (as does the [OECD] Convention), it chose 
to add the ‘improper advantage’ provision to the original list 
of abuses of discretion in consideration for bribes that the 
statute proscribes.158
The Kay court did conclude that payments outside the context 
of foreign government procurement “could” violate the FCPA, 
but only if the payments were intended to lower a company’s 
cost of doing business enough to assist the company in 
“obtaining or retaining” business. Specifically, the court stated:
[I]f the government is correct that anytime operating costs are 
reduced the beneficiary of such advantage is assisted in getting 
or keeping business, the FCPA’s language that expresses the 
necessary element of assisting i[n] obtaining . . . business 
157. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2010).
158. United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 754 (5th Cir. 2004).
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would be unnecessary, and thus surplusage – a conclusion that 
we are forbidden to reach.159
Facilitating Payments
Even if all of the substantive elements of the FCPA’s anti-
bribery provisions are met, the final step in analyzing the 
FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions is determining whether the 
FCPA’s facilitating payment exception applies.
The FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions “shall not apply to any 
facilitating or expediting payment to a foreign official … the 
purpose of which is to expedite or to secure the performance of a 
routine governmental action by a foreign official.”160 In a case of 
first impression in an FCPA enforcement action in 2012, a court 
rejected the SEC’s position that a defendant had the burden of 
pleading the inapplicability of the exception.161 Rather, the court 
concluded that the enforcement agency “must bear the burden of 
negating the ‘facilitating’ payments exception” and that the 
“exception is best understood as a threshold requirement to 
pleading that a defendant acted ‘corruptly.’”162
2. Internal Controls Provisions
As to the FCPA’s internal controls provisions, while it again 
may seem old-fashioned, the rule of law likewise demands an 
analysis of actual legal authority. The internal controls 
provisions are specifically qualified through concepts of 
reasonableness and good faith.163 This statutory standard is 
consistent with Congressional intent in enacting the provisions 
and relevant legislative history states:
While management should observe every reasonable prudence 
in satisfying the objectives called for [in the books and records 
159. Id. at 760.
160. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b).
161. SEC. v. Jackson, 908 F.Supp. 2d 834, 869 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
162. Id. at 857.
163. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (2012).
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and internal controls provisions] … management must 
necessarily estimate and evaluate the cost/benefit relationships 
of the steps to be taken in fulfillment of its responsibilities . . . 
. The size of the business, diversity of operations, degree of 
centralization of financial and operating management, amount 
of contact by top management with day-to-day operations, and 
numerous other circumstances are factors which management 
must consider in establishing and maintaining an internal 
accounting controls system.164
Judicial decisions are also another form of actual legal 
authority concerning the internal control provisions, and the only 
judicial decision to directly address the substance of the internal 
controls provisions states, in pertinent part, as follows:
The definition of accounting controls does comprehend 
reasonable, but not absolute, assurances that the objectives 
expressed in it will be accomplished by the system. The 
concept of ‘reasonable assurances’ contained in [the internal 
control provisions] recognizes that the costs of internal 
controls should not exceed the benefits expected to be derived. 
It does not appear that either the SEC or Congress, which 
adopted the SEC’s recommendations, intended that the statute 
should require that each affected issuer install a fail-safe 
accounting control system at all costs. It appears that Congress 
was fully cognizant of the cost-effective considerations which 
confront companies as they consider the institution of 
accounting controls and of the subjective elements which may 
lead reasonable individuals to arrive at different conclusions. 
Congress has demanded only that judgment be exercised in 
applying the standard of reasonableness.165
In addition, various courts have held – in the context of civil 
derivative actions in which shareholders seek to hold company 
directors liable for breach of fiduciary duties due to the 
company’s alleged FCPA violations – that just because improper 
164. S. Rep. NO. 95-114 at 5 (1977).
165. SEC v. World-Wide Coin Invs., 567 F. Supp. 724, 751 (N.D. Ga. 
1983).
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conduct allegedly occurred somewhere within a corporate 
hierarchy does not mean that internal controls must have been 
deficient.166
While lacking the status of legal authority, it is nevertheless 
notable that the SEC’s most extensive guidance on the internal 
controls provisions state, in pertinent part, as follows:
The Act does not mandate any particular kind of internal 
controls system. The test is whether a system, taken as a 
whole, reasonably meets the statute’s specified objectives. 
‘Reasonableness,’ a familiar legal concept, depends on an 
evaluation of all the facts and circumstances.
[…]
Private sector decisions implementing these statutory 
objectives are business decisions. And, reasonable business 
decisions should be afforded deference. This means that the 
issuer need not always select the best or the most effective 
control measure. However, the one selected must be 
reasonable under all the circumstances.
[…]
The accounting provisions principal objective is to reaching 
knowing or reckless conduct.
[…]
Inherent in this concept [of reasonableness] is a toleration of 
deviations from the absolute. One measure of the 
reasonableness of a system relates to whether the expected 
benefits from improving it would be significantly greater than 
the anticipated costs of doing so. Thousands of dollars 
ordinarily should not be spent conserving hundreds. Further, 
not every procedure which may be individually cost-justifiable 
166. See Midwestern Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. Baker Huges 
Inc., No. H-08-1809, 2009 WL 6799492 (S.D. Tex. May 7, 2009); Freuler v. 
Parker, 803 F. Supp. 2d 630 (S.D. Tex. 2011).
1028 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 22.3
need be implemented; the Act allows a range of reasonable 
judgments.
[…]
The test of a company’s internal control system is not whether 
occasional failings can occur. Those will happen in the most 
ideally managed company. But, an adequate system of internal 
controls means that, when such breaches do arise, they will be 
isolated rather than systemic, and they will be subject to a 
reasonable likelihood of being uncovered in a timely manner 
and then remedied promptly. Barring, of course, the 
participation or complicity of senior company officials in the 
deed, when discovery and correction expeditiously follow, no 
failing in the company’s internal accounting system would 
have existed. To the contrary, routine discovery and correction 
would evidence its effectiveness.167
It is against this backdrop that all FCPA enforcement action 
should be judged including the following corporate enforcement 
actions from 2013: ADM, Stryker and Philips Electronics.
3. ADM
The ADM enforcement action (the 17th largest settlement 
amount in FCPA history) involved a $17.8 million DOJ 
enforcement action and a $36.5 million SEC enforcement action 
focused on value-added tax (VAT) refunds in Ukraine. In the 
words of the DOJ, “the Ukrainian government did not have the 
money to pay [VAT] refunds that it owed to companies that sold 
Ukrainian goods outside of Ukraine.”168 Likewise, the SEC 
acknowledged that “the Ukrainian government determined to 
delay paying the VAT refunds owed or did not make any refund 
167. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977: Statement of Policy, SEC 
Release No. 34-17500 (Jan. 29, 1981).
168. Information at 1, United States v. Alfred C. Toepfer International 
Ltd., No. 13-20062, (C.D. Ill. Dec. 23, 2013), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/alfred-c-toepfer-international/
acti-information.pdf.
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payments at all.”169 Accordingly, Alfred C. Toepfer, 
International (Ukraine) Ltd. (“ACTI Ukraine”), an indirectly 
owned subsidiary of ADM whose operations “were largely 
independent from ADM’s operations,” accumulated tens of 
millions in receivables for VAT refunds.
Before detailing the DOJ and SEC’s allegations how ACTI 
Ukraine sought to obtain the VAT refunds it was owed by the 
Ukrainian government, it is important to understand how the 
Ukraine government’s retention of VAT refunds were a 
“lucrative aspect of Ukraine’s endemic corruption.”170
For instance, a report from the Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative noted that “delays in the payment of VAT 
refunds to exporters [has] been a problem” and that “some 
companies received reduced refunds or were refused refunds for 
arbitrary reasons.”171 The report specifically noted that “U.S. 
grain traders in particular claim several hundred million dollars 
in VAT arrears” and that “the [Ukraine State Tax 
Administration] instituted an automated system for VAT 
refunds, but nontransparent criteria have prevented most firms 
from participating in the system and receiving their refunds.”172
Likewise, the Agribusiness Working Group of the U.S. –
Ukraine Business Council in Washington, D.C., noted:
VAT tax refunds due [to] businesses are presently paid by the 
government of Ukraine with lag times that range from months 
to over a year, and in some cases with an ultimate bureaucratic 
denial of valid refund claims. The size of the refunds due 
private businesses and the time it takes to pay them in Ukraine 
169. Complaint at 4-5, SEC v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., No. 2:13-
cv-2279 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints
/2013/comp-pr2013-271.pdf.
170. Mark Rachkevych, US Prosecutors Expose Ukraine’s Corruption 
in VAT-refund Payments, KYIV POST (Dec. 26, 2013, 4:35 PM), 
http://www.kyivpost.com/content/business/us-prosecutors-expose-ukraines-
corruption-in-vat-refund-payments-2-334308.html.
171. Ukraine Report, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 6, 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Ukraine.pdf.
172. Id.
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… represents the worst record in the world by any 
government.173
4. ACTI Ukraine Enforcement Action
It is against this relevant backdrop that the alleged conduct at 
issue in the ADM enforcement action occurred. According to the 
DOJ, “in order to obtain VAT refunds from the Ukrainian 
government, ACTI Ukraine, with the help of its affiliate, Alfred 
C. Toepfer International G.m.b.H. (“ACTI Hamburg”) [likewise 
an indirect subsidiary of ADM], paid third party vendors to pass 
on nearly all of that money as bribes to government officials […] 
in exchange for those officials’ assistance in obtaining VAT 
refunds for and on behalf of ACTI-Ukraine.”
The DOJ alleged that the “VAT refunds gave ACTI Ukraine a 
business advantage resulting in a benefit to ACTI Ukraine and 
ACTI Hamburg of roughly $41 million.” The SEC alleged that 
the payments allowed ACTI Ukraine to obtain the “VAT refunds 
earlier than they otherwise would have” and that “getting these 
VAT refunds earlier – before Ukraine endured a brief period of 
hyperinflation – gave ACTI Ukraine a business advantage 
resulting in a benefit to ADM of roughly $33 million.”
Based on these allegations, the DOJ charged ACTI Ukraine 
with conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.
As highlighted above, the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions of 
course have specific elements including corrupt intent and obtain 
or retain business. Moreover, even if these statutory elements 
have been met, the DOJ has the burden of rebutting the FCPA’s 
facilitation payments exception. It is difficult to see how the 
corrupt intent element was met in the ATCI Ukraine 
enforcement action given that the DOJ itself alleged that VAT 
refunds were “owed” to ADM entities. Equally problematic is 
application of the FCPA’s required “obtain or retain business” 
element to the ATCI Ukraine criminal information as it is
173. VAT Refunding Remains a Major Issue, US-UKRAINE BUS.
COUNCIL (Feb. 25, 2008), http://www.usubc.org/keyissues/vat_refunding
022508.php.
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difficult to see how this required element would have been met 
had the DOJ been put to its burden of proof given that the DOJ 
itself alleged that VAT refunds were “owed” to ADM entities.
Indeed, as noted by Philip Urofsky (a former high-ranking DOJ 
FCPA enforcement attorney) “the linkage to obtain or retain 
specific or even general business” in the ADM action seems “so 
tenuous as to be nonexistent.”174
Even if all of the substantive elements of the FCPA’s anti-
bribery provisions were met based on the facts alleged in the 
ATCI Ukraine information, it is further difficult to see how the 
DOJ would have satisfied its pleading burden under the 
facilitating payments exception given that the DOJ itself alleged 
that VAT refunds were “owed” to ADM entities. As Richard 
Grime (a former high-ranking SEC FCPA enforcement attorney) 
observed prior to the ADM action: “the fact that the FCPA’s 
twin enforcement agencies have treated certain payments as 
prohibited despite their possible categorization as facilitating 
payments does not mean that a federal court would agree.”175
In short, it is difficult to square existing legal authority 
regarding the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions with the facts 
alleged in the ATCI Ukraine information and anyone who values 
the rule of law should be alarmed by it.
5. ADM Enforcement Action
In addition to the ACTI Ukraine criminal information and 
plea agreement, the DOJ also entered into an NPA with ADM 
174. SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, FCPA DIGEST: RECENT TRENDS IN 
PATTERNS IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 13 
(2014) [hereinafter Enforcement of the FCPA], available at
http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/Services/FCPA/2014/FCPADigestTP
FCPA010614.pdf.
175. Richard Grime and Sara Zdeb, “The Illusory Facilitating Payments 
Exception: Risks Posed By Ongoing FCPA Enforcement Actions And The 
U.K. Bribery Act,” in THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 2011: Coping 
With Heightened Enforcement Risks (PLI 2011).
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based principally on the same Ukraine allegations.176 In addition, 
the SEC brought a settled civil complaint against ADM based on 
the same Ukraine allegations. The SEC complaint charged ADM 
with civil violations of the FCPA’s books and records and 
internal controls provisions. Because the DOJ’s resolution 
vehicle was a NPA, it did not charge any technical violations of 
law, but it does reference how the DOJ “will not criminally 
prosecute ADM … for any crimes … related to violations of the 
internal controls provisions of the FCPA and arising from or 
related to improper payments by the Company’s subsidiaries, 
affiliates, or joint ventures.”
The principal basis for ADM’s alleged liability is that ADM 
failed to prevent alleged bribes at its indirect subsidiaries.
With the typical after-the-fact perfect hindsight the SEC tends 
to view conduct that took place many years ago, the SEC alleged 
that “ACTI’s conduct went unchecked by ADM” and that 
“ADM’s anti-bribery compliance controls in existence at the 
time were insufficient in that they did not deter and detect these 
payments.” The SEC further stated that “ADM’s anti-corruption 
policies and procedures relating to ACTI were decentralized and 
did not prevent improper payments by ACTI to third-party 
vendors in the Ukraine or ensure that these transactions were 
properly recorded by ACTI.” The SEC’s release also states that 
ADM failed “to prevent illicit payments made by foreign 
subsidiaries to Ukrainian government officials in violation of the 
FCPA.” Likewise, the DOJ asserted that ADM “failed to 
implement sufficient policies and procedures to prevent the bribe 
payments.”
Although the ADM action was certainly not the first FCPA 
enforcement action to assert a standard akin to issuer strict 
liability for the alleged activities of subsidiaries, the enforcement 
176. The NPA’s Statement of Facts also contain additional allegations 
regarding “Conduct Relating to Venezuela” including how a “high level 
executive” of an ADM joint venture circumvented ADM’s internal controls in 
making alleged payments to alleged Venezuela officials as well as engaging in 
self-dealing. Given the terms of the NPA, this alleged Venezuela conduct did 
not factor into $17.8 million DOJ settlement amount.
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agencies’ reference to a “failure to prevent” standard is alarming 
because such a standard does not even exist in the FCPA and is 
inconsistent with actual legal authority. Moreover, such a 
standard is inconsistent with even enforcement agency guidance 
relevant to the internal controls provisions.
While there is reference in the ADM enforcement actions to 
certain ADM tax professionals having knowledge of ATCI 
Ukraine’s VAT refund struggles, this is hardly surprising and 
does not suggest participation or complicity of senior company 
officials in the alleged bribe payments. Indeed, the allegations 
suggest that ADM executives frequently questioned ACTI 
Ukraine and ACTI Hamburg about the VAT refunds and the 
SEC alleged that ACTI Hamburg and ACTI Ukraine “structured 
payments to avoid detection, and created fictitious insurance 
contracts to hide from ADM and others the payments to third-
parties to secure VAT refunds in Ukraine.”
Wholly apart from the internal controls theory of enforcement 
in the ADM enforcement action, it is also alarming that the 
SEC’s $36.4 million settlement amount consisted entirely of 
disgorgement and prejudgment interest, even though the SEC did 
not charge ADM with violating the FCPA’s anti-bribery 
provisions. This is yet another example of what has been called 
no-charged bribery disgorgement and one of the more vocal 
critics of this typical SEC resolution feature in corporate FCPA 
enforcement actions has been Paul Berger (a former Associate 
Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement) who stated:
Settlements invoking disgorgement but charging no primary 
anti-bribery violations push the law’s boundaries, as 
disgorgement is predicated on the common-sense notion that 
an actual, jurisdictionally-cognizable bribe was paid to 
procure the revenue identified by the SEC in its complaint . . . 
. ‘No-charged bribery disgorgement’ settlements appear 
designed to inflict punishment rather than achieve the goals of 
equity . . . . Given the bedrock principle that a court’s 
equitable power to order such disgorgement goes only as far 
as the scope of the violation, it is difficult to determine how a 
court could lawfully allow disgorgement of profits for 
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uncharged violations without the remedy crossing the line into 
‘punishment’ for the violations actually charged.177
The SEC claims that its FCPA enforcement program is 
designed, in part, to “protect investors.”178 It is difficult to see 
how this mission was accomplished in the ADM enforcement 
action by requiring ADM (or more accurately its shareholders) to 
disgorge approximately $36 million in money that it was 
legitimately owed in VAT refunds by the Ukraine government. 
In this regard, a 2010 Forbes article titled “The Bribery Racket” 
is instructive in that it observed that “companies can find 
themselves getting extorted in foreign lands, only to get extorted 
again by Washington.”179
6. Stryker
The SEC’s “failure to prevent” standard was also the basis of 
a $13.2 million FCPA enforcement action against Stryker 
Corporation in 2013. The conduct at issue focused on various 
Stryker subsidiaries and alleged payments by the subsidiaries to 
various alleged government employees, including public health 
care professionals in Mexico, Poland, Romania, Argentina, and 
Greece.180 Stryker agreed to resolve the enforcement action via 
an administrative cease and desist order in which the company 
neither admitted nor denied the SEC’s allegations. The SEC’s 
177. Debevoise & Plimpton, LLP, Do FCPA Remedies Follow FCPA 
Wrongs? “Disgorgement” in Internal Controls and Books and Records Cases, 
3.1 FCPA UPDATE 1, 1-4 (2011).
178. See CRIMINAL DIV. OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE & THE 
ENFORCEMENT DIV. OF THE U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FCPA: A RESOURCE 
GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-resource-guide.pdf.
179. Nathan Vardi, The Bribery Racket, FORBES (June 7, 2010),
available at http://www.forbes.com/global/2010/0607/companies-payoffs-
washington-extortion-mendelsohn-bribery-racket.html.
180. Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Stryker 
Corporation With FCPA Violations (Oct. 24, 2013), available at
http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370540044262.
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order contains no allegation as to Stryker itself other than the 
following.
The financial results of all of the Stryker subsidiaries 
discussed herein were consolidated into Stryker’s financial 
statements. Stryker’s foreign subsidiaries were organized in a 
decentralized, country-based structure, wherein a manager of a 
particular country’s operations had primary responsibility for 
all business within a given country. During the relevant 
period, each of Stryker’s foreign subsidiaries operated 
pursuant to individual policies and directives implemented by 
country or regional management. Stryker had corporate 
policies addressing anti-corruption, but these policies were 
inadequate and insufficiently implemented on the regional and 
country level.181
Based on the above findings, the SEC found that Stryker 
violated the FCPA’s books and records and internal controls 
provisions. Similar to the ADM enforcement action discussed 
above, the SEC settlement required Stryker to pay approximately 
$9.7 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest even 
though there was no finding or charging of FCPA’s anti-bribery 
violations. 
7. Philips
Also in 2013, Netherlands-based Philips Electronics, a 
company with shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange, 
agreed to pay approximately $4.5 million to resolve an FCPA 
enforcement action.182 The administrative cease and desist order 
found that Philips’s Polish subsidiary made improper payments 
to alleged public officials of Polish healthcare facilities to 
increase the likelihood that public tenders for the sale of medical 
equipment would be awarded to the subsidiary.183 There is no 
181. Stryker Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 70751 (Oct. 24, 2013).
182. Koninklijke Philips Elec. N.V., Exchange Act Release No. 69327, 
Accounting & Auditing Release No. 2451 (Apr. 5, 2013).
183. Id. at 2.
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allegation or suggestion in the SEC’s order of Philips’s 
knowledge or approval of the alleged improper payments. In 
fact, the SEC found that certain of the alleged improper 
payments “were supported by false documentation created by 
Philips Poland employees and/or third parties.”
Nevertheless, the SEC found that Philips violated the FCPA’s 
books and records and internal control provisions. The SEC’s 
order stated:
Philips’s internal controls failed to detect or prevent the 
improper payments and false recordings of those transactions 
during that time. As a result, Philips failed to devise and 
maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to 
provide reasonable assurances that transactions were properly 
recorded by Philips in its books and records. Philips also failed 
to implement an FCPA compliance and training program 
commensurate with the extent of its international operations. 
Accordingly, Philips violated [the internal control 
provisions].184
Similar to the above ADM and Stryker enforcement actions, 
the SEC settlement required Philips to pay approximately $4.5 
million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest even though 
there was no finding or charging of FCPA anti-bribery 
violations.
Legal authority—and even enforcement agency guidance—
regarding the FCPA’s internal control provisions stand for the 
following: internal controls are not held to a standard of absolute 
assurances, inherent in the concept of reasonableness is a 
toleration of deviations from the absolute, and occasional 
failings may occur in even the most ideally managed company. It 
is difficult to square this authority and information with the facts 
alleged in the ADM, Stryker, and Philips enforcement actions, 
and anyone who values the rule of law should be alarmed by it.
Moreover, general black-letter legal principles such as regard 
for the corporate form and its limited liability are also relevant to 
184. Id.
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FCPA enforcement actions. In this regard, the 2013 FCPA 
enforcement action against RLC was also alarming in that the 
enforcement agencies seemingly advanced a theory that legal 
liability can hop, skip, and jump around a multinational company 
in the absence of an “alter ego” / “veil piercing” analysis.
8. RLC
As previously discussed in Section IIA, in 2013 RLC agreed 
to resolve DOJ and SEC enforcement actions by paying 
approximately $1.6 million via NPAs – the first instance in 
FCPA history involving both a DOJ and SEC NPA as noted 
above.
The enforcement action can be summarized as follows:
RLC has approximately 95 foreign subsidiaries. One 
subsidiary, PRL S.R.L, an indirectly wholly-owned subsidiary 
of RLC headquartered and incorporated in Argentina, had a 
General Manager who conspired with a customs clearance 
agency to make improper payments to assist in improperly 
obtaining paperwork necessary for goods to clear customs, to 
permit clearance of items without the necessary paperwork, to 
permit the clearance of prohibited items, and to avoid 
inspection.185
There is no allegation or suggestion that RLC was aware of, 
or participated in, the alleged conduct. The resolution documents 
merely say that “in the five years that General Manager A, Agent 
1, and others at PRL S.R.L carried out this scheme, RLC did not 
have an anti-corruption program and did not provide any anti-
corruption training or oversight with respect to PRL S.R.L.”186
185. Ralph Lauren Resolves FCPA Enforcement Action Via Double 
NPAs Based On Subsidiary Conduct in Argentina, FCPA PROFESSOR (April 23, 
2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/ralph-lauren-resolves-fcpa-enforcement-
action-via-double-npas-based-on-subsidiary-conduct-in-argentina. 
186. Id. Letter from U.S. Dep’t. of Justice to Thomas A. Hanusik (April 
22, 2013), attachment A ¶ 15 [hereinafter Hanusik Letter]. available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1037038/000095014213000973/eh130
1038 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 22.3
The simplistic inference would seem to be that General Manager 
A would not have engaged in the improper conduct had RLC had 
an anti-corruption program and provided anti-corruption 
training. However, this notion would seem to be undermined by 
reference to RLC’s worldwide FCPA compliance review which 
“identified no further violations.”187
Notwithstanding the fact that there was no allegation or 
suggestion that RLC was aware of, or participated in, the alleged 
improper conduct, the DOJ NPA stated that the DOJ “will not 
criminally prosecute RLC . . . related to violations of the anti-
bribery provisions of the FCPA . . . arising from and related to 
improper payments in Argentina . . . .”188 Likewise, the SEC 
NPA release stated that the SEC “has determined not to charge 
Ralph Lauren Corporation with violations of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act.”189
Respondeat superior corporate liability is broad, but not as 
broad as advanced by the DOJ in the RLC enforcement action.
Absent an “alter ego” / “piercing the veil” analysis, legal liability 
of any kind does not ordinary hop, skip, and jump around a 
multinational enterprise as the DOJ or SEC see fit.
Indeed, in an article titled, “The Ralph Lauren FCPA Case: 
Are There Any Limits to Parent Corporation Liability?,” Philip 
Urofsky (a former high-ranking DOJ FCPA enforcement 
attorney) and his co-author state, in pertinent part:
The facts of the case . . . point to the steady entrenchment of a 
more ominous prosecution theory: an approach that appears to 
0614_ex9902.htm. Id.
187. Id. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm., Ralph Lauren Corporation Non-
Prosecution Agreement, Exhibit A ¶ 12, available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2013/2013-65-npa.pdf. Id.
188. Id. Hanusik Letter, supra note 186, at 1. Id.
189. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces Non-
Prosecution Agreement With Ralph Lauren Corporation Involving FCPA 
Misconduct, U.S. Exchange and Securities Commission (April 22, 2013) (on 
file with the U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171514780#
.UxDoQIW5G9Q.
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approximate strict criminal and civil liability of parent 
corporations for their subsidiaries’ corrupt acts. Although this 
disregard of corporate structures has been hinted at in previous 
SEC matters--and the theoretical underpinnings discussed in 
last year’s DOJ/SEC Resource Guide--the RLC case puts both 
agencies firmly in the camp of this aggressive and 
unprecedented expansion of corporate liability.
This approach, however, fails to honor the corporate form and 
the black-letter rule that to ‘pierce the corporate veil’ the 
government and other litigants must show that the parent 
operated the subsidiary as an alter ego, and itself paid no 
attention to the corporate form. Moreover, it is contrary to the 
language of the [FCPA’s] original history.190
In conclusion, the article stated:
It is disquieting [that in the RLC case] the DOJ appears to 
have jumped on the charge-the-parent bandwagon, bringing a 
bribery case against a parent without alleging any involvement 
by the parent in those violations. One can only speculate that it 
did so because it had no jurisdiction over the foreign 
subsidiary itself, given that it also did not allege any act by the 
subsidiary in U.S. territory. 
However, as always, the maxim that bad facts make bad law 
applies, and evidentiary weaknesses cannot excuse the 
distortion of the statute’s previously clear and reasonable 
allocation of responsibility.191
Urofsky further noted as to the RLC enforcement action as 
follows.
The fact that the Ralph Lauren case was resolved through an 
NPA rather than a DPA (or a guilty plea) does not excuse this 
190. Philip Urofsky, The Ralph Lauren FCPA Case: Are there any 
Limits to Parent Corporation Liability?, BLOOMBERG LAW (Mar. 3, 2014, 11:21 
AM), http://about.bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-contributions/the-ralph-
lauren-fcpa-case-are-there-any-limits-to-parent-corporation-liability/.
191. Id. 
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approach—when the DOJ announces it will not prosecute but 
requires the company to admit to facts establishing a criminal 
violation of the law, it is stating, as a fact, that the company 
committed a crime. In such case, it is obligated to 
demonstrate, through the pleadings, in whatever form they are 
presented, that it could, in fact, prove each and every element 
of the offense.192
In short, the theory of liability advanced by the DOJ in the 
RLC enforcement action would be inconceivable in other areas 
of law such as contract liability or tort liability for the simple 
reason that absent an “alter ego” / “piercing the veil” analysis, 
legal liability of any kind does not ordinary hop, skip, and jump 
around a multinational enterprise.
However, in this new era of FCPA enforcement any theory of 
liability, no matter how dubious, seems to be fair game for the 
DOJ or SEC to extract a multi-million dollar settlement from a 
risk-averse corporation.
So why if the ADM, Stryker, Philips, and RLC enforcement 
actions were based on dubious theories of liability did the 
companies resolve alleged FCPA scrutiny for approximately $75 
million in combined fines and penalties?
As highlighted in “The Façade of FCPA Enforcement,”
because of the “carrots” and “sticks” relevant to resolving a 
government enforcement action, companies under FCPA
scrutiny are often nudged to accept resolution vehicles 
notwithstanding the enforcement agencies’ dubious enforcement 
theories or the existence of valid and legitimate defenses.193
Settlement of a corporate FCPA enforcement action does not 
necessarily reflect the triumph of one party’s legal position, but 
rather it reflects a risk-based decision primarily grounded in 
issues other than facts or the law.
Consider the following – using the ADM enforcement action 
as an example. If ADM wanted to put the enforcement agencies 
to their burdens of proof, it would have required the company to 
192. Enforcement of the FCPA, supra note 174, at 12.
193. See The Façade, supra note *.
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first be criminally indicted by the DOJ or face long protracted 
civil litigation with the SEC. If either route were chosen, ADM’s 
stock price would surely have fallen. Even if the drop were small 
– say 3% and even if short-lived – the hit to ADM’s market 
capitalization, an important data point for investors and an 
important metric by which business manager performance is 
judged, would have been approximately $850 million. Compared 
to this figure, resolving an FCPA enforcement action for 
approximately $56 million seems like a rationale corporate 
decision in the best interest of shareholders.
Yet what are the long-term effects of ADM’s decision and 
those of other similarly situated companies, not just to the 
companies, but other business organizations subject to 
increasingly aggressive FCPA enforcement theories while trying 
to compete in good faith in the global marketplace where – in the 
words of Joseph Covington (the DOJ’s former FCPA Unit chief) 
– they “can’t help but confront corrupt officials – as customers, 
regulator and adjudicators – and confront them often”?194
As Neil Eggleston, a former DOJ prosecutor, stated:
Most [corporate FCPA enforcement actions] have been 
settled. When that occurs, defendants have little incentive to 
refuse to agree to novel Department of Justice theories of 
prosecution or jurisdiction, so long as the penalty is 
acceptable. The department then cites its prior settlement as 
precedent when settling later ones. But no court approved the 
earlier settlement, and the prior settlement should have no 
precedential value in favor of the DOJ in later settlements.195
Likewise, former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales rightly 
noted:
194. Former DOJ FCPA Chief Supports FCPA Compliance Defense,
FCPA PROFESSOR (Oct. 4, 2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/former-doj-
fepa-chef-supports-fepa-compliance-defense.
195. Friday Roundup, FCPA PROFESSOR (Mar. 1, 2013), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/friday-roundup-69.
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In an ironic twist, the more that American companies elect to 
settle and not force the DOJ to defend its aggressive 
interpretation of the [FCPA], the more aggressive DOJ has 
become in its interpretation of the law and its prosecution 
decisions.196
In this regard, the alarming enforcement actions highlighted 
above should serve as a reminder that the business community is, 
at least in part, responsible for the current aggressive FCPA 
enforcement climate. Indeed, as Homer Moyer (a dean of the 
FCPA bar) observed:
One reality is the enforcement agencies’ [FCPA] views on 
issues and enforcement policies, positions on which they are 
rarely challenged in court. The other is what knowledgeable 
counsel believe the government could sustain in court, should 
their interpretations or positions be challenged. The two may 
not be the same. The operative rules of the game are the 
agencies’ views unless a company is prepared to go to court or 
to mount a serious challenge within the agencies.197
There are many who cheer more FCPA enforcement 
regardless of the enforcement theories. For these cheerleaders, 
there is much to cheer in the ADM, Stryker, Philips, and RCL 
enforcement actions and the combined $75 million in settlement 
amounts will be blindly inserted into FCPA enforcement 
statistics and trotted out at every available opportunity to 
demonstrate how the U.S. is the leader in anti-bribery 
enforcement.
Yet for those who value the rule of law, there is much to 
lament in these enforcement actions. In 2010, the DOJ’s 
196. Add Alberto Gonzalez To The List Of Former High-Ranking DOJ 
Officials Who Support An FCPA Compliance Defense, FCPA PROFESSOR (Sept. 
11, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/add-alberto-gonzalez-to-the-list-of-
former-high-ranking-doj-officials-who-support-an-fcpa-compliance-defense.
197. Homer E Moyer, Jr. et al., Becoming an FCPA-Savvy Director,
NYSE GOVERNANCE SERVICES CORPORATE BOARD MEMBER (Jan. 03, 2014), 
https://www.boardmember.com/Article_DetailsDetailsDetailsPrintDetails.aspx
?id=10857.
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Assistant Attorney General (“AAG”) delivered a speech before 
the Council on Foreign Relations titled “International Criminal 
Law Enforcement: Rule of Law, Anti-Corruption and 
Beyond.”198 As suggested by the title of the speech, the AAG 
spoke about FCPA enforcement and how the increase in FCPA 
enforcement was consistent with the U.S.’s global approach to 
promote the rule of law. The AAG began his speech by asking 
two rhetorical questions: is the rule of law “more than [just] a 
catch phrase” and “does [the rule of law] have any real 
meaning.”199
In light of the above enforcement actions, these are great 
questions.
B. Judicial Scrutiny of Enforcement Theories
This section provides a comprehensive analysis of judicial 
scrutiny of FCPA enforcement theories in 2013 as well as how 
non-FCPA legal developments in 2013 should cause pause as to 
certain FCPA enforcement theories.
1. FCPA Enforcement Theories
As previously highlighted, NPAs and DPAs are the dominant 
resolution vehicle used to resolve corporate FCPA enforcement 
actions. In addition, few corporate FCPA enforcement actions 
result in related enforcement actions against company 
employees. The combined effect of these two dynamics of FCPA 
enforcement means there is little judicial scrutiny regarding the 
FCPA’s provisions.
Yet, in the rare instances in which individuals are prosecuted 
for FCPA offenses by the DOJ or SEC, such defendants – unlike 
198. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney Gen. for the Criminal Div. of 
the U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Address to the Council on Foreign Relations: 
International Criminal Law Enforcement: Rule of Law, Anti-Corruption and 
Beyond (May 4, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/icitap/
pr/2010/05-04-10AAG-breuer-remarks.pdf.
199. Id.
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business organizations – are more likely to put the enforcement 
agencies to its burden of proof as their personal liberty, assets, 
and reputation are at stake. Indeed, without individual FCPA 
defendants there would be no FCPA case law.200 Because certain 
individual defendants have chosen not to take the path of least 
resistance, the contours of FCPA jurisprudence have begun to 
take shape and discussed below are FCPA legal developments 
from 2013 regarding the FCPA’s “foreign official” element as 
well as jurisdictional and statute of limitations issues.
2. “Foreign Official” Oral Argument
In this new era of FCPA enforcement, a prominent 
enforcement agency theory has been that employees of alleged 
state-owned or state-controlled enterprises (SOEs) are “foreign 
officials” under the FCPA and thus occupy a status equal to 
traditional bona fide government officials such as a president or 
prime minister. As highlighted in Table X below, 5 of the 9 
corporate FCPA enforcement actions in 2013 (56%) involved, in 
whole or in part, employees of SOEs ranging from oil and gas 
companies to banks.
200. Without Individual FCPA Defendants, There Would Be No FCPA 
Case Law, FCPA PROFESSOR (July 24, 2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/
without-individual-fcpa-defendants-there-would-be-no-fcpa-case-law.
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Table X
Alleged “Foreign Officials” in 2013 Corporate Enforcement
Actions201
Enforcement 
Action Alleged “Foreign Officials”
ADM
DOJ
Ukrainian government officials in exchange for 
those officials’ assistance in obtaining VAT 
refunds
An employee of Industrias Diana (an oil company 
headquartered in Venezuela that was wholly owned 
by Petroleos de Venezuela, Venezuela’s state-
owned and controlled national oil company)
SEC
Ukrainian government officials in exchange for 
obtaining VAT refunds
Bilfinger
DOJ
Employees of the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation (NNPC), employees of National 
201. From Healthcare Providers to Customs Officials to SOE 
Employees – The “Foreign Officials” of 2013, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 13,
2014), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/from-healthcare-providers-to-customs-
officials-to-soe-employees-the-alleged-foreign-officials-of-2013. As apparent 
from the descriptions, in certain instances the enforcement agencies describe 
the “foreign official” with reasonable specificity; in other instances with 
virtually no specificity. Certain of the enforcement actions in the table 
technically involved only FCPA books and records and internal control 
charges. However, actual charges in most corporate FCPA enforcement actions 
hinge on voluntary disclosure, cooperation, collateral consequences, and other 
non-legal issues. Thus, even if an FCPA enforcement action is resolved without 
formal FCPA anti-bribery charges, the actions remain very much about the 
alleged “foreign officials” involved. Id.
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Petroleum Investment Management Services (a 
subsidiary of NNPC), the dominant political party 
in Nigeria, and an official in the executive branch 
of the Government of Nigeria
Weatherford
DOJ
Employees of Sonangol, a company wholly owned, 
controlled, and managed by the Angolan 
government
Angolan Officials 1, 2, and 3 (described as “high-
level, senior officials of Sonangol” with influence 
over contracts), a “relative of Angolan Official 4 
(described as a “high-level, senior official of 
Angola’s Ministry of Petroleum” with influence 
over contracts entered into by the Angolan 
government), Angolan Official 5 (described as “a 
Sonangol official with decision-making authority 
LQ$QJROD¶V&DELQGDUHJLRQ´$QJRODQ2IILFLDOƍV
ZLIH $QJRODQ 2IILFLDO ƍV GDXJKWHU DQG VRQ-in-
law.”
“Decision makers at the national oil company” in 
the Middle East
SEC
A Sonangol Drilling Manager, Sonangol officials
“Decision makers at the national oil company” in 
the Middle East
Employees of Sonatrach, an Algerian state-owned 
company
Albanian tax auditors
The tax director and two members of Albania’s 
National Petroleum Agency
Stryker SEC
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“Various government employees including public 
health care professionals in Mexico, Poland, 
Romania, Argentina, and Greece”
“Foreign officials employed by a Mexican 
governmental agency responsible for providing 
social security for government employees”
“Foreign official then employed as the director of a 
public hospital in Poland,” “a state-employed 
healthcare professional” in Poland
A person “waiting to be confirmed as chief 
physician” at a public hospital in Romania
“Physicians employed in the public healthcare 
system” of Argentina
“A foreign official who served as a prominent 
professor at the Greek University, and was the 
director of medical clinics at two public hospitals 
affiliated with the Greek University”
Diebold
DOJ
Employees of Bank 1 and Bank 2 described as 
follows. “[The Banks] were controlled and 
approximately 70% owned by the [Chinese 
government] … and were [two] of several state-
owned banks in [China] that together maintained a 
monopoly over the banking system in [China] and 
provided core support for the government’s 
projects and economic goals. The government 
retained a controlling right in [the Banks], 
including appointing or nominating a majority of 
board of directors and top managers at the bank. 
[The Banks] were an ‘instrumentality’ of a foreign 
government [under the FCPA].”
Inferences to employees of banks owned or 
controlled by the government of Indonesia
1048 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 22.3
SEC
Employees of banks owned or controlled by the 
government of China
Employees of banks owned or controlled by the 
government of Indonesia
Total
DOJ
An Iranian Official described as “the Chairman of 
an Iranian engineering company that was more 
than 90% owned by the Government of Iran and 
substantially controlled by the Government of 
Iran” and also described as follows. “The Iranian 
Official was [also] the head of an Iranian 
organization concerned with fuel consumption, 
which was a wholly owned subsidiary of the 
National Iranian Oil Company (“NIOC”), and was 
a government advisor to a high-ranking Iranian 
official.” NIOC is described as a “government-
owned corporation operating under the direction 
and control of the Ministry of Petroleum of Iran.”
SEC
An Iranian Official described as follows. “Between 
1995 and 2004 the Iranian Official was first the 
head of one wholly owned subsidiary of NIOC and 
later the head of another NIOC wholly owned 
subsidiary. The Iranian Official was also a 
government advisor to a high-ranking Iranian 
official.”
Ralph Lauren
DOJ
“Customs and other government officials [in 
Argentina] to assist in improperly obtaining 
paperwork necessary for goods to clear customs, to 
permit clearance of items without the necessary 
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paperwork, to permit the clearance of prohibited 
items, and to avoid inspection”
SEC
“Argentine customs officials to secure the 
importation of RLC’s products into Argentina”
“Argentine government officials to improperly 
secure the importation of RLC’s products into 
Argentina”
Parker Drilling
DOJ
Employees of the Nigerian Customs Service 
(“NCS”)
Employees of the “Panel of Inquiry for the 
Investigation of All Cases of Temporary Import 
Permits Issued Between 1984 to Year 2000 (the 
“TI Panel”) (a board empanelled for the purpose of 
examining certain duties and tariffs that the NCS 
collected or failed to collect; the TI Panel was 
presidentially appointed, operated under the 
auspices of the Nigerian President’s office, and 
possessed the power to issue subpoenas and levy 
fines)”
Employees of “Nigeria’s State Security Service, a 
Nigerian intelligence and law enforcement agency 
that operated as a department within the Nigerian 
government’s executive”
SEC
Employees of the Nigerian Customs Service 
(“NCS”)
Employees of the “Panel of Inquiry for the 
Investigation of All Cases of Temporary Import 
Permits Issued Between 1984 to Year 2000 (the 
“TI Panel”) (a board empanelled for the purpose of 
examining certain duties and tariffs that the NCS 
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collected or failed to collect; the TI Panel was 
presidentially appointed, operated under the 
auspices of the Nigerian President’s office, and 
possessed the power to issue subpoenas and levy 
fines)”
Employees of “Nigeria’s State Security Service, a 
Nigerian intelligence and law enforcement agency 
that operated as a department within the Nigerian 
government’s executive”
Philips
SEC
“Public officials of Polish healthcare facilities”
The prominence of the SOE employee “foreign official” 
theory was not unique to 2013. Rather, it was consistent with 
prior years as 42% of corporate enforcement actions in 2012 
involved, in whole or in part, employees of alleged SOEs; 81% 
of corporate enforcement actions in 2011 involved, in whole or 
in part, employees of alleged SOEs; 60% of corporate 
enforcement actions in 2010 involved, in whole or in part, 
employees of alleged SOEs; and 66% of corporate enforcement 
actions in 2009 involved, in whole or in part, employees of 
alleged SOEs.202
There is no case law precedent regarding this prominent 
FCPA enforcement theory.203 However, the issue of whether 
202. Id.
203. For a discussion of trial court decisions regarding this enforcement 
theory see Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Under the 
Microscope, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1, 1-2 (2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2191149. These trial court 
challenges relied in part on the author’s declaration which detailed the FCPA’s 
extensive legislative history relevant to the “foreign official” issue. See 
Declaration of Professor Michael Koehler, available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/49310598/U-S-v-Stuart-Carson-el-al-Declaration-
of-Professor-Michael-Koehler. In sum, the declaration states as follows, “There 
is no express statement or information in the FCPA’s legislative history 
describing the ‘any department, agency, or instrumentality’ portion of the 
‘foreign official’ definition. Further, there is no express statement or 
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employees of alleged SOEs are “foreign officials” under the 
FCPA is currently the focus of an appeal pending in the Eleventh 
Circuit and oral argument in U.S. v. Joel Esquenazi and Carlos 
Rodriguez occurred in October 2013.204
By way of background, in 2011 a federal jury convicted 
Esquenazi and Rodriguez of various counts for their alleged 
roles in a scheme to pay bribes to alleged “foreign officials” at 
Haiti Telecom, an alleged SOE.205 On appeal, defendants are 
challenging, among other things, the trial court’s “foreign 
official” jury instruction and the issue presented to the 11th
Circuit is as follows.
Whether [defendants are] entitled to an acquittal because 
employees of Haiti Teleco were not “foreign officials” within 
information in the FCPA’s legislative history to support the DOJ’s expansive 
legal interpretation that alleged SOEs are ‘instrumentalities’ (or ‘departments’ 
or ‘agencies’) of a foreign government and that employees of SOEs are 
therefore ‘foreign officials’ under the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions. 
However, there are several statements, events, and information in the FCPA’s 
legislative history that demonstrate that Congress did not intend the ‘foreign 
official’ definition to include employees of SOEs. Among other things, during 
its multi-year investigation of foreign corporate payments that preceded 
enactment of the FCPA, Congress was aware of the existence of SOEs and that 
some of the questionable payments uncovered or disclosed may have involved 
such entities. In certain of the competing bills introduced in Congress to 
address foreign corporate payments, the definition of ‘foreign government’ 
expressly included SOEs,” and Congress was provided a more precise 
definition of “foreign government” to include SOEs. However, despite being 
aware of SOEs, despite exhibiting a capability for drafting a definition that 
expressly included SOEs in other bills, and despite being provided a more 
precise way to describe SOEs, Congress chose not to include such definitions 
or concepts in the bill that ultimately became the FCPA.”
204. Oral Arguments Heard In Historic “Foreign Official” Challenge,
FCPA PROFESSOR (Oct. 14, 2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/oral-
arguments-heard-in-historic-foreign-official-challenge.
205. See Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Two 
Telecommunications Executives Convicted by Miami Jury on All Counts for 
Their Involvement in Scheme to Bribe Officials at State-Owned 
Telecommunications Company in Haiti, (Aug. 5, 2011) (on file with the Dept. 
of Justice, available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/August/11-crm-
1020.html).
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the meaning of FCPA simply because the National Bank of 
Haiti owned shares of Haiti Teleco and the Haitian 
government appoints board members and directors.206
The appeal is historic in that it is the first time in FCPA 
history an appellate court has the opportunity to weigh in on the 
prominent enforcement theory that employees of alleged SOEs 
are “foreign officials” under the FCPA.207
3. Jurisdiction and Related Issues in Straub 
and Steffen
In 2013, the SEC was put to its initial burden of proof in two 
individual FCPA enforcement actions involving foreign national 
defendants. The results were mixed for the SEC as one case was 
allowed to proceed past the motion to dismiss stage while the 
other case was dismissed. This section provides a comprehensive 
analysis of SEC v. Straub and SEC v. Steffen.
Straub
SEC v. Straub involved allegations that Hungarian nationals 
(Elek Straub, Andras Balogh, and Tamas Morvai employed by 
issuer Magyar Telecom) violated the FCPA’s anti-bribery 
provisions in connection with a bribery scheme involving 
Macedonian “foreign officials.”208 The defendants moved to 
dismiss the SEC’s complaint on three principal grounds: (i) the 
court lacked personal jurisdiction over them; (ii) the SEC’s 
claims were time-barred; and (iii) the complaint failed to state 
claims for certain causes of action.
206. Historic “Foreign Official” Appeals Filed, FCPA PROFESSOR (May 
10, 2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/historic-foreign-official-appeals-
filed.
207. For a summary of the oral arguments, as well as an audio clip, see
FCPA PROFESSOR, supra note 204.
208. See Complaint, S.E.C. v. Straub, 921 F. Supp. 2d 244 (S.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 29, 2011) (No. 11 CIV. 9645 RJS).
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U.S. District Court Judge Richard Sullivan (S.D.N.Y.) denied 
defendants’ motion in its entirety and highlighted below is a 
summary of the decision as to the following issues: personal 
jurisdiction, statute of limitations, the jurisdictional element of 
the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions and “foreign official” 
issues.209
Personal Jurisdiction
Judge Sullivan’s decision began with a discussion of personal 
jurisdiction issues including the pleading standard on a motion to 
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction – that is, the SEC bears 
the burden of establishing that the court has jurisdiction over the 
defendants which can be met by pleading in good faith legally 
sufficient allegations of jurisdiction. Judged against the due 
process standards of “minimum contacts” and “reasonableness,” 
Judge Sullivan concluded that the SEC established that 
defendants have minimum contacts with the United States and 
that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendants 
would not be unreasonable. Accordingly, Judge Sullivan 
concluded that “the SEC has met its burden at this stage of 
establishing a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction over 
defendants.”
As to “minimum contacts” Judge Sullivan stated as follows.
[T]he Defendants here allegedly engaged in conduct that was 
designed to violate United States securities regulations and 
was thus necessarily directed toward the United States, even if 
not principally directed there. [...] [D]uring and before the 
time of the alleged violations, both Magyar’s and Deutsche 
Telekom’s securities were publicly traded through ADRs 
listed on the NYSE and were registered with the SEC [...] 
Because these companies made regular quarterly and annual 
consolidated filings during that time, Defendants knew or had 
reason to know that any false or misleading financial reports 
209. See S.E.C. v. Straub, 921 F. Supp. 2d 244 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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would be given to prospective American purchasers of those 
securities.
Indeed, during the period of the alleged violations, Straub 
allegedly signed false management representation letters to 
Magyar’s auditors, and Balogh and Morvai signed allegedly 
false management subrepresentation letters for quarterly and 
annual reporting periods in 2005. Therefore, it is not only that 
Magyar traded securities through ADRs listed on the NYSE 
that satisfies the minimum contacts standard but also that 
Defendants allegedly engaged in a cover-up through their 
statements to Magyar’s auditors knowing that the company 
traded ADRs on an American exchange, and that prospective 
purchasers would likely be influenced by any false financial 
statements and filings. The court thus has little trouble 
inferring from the SEC’s detailed allegations that, even if 
Defendants’ alleged primary intent was not to cause a tangible 
injury in the United States, it was nonetheless their intent, 
which is sufficient to confer jurisdiction.
In discussing “minimum contacts,” Judge Sullivan rejected 
Defendants’ assertion that their contact must “proximately 
cause” a “substantial injury” in the forum.
As to Defendants’ argument that, should the Court exercise 
jurisdiction over them, “it would automatically imply that ‘any 
individual director, officer, or employee of an issuer in any 
FCPA case’ would also be subject to personal jurisdiction,” 
Judge Sullivan called Defendants’ concerns “overblown” and 
stated:
In holding that Defendants have met their burden of 
demonstrating a prima facie case for jurisdiction at this early 
stage, the Court does not create a per se rule regarding 
employees of an issuer but rather bases its decision on a fact-
based inquiry – namely, an analysis of the SEC’s specific 
allegations regarding the Defendants’ bribery scheme, 
Defendants’ falsification of Magyar’s books and records, and 
Defendants’ personal involvement in making representations 
and subrepresentations with respect to and in anticipation of 
Magyar’s SEC filings. Although Defendants’ alleged bribes 
may have taken place outside of the United States (as is 
2014] A Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Narrative 1055
typically true in cases brought under the FCPA), their 
concealment of those bribes, in conjunction with Magyar’s 
SEC filings, was allegedly directed toward the United States.
[...]Accordingly, the Court finds that the SEC has established a 
prima facie case that Defendants had the requisite minimum 
contacts with the United States to support personal 
jurisdiction.
As to the “reasonableness” prong of the due process analysis, 
Judge Sullivan cited other authority for the proposition that “the 
reasonableness inquiry is largely academic in non-diversity cases 
brought under federal law which provides for nationwide service 
of process because of the strong federal interests involved.”
Judge Sullivan then stated:
Like each and every court in this Circuit to have applied the 
reasonableness standard after determining that a given 
defendant has the requisite minimum contacts, this Court finds 
that this is not the rare case where the reasonableness analysis 
defeats the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Although it might 
not be convenient for Defendants to defend this action in the 
United States, Defendants have not made a particular showing 
that the burden on them would be “severe” or “gravely 
difficult.” Indeed, as the SEC rightly notes, unlike in a private 
diversity action, here there is no alternative forum available 
for the government. Thus, if the SEC could not enforce the 
FCPA against Defendants in federal courts in the United 
States, Defendants could potentially evade liability altogether. 
Additionally, because this case was brought under federal law, 
the judicial system has a strong federal interest in resolving 
this issue here. The Court therefore finds that the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction over Defendants is not unreasonable.
Statute of Limitations
The FCPA does not have a specific statute of limitations. 
Rather, the five year “catch-all” provisions in 18 USC § 3282 
(for criminal actions) and 28 USC §2462 (for civil actions) apply 
to FCPA enforcement actions.
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Judge Sullivan began by setting forth the applicable 
limitations period found in §2462.
Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an action, 
suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, 
penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, shall not be 
entertained unless commenced from the date when the claim 
first accrued if, within the same period, the offender or the 
property is found within the United States in order that proper
service be made thereon. (emphasis added).
Judge Sullivan began by noting that it was “undisputed that 
more than five years have elapsed since the SEC’s claims first 
accrued,” but that the parties disagreed as to the plain meaning of 
section 2642 and, given that Defendants were not physically 
located within the United States during the limitations period, 
whether the statute of limitations has run on the SEC’s claims.
Judge Sullivan stated:
The SEC argues that the statute of limitations has not run 
because the statute applies only ‘if within the same period, the 
offender … is found within the United States. Thus, according 
to the SEC, because Defendants were not ‘found’ in this 
country at any point during the limitations period in question, 
the Court’s inquiry should end. The Court agrees.
Judge Sullivan then stated:
Here, the operative language in § 2462 requires, by its plain 
terms, that an offender must be physically present in the 
United States for the statute of limitations to run. In arguing 
otherwise, Defendants essentially seek to amend the statute to 
run against a defendant if he is either ‘found within the United 
States’ or subject to service of process elsewhere by some 
alternative means. Such a reading would be a dramatic 
restatement of the statutory language and would render the 
clause ‘if . . . found within the United States’ mere 
surplusage.’
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“Additionally, reading the statute to require a defendant’s 
physical presence in the United States is not inconsistent with 
§ 2462’s statement of purpose, as was originally understood.
[…]
Accordingly, the Court finds that the statute of limitations 
within § 2462 has not run on the SEC’s claims.
In addition to the above jurisdiction and statute of limitations 
challenges, the Defendants also argued that the SEC’s complaint 
should be dismissed for, among other reasons, failure to state a 
claim as to: (i) whether the complaint adequately alleged that 
Defendants made use of U.S. interstate commerce; and (ii) 
whether the complaint adequately alleged the involvement of 
“foreign officials.”
Jurisdictional Element of an FCPA Anti-Bribery Violation
Judge Sullivan began by noting that the complaint alleged 
that “Balogh used e-mails in furtherance of the bribe scheme by 
attaching [various documents] all of which were the alleged 
means by which Defendants concealed the true nature of the 
payments offered to the Macedonian government officials” and 
“that the e-mails were sent from locations outside the United 
States but were routed through and/or stored on network services 
located within the United States.”
As stated by Judge Sullivan, “according to the Defendants, 
because the SEC fails to allege that Defendants personally knew 
that their e-mails would be routed through and/or stored on 
servers within the United States, the SEC’s allegations cannot 
state a claim under the FCPA’s bribery provision.”
Judge Sullivan then stated:
The issue of whether § 78dd-1(a) requires that a defendant 
intend to use “the mails or any means or instrumentality of 
interstate commerce” is a matter of first impression in the 
FCPA context. Section 78dd-1(a) is not a model of precision 
in legislative drafting: its text does not make immediately 
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clear whether “corruptly” modifies the phrase “make use of 
the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce” or the phrase “any offer, payment, promise to pay, 
or authorization of the payment of any money . . . or . . . 
anything of value.” The use of the adverb “corruptly” appears 
to modify the verb “use,” but the word’s delayed placement in 
the statutory text appears to reflect a legislative choice to 
modify the grouping of words that follows: “offer, payment, 
promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money 
. . . or . . . anything of value.” Because the plain language of 
the provision is ambiguous, even when read in context and 
after applying traditional canons of statutory construction, the 
Court turns to the legislative history, which is instructive: The 
word “corruptly” is used in order to make clear that the offer, 
payment, promise, or gift, must be intended to induce the 
recipient to misuse his official position in order to wrongfully 
direct business to the payor or his client, or to obtain 
preferential legislation or a favorable regulation. The word 
“corruptly” connotes an evil motive or purpose, an intent to 
wrongfully influence the recipient.
Thus, the legislative history reveals that, although Congress 
intended to make an “intent” or mens rea requirement for the 
underlying bribery, it expressed no corresponding intent to
make such a requirement for the “make use of . . . any means 
or instrumentality of interstate commerce” element.
Such a reading is consistent with the way that courts have 
interpreted similar provisions in other statutes. For instance, 
courts have held that the use of interstate commerce in 
furtherance of violations of the securities laws, the mail and 
wire fraud statutes, and money laundering statutes is a 
jurisdictional element of those offenses. [...] As such, 
defendants need not have formed the particularized mens rea 
with respect to the instrumentalities of commerce.” [...] 
Although no court appears to have addressed whether the use 
of interstate commerce is also a jurisdictional element of an 
FCPA violation, the similarity of the language in § 78dd-1(a) 
[...] weighs in favor of finding that Congress intended a 
similar application of the requirement in the FCPA context. 
[...] [T]he mere fact that § 78dd-1(a) does not include the 
phrase ‘directly or indirectly’ does not indicate that the 
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requirement ‘make use’ implies that a defendant must have 
made direct use. Therefore, the Court finds that the Complaint 
sufficiently pleads that Defendants used the means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, pursuant to the FCPA.
As to the disputed jurisdictional issues, Judge Sullivan stated:
The Court also rejects two of Defendants’ additional 
arguments. First, the Court rejects Defendants’ argument that 
the SEC has failed to allege that there was any ‘use’ 
whatsoever of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce. As 
noted above, the Complaint specifically alleges that Balogh 
emailed, on behalf of Defendants, drafts of the Protocols, the 
Letter of Intent, and copies of consulting contracts to third-
party intermediaries, and that the e-mails were ‘routed through 
and/or stored on network servers located within the United 
States. The mere fact that Defendants may not have had 
personal knowledge that their emails would be routed through 
or stored in the United States does not mean that they did not, 
in fact, use an instrument of interstate commerce sufficient for 
purposes of conferring jurisdiction. Second, the Court rejects 
Defendants’ argument that it was not foreseeable that emails 
sent over the Internet in a foreign country would touch servers 
located elsewhere. The Court does not disagree with 
Defendants that “the internet is a huge, complex, gossamer 
web ,” but that is all the more reason why it should be 
foreseeable to a defendant that Internet traffic will not 
necessarily be entirely local in nature.
Defendants also assert that the Complaint fails to sufficiently 
allege that Defendants used the means or instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce “in furtherance” of their FCPA violations. 
Specifically, they argue that the Complaint alleges only that 
Defendants executed a “scheme” to bribe Macedonian 
government officials and not that they made an “‘offer, 
payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of 
any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of 
the giving of anything of value.” However, Defendants ignore 
the fact that the Complaint specifically alleges that Defendants 
sent the Protocols and Letter of Intent, which were essentially 
their offers to pay or promises to pay the alleged bribes, to 
Macedonian government officials. These e-mails also included 
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reference to the alleged ‘sham’ contracts used to conceal the 
true nature of Defendants’ bribes. Accordingly, such 
allegations are sufficient to satisfy the ‘in furtherance’ 
language of § 78dd-1.
Identity of “Foreign Officials”
Judge Sullivan agreed with a 2012 decision in SEC v. 
Jackson210 that “the language of the statute does not appear to 
require that the identity of the foreign official involved be pled 
with specificity.”
Judge Sullivan stated:
Such a requirement would be at odds with the statutory 
scheme, which targets actions (such as making an “offer” or 
“promise”) without requiring that the “foreign official” accept 
the offer or reveal his specific identity to the payor. Indeed, 
the fact that the FCPA prohibits using “any person” or an
intermediary to facilitate the bribe to any “foreign official” or 
“any foreign political party” suggests that the statute 
contemplates situations in which the payor knows that a 
“foreign official” will ultimately receive a bribe but only the 
intermediary knows the foreign official’s specific identity.
While obviously important to the case, Judge Sullivan’s 
personal jurisdiction conclusion was case-specific and the least 
important conclusion from the standpoint of FCPA case law.211
Even though Judge Sullivan’s decision was a non-binding trial 
210. Judge Grants Jackson And Ruehlen’s Motion To Dismiss SEC’s 
Monetary Claims – Finds That SEC Was Not Diligent In Bringing Case And 
That SEC Failed To Negate Facilitation Payments Exception – However Judge 
Allows SEC To File An Amended Complaint, FCPA PROFESSOR (Dec. 12, 
2012), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/judge-grants-jackson-and-ruehlens-
motion-to-dismiss-secs-monetary-claims-finds-that-sec-was-not-diligent-in-
bringing-case-and-that-sec-failed-to-negate-facilitation-payments-exception-
however.
211. Whether a court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a specific 
defendant is a separate and distinct question from whether the jurisdictional 
element of an FCPA anti-bribery violation has been met. 
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court decision, the two most important aspects of his decision 
concern statute of limitations and the jurisdictional element of an 
FCPA anti-bribery violation – both of which present an uphill 
battle for foreign nationals charged with FCPA offenses based 
on sparse jurisdictional allegations and/or not being physically 
present in the U.S.
As noted above, Judge Sullivan’s decision in SEC v. Straub
was in connection with the Defendants’ pre-trial motion to 
dismiss and the case remains pending. While SEC v. Straub was 
allowed to proceed, the SEC’s FCPA enforcement action against 
Herbert Steffen was dismissed when subjected to judicial 
scrutiny.
Steffen
Issues similar to those presented in SEC v. Straub were also at 
issue in the SEC’s FCPA enforcement action against former 
Siemens executive Herbert Steffen.
Judge Shira Scheindlin (a federal court judge also in the S.D. 
of N.Y. and well versed in FCPA issues) granted Steffen’s 
motion to dismiss the SEC’s complaint a few weeks after the 
Straub decision.212 Because Judge Scheindlin concluded, as an 
initial threshold matter, that personal jurisdiction over Steffen 
exceeded the limits of due process, she did not address Steffen’s 
other challenges including as to similar statute of limitations 
issues at issue in Straub. Unlike the defendants in Straub, Steffen 
was not alleged to have signed any management representation 
letters used in connection with financial reporting.213
Rather, the SEC’s complaint against Steffen, and several 
other foreign Siemens executives, concerned an alleged bribery 
scheme in Argentina concerning a national identity card 
212. SEC v. Sharef, 924 F. Supp.2d 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).2013 WL 
603135 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
213. Like Magyar Telekom in Straub, Siemens, a German company, 
also had shares listed on U.S. exchanges during the time period relevant to the 
action.
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contract.214 As to Steffen (the former CEO of Siemens S.A. 
Argentina who retired in 2003), Judge Scheindlin summarized 
the allegations as follows.
The Complaint alleged that [Defendant] Sharef recruited 
Steffen ‘to facilitate the payment of bribes’ to officials in 
Argentina because of his longstanding connections in 
Argentina, which he acquired during his tenure at Siemens 
Argentina. Following the cancellation of the contract, 
beginning in December 2000, Steffen and Sharef began 
renegotiating with the Argentine government, including the 
newly elected President, which demanded that Siemens paid it 
bribes in order to reinstate the contract. In order to facilitate 
payment of bribes to the Argentine officials, Steffen met 
several times with [Defendant] Regendantz, who become the 
Chief Financial Officer of [Siemens Business Services - SBS] 
in February 2002, and ‘pressured’ Regendantz to authorize 
bribes from SBS to Argentine officials. In April 2002, Steffen 
told Regendantz that SBS had a ‘moral duty’ to make at least 
an ‘advance payment’ of ten million dollars to the individuals 
who had previously handled the bribes because he and other 
individuals were being threatened as a result of the unpaid 
bribes. Once Regendantz authorized the bribes, the allegations 
against Steffen are limited to participation in a phone call 
initiated by Sharef from the United States in connection with 
the bribery scheme, and that in the first half of 2003, 
defendants including Steffen ‘urged Sharef to meet the 
demands [of Argentine officials] and make the additional 
payments.
Judge Scheindlin next addressed whether the SEC’s 
complaint alleged sufficient facts to establish the two 
components of due process – minimum contacts and 
reasonableness. Judge Scheindlin noted that because the SEC 
alleged specific jurisdiction over Steffen, this required that he 
214. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SEC CHARGES SEVEN FORMER SIEMENS 
EXECUTIVES WITH BRIBING LEADERS IN ARGENTINA, (Dec. 19, 2011), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-263.htm.
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“purposefully directed his activities towards [the U.S.] and the 
litigation arises out of or is related to [Steffen’s ] contact with the 
forum.”
Judge Scheindlin then stated:
It is well-established that a court may exercise personal 
jurisdiction over a foreign defendant who causes an effect in 
the forum by an act committed elsewhere. However, ‘this is a 
principle that must be applied with caution, particularly in an 
international context.’ ‘Foreseeability’ alone has never been a 
sufficient benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due 
Process Clause. Rather defendants must have ‘followed a 
course of conduct directed at … the jurisdiction of a given 
sovereign, so that the sovereign has the power to subject the 
defendant to judgment concerning the conduct. The effects in 
the United States must ‘occur as a direct and foreseeable result 
of the conduct outside the territory’ and defendant ‘must 
know, or have good reason to know, that his conduct will have 
effects in the [forum] seeking to assert jurisdiction over him.
After noting the legal standards for “reasonableness,” Judge 
Scheindlin concluded that the court lacked personal jurisdiction 
over Steffen in that the SEC did not establish minimum contacts 
and that the exercise of jurisdiction over Steffen was not 
reasonable.
As to minimum contacts, Judge Scheindlin stated:
The SEC’s allegations are premised on Steffen’s role in 
encouraging Regendantz to authorize bribes to Argentine 
officials that ultimately resulted in falsified filings. While 
Steffen’s actions may have been a proximate cause of the false 
filings – and that is a matter of some doubt – Steffen’s actions 
are far too attenuated from the resulting harm to establish 
minimum contacts. Steffen was brought into the alleged 
scheme based solely on his connections with Argentine 
officials. In furtherance of his negotiations with those 
officials, Steffen ‘urged’ and ‘pressured’ Regendantz to make 
certain bribes. However, Regendantz did not agree to make the 
bribes until he communicated with several ‘higher ups’ whose 
responses he perceived to be instructions to make the bribes. 
Once Regendantz agreed to make the bribes – following 
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receipt of instructions from Siemens’ management rather than 
Steffen – Steffen’s alleged role was tangential at best. Steffen 
did not actually authorize the bribes. The SEC does not allege 
that he directed, ordered or even had awareness of the cover 
ups that occurred at SBS much less that he had any 
involvement in the falsification of SEC filings in furtherance 
of those cover ups.
In a footnote, Judge Scheindlin then stated:
Neither Sharef’s call to Steffen from the United States nor the 
fact that a portion of the bribery payments were deposited in a 
New York bank provide sufficient evidence of conduct 
directed towards the United States to establish minimum 
contacts. First, Steffen did not place the calls to Sharef. 
Further, Steffen did not direct that the funds be routed through 
a New York bank. . . . His conduct was focused solely on 
ensuring the continuation of the Siemens contract in 
Argentina.
Judge Scheindlin then noted that in Straub the defendants not 
only orchestrated a bribery scheme aimed at the Macedonia 
government, but also as part of the bribery scheme, “signed off 
on misleading management representations to the company’s 
auditors and signed false SEC filings.”
Judge Scheindlin next stated:
If this Court were to hold that Steffen’s support for the bribery 
scheme satisfied the minimum contacts analysis, even though 
he neither authorized the bribe, nor directed the cover up, 
much less played any role in the falsified filings, minimum 
contacts would be boundless. Illegal corporate action almost 
always requires cover ups, which to be successful must be 
reflected in financial statements. Thus, under the SEC’s 
theory, every participant in illegal action taken by a foreign 
company subject to U.S. securities laws would be subject to 
the jurisdiction of U.S. courts no matter how attenuated their 
connection with the falsified financial statements. This would 
be akin to a tort-like foreseeability requirement, which has 
long been held to be insufficient. The allegations against 
Steffen fall far short of the requirement that he ‘follow a 
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course of conduct directed to . . . the jurisdiction of a given 
sovereign, so that the sovereign has the power to subject the 
defendant to judgment concerning that conduct. Absent any 
alleged role in the cover ups themselves, let alone any role in 
preparing false financial statements the exercise of jurisdiction 
here exceeds the limits of due process, as articulated by the 
Supreme Court and the Second Circuit.
As to reasonableness, Judge Scheindlin stated:
The decision not to exercise jurisdiction in this case is 
bolstered by my conclusion that requiring Steffen to defend 
this case in the United States would be unreasonable. [...] 
When a defendant is not located in the United States, ‘great 
care and reserve should be exercised when extending our 
notions of personal jurisdiction into the international context. 
Steffen’s lack of geographic ties to the United States, his age, 
his poor proficiency in English, and the forum’s diminished 
interest in adjudicating the matter, all weight against personal 
jurisdiction. [...] [I]t would be a heavy burden on this seventy-
four year old defendant to journey to the United States to 
defend against this suit. Further, the SEC and the Department 
of Justice have already obtained comprehensive remedies 
against Siemens and Germany has resolved an action against 
Steffen individually. The SEC’s interest in ensuring that this 
type of conduct does not go unpublished will not be furthered 
by continuing the suit against Steffen, in light of his age, the 
burden on him to defend this suit, and the previous 
adjudications.
Given the general lack of FCPA case law, the Straub and 
Steffen decisions generated much commentary.215 While there 
were many “hits,” there were also some “misses.” For instance, 
the headline of one law firm alert read “District Court Decision 
Limits the Extraterritorial Reach of the FCPA,” another headline 
of a law firm alert read “Court Sets Limits on Extraterritorial 
FCPA Reach; Dismisses Case Against Foreign Siemens 
215. Friday Roundup, FCPA PROFESSOR (Mar. 1, 2013), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/friday-roundup-69.
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Executive.”216 However, neither the Straub nor Steffen decisions 
concerned extraterritorial application of the FCPA. In fact, there 
is no extraterritorial reach of the FCPA as to foreign actors.217
Rather, the Straub decision concerned the scope of territorial 
jurisdiction under 78dd-1(a), specifically the meaning of “use of 
the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce 
. . . .” The Steffen decision did not even reach this issue as the 
judge found the initial threshold issue of personal jurisdiction 
lacking.
While the judicial decisions in Straub and Steffen occurred in 
the context of civil SEC FCPA enforcement actions, FCPA 
practitioners have correctly noted that the decisions “rightly raise 
the question of the jurisdictional limits that apply as a matter of 
due process in the criminal FCPA arena” as “the DOJ pursues 
aggressive jurisdictional theories against individual foreign 
nationals.”218
Notwithstanding the above non-binding trial court decisions 
in Straub and Steffen in 2013, development of actual FCPA legal 
authority remains in an infant state for the reasons discussed in 
Section II above. Accordingly, those who seek a better 
understanding of many of the controversial aspects of FCPA 
enforcement in this new era must look to other legal authority for 
guidance. As highlighted below, 2013 witnessed several non-
FCPA legal developments and these developments, including 
two Supreme Court cases, should cause pause as to certain 
enforcement theories relevant to the FCPA.
216. Id.
217. The FCPA was amended in 1998 to provide for alternative 
“nationality” jurisdiction (i.e. extraterritorial jurisdiction) over U.S. persons 
(both legal and natural). However, 78dd-1(g) and 78dd-2(i) are strictly limited 
to U.S. persons.
218. Sean Hecker, et al., “Due Process” Limits on Criminal 
Enforcement of the FCPA Against Non-U.S. Nationals Based on 
Extraterritorial Conduct, FCPA PROFESSOR (May 14, 2013), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/due-process-limits-on-criminal-enforcement-of-
the-fcpa-against-non-u-s-nationals-based-on-extraterritorial-conduct.
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4. Non-FCPA Legal Developments
Most corporate FCPA enforcement actions concern conduct 
that occurred a long time ago and most FCPA enforcement 
actions against foreign companies are based on expansive 
jurisdictional theories. Thus, two Supreme Court decisions in 
non-FCPA cases from 2013 should cause pause as to certain 
enforcement theories relevant to the FCPA.
Statute of Limitations
Despite the general five-year limitations period applicable to 
FCPA violations highlighted above, most corporate FCPA 
enforcement actions concern alleged conduct that occurred 5-7
years, 7-10 years, and in some instances 10-20 years prior to the 
enforcement action. For instance, the $398 million enforcement 
action against Total in 2013 (the third-largest settlement amount 
in FCPA history) alleged conduct that went back to 1995. So old 
was the conduct giving rise to the enforcement action that the 
DOJ made the unusual statement in the DPA that “evidentiary 
challenges” were present for both parties given that “most of the 
underlying conduct occurred in the 1990s and early 2000s.”219
Likewise, the $32 million enforcement action against Bilfinger 
in 2013 focused on conduct that allegedly occurred between 
2003 and 2005.220 In a press release (which the company had to 
consult with the DOJ before releasing), Bilfinger’s CEO stated:
“we are pleased that we have now been able to put these events 
from the distant past behind us.”221
219. Total S.A., Crim. No. 1:13 CR 239 (E.D.V.A. May 29, 2013), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/totalsa/2013-05-
29-total-dpa-filed.pdf.
220. German Company Resolves FCPA Enforcement Action Based on 
Conduct From “The Distant Past,” FCPA PROFESSOR (Dec. 10, 2013),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/german-company-resolves-fcpa-enforcement-
action-based-on-conduct-from-the-distant-past.
221. Press Release, Bilfinger, Bilfinger Reaches Settlement with US 
Department of Justice (Dec. 9, 2013), available at http://www.bilfinger.com/
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Against this backdrop, in 2013 the Supreme Court, in an
unanimous decision authored by Chief Justice Roberts, rejected 
the SEC’s expansive statute of limitations position in an 
enforcement action against Bruce Alpert and Marc Gabelli under 
the Investment Advisors Act.222 The SEC’s complaint in SEC v. 
Gabelli alleged that from 1999 to 2002, Alpert and Gabelli 
allowed an investor to engage in “market timing” in an 
investment fund they operated. The defendants moved to 
dismiss, arguing in part, that the SEC’s claim was untimely 
under § 2462. “The trial court agreed and dismissed the SEC’s 
civil penalty claim as time barred.” The Second Circuit reversed 
and accepted the SEC’s argument that “because the underlying 
violations sounded in fraud, the ‘discovery rule’ applied to the 
statute of limitations.” As explained by the Second Circuit, 
“under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations or a 
particular claim does not accrue until that claim is discovered, or 
could have been discovered with reasonably diligence, by the 
plaintiff.”
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendants argued that a 
“claim based on fraud accrues – and the five year clock begins to 
tick – when a defendants’ allegedly fraudulent conduct occurs.” 
The Supreme Court found that this position “is the most natural 
reading of the statute” and declined to read a discovery rule into 
§ 2462.
In pertinent part, the Supreme Court stated:
Statute of limitations are intended to ‘promote justice by 
preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have 
been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost,
memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. They 
provide ‘security and stability to human affairs. [They] are 
‘vital to the welfare of society [and] ‘even wrongdoers are 
fileadmin/corporate_webseite/Presse/pressenotizen/2013/1-DPA-Nigeria-
PN_eng.pdf.
222. Gabelli v. SEC, 133 S. Ct. 1216 (2013). The Act makes it illegal for 
investment advisors to defraud their clients and authorizes the SEC to seek civil 
penalties. The Act makes it illegal for investment advisors to defraud their 
clients and authorizes the SEC to seek civil penalties.
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entitled to assume that their sins may be forgotten.’ . . . It 
‘would be utterly repugnant to the genius of our laws if actions 
for penalties could ‘be brought at any distance of time.’ 
The Supreme Court further stated that statute of limitations 
are even more important in a government enforcement action 
compared to a case brought by a private plaintiff.
There are good reasons why the fraud discovery rule has not 
been extended to Government enforcement actions for civil 
penalties. . . . The SEC, for example, is not like an individual 
victim who relies on apparent injury to learn of a wrong. 
Rather, a central ‘mission’ of the Commission is to 
‘investigate potential violations of the federal securities laws.’ 
Unlike the private party who has no reason to suspect fraud, 
the SEC’s very purpose is to root it out, and it has many legal 
tools at hand to aid in that pursuit. . . . Charged with this 
mission and armed with these weapons, the SEC as enforcer is 
a far cry from the defrauded victim the discovery rule evolved 
to protect. In a civil penalty action, the Government is not only 
a different kind of plaintiff, it seeks a different kind of relief. 
The discovery rule helps to ensure that the injured receive 
recompense. But this case involves penalties, which go 
beyond compensation, and are intended to punish, and label 
defendants wrongdoers.
Why, despite the importance of statute of limitations to our 
legal system and Supreme Court recognition in Gabelli that it 
“‘would be utterly repugnant to the genius of our laws’ if actions 
for penalties could be brought at any distance of time,” do most 
corporate FCPA enforcement actions concern conduct well 
beyond the statute of limitations?
Simply put, it is because in corporate FCPA enforcement 
actions the fundamental black letter legal principle of statute of 
limitations seems not to matter. Granted, counsel for a company 
under FCPA scrutiny based on conduct beyond the limitations 
period can argue about statute of limitation defenses around 
conference room tables behind closed doors in Washington, D.C.
However, like with other FCPA issues, to truly challenge the 
enforcement agencies first requires that the company be 
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criminally or civilly charged, something few corporate leaders 
are willing to let happen.
In short, and as generally described in Sections IIA and IIIA 
above, cooperation is the name of the game in corporate FCPA 
inquiries and to raise bona fide legal arguments such as statute of 
limitations is not cooperating in an investigation. Indeed, given 
the “carrots” and “sticks” relevant to resolving corporate FCPA 
enforcement actions, one of the first steps a company the subject 
of FCPA scrutiny often does to demonstrate its cooperation is 
agree to toll the statute of limitations or waive any statute of 
limitations defenses. 
A former DOJ enforcement attorney noted:
As a practical matter, companies, especially publicly held 
companies . . . typically make a strategic decision to fully 
cooperate with a DOJ investigation. Despite the potential 
success of a statute of limitations defense, a company will 
often make the judgment that the negative press of a 
protracted investigation and the uncertainty of the outcome at 
trial make cooperation the more prudent business judgment. 
The company’s hope is that it will be given credit for the 
cooperation and it will achieve a better outcome than if it went 
to trial (i.e., avoid charges, a DPA, or a reduced fine).223
Given this dynamic, the enforcement agencies face little or no 
time pressure in bringing corporate FCPA enforcement actions.
The end result is that the gray cloud of FCPA scrutiny often 
hangs over a company far too long. For instance, Total’s FCPA 
scrutiny began in 2003 but was not resolved until a 2013 
enforcement action.
Regarding the typical long periods of corporate FCPA 
scrutiny, an FCPA commentator rightly noted:
223. Breon S. Peace et al., The FCPA Statute of Limitations – A Way 
Out for Wal-Mart?, BLOOMBERG LAW, http://about.bloomberglaw.com/
practitioner-contributions/the-fcpa-statute-of-limitations—a-way-out-for-wal-
mart/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2014).
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[Companies under FCPA scrutiny are] routinely asked to 
waive the statute of limitations. They could refuse but none 
do; refusal might trigger an instant enforcement action against 
the company or its people. So the waiver gives the feds 
limitless time to investigate, deliberate, or procrastinate. And 
no one can force the DOJ or SEC to move on, either with an 
enforcement action or a declination. The result? Companies 
[under FCPA scrutiny] get stuck in FCPA limbo. . . . But the 
DOJ and SEC should always keep one eye on the calendar. 
The threat of FCPA enforcement . . . casts a long shadow. It 
darkens the future for management, shareholders, lenders, 
customers, and suppliers. Exactly the problem the statute of 
limitations was supposed to fix.224
In addition to often alleging conduct that occurred a long time 
ago, most FCPA enforcement actions against foreign companies 
are based on expansive jurisdictional theories. Here too, a 
Supreme Court decision from 2013, as well as other legal 
developments, should cause pause as to certain enforcement 
theories relevant to the FCPA. 
Jurisdictional Issues
The FCPA is explicit as to its jurisdictional scope and 
provides as follows depending on the category of person (legal 
or natural) subject to the anti-bribery provisions.
x As to U.S. persons (legal or natural) the FCPA provides 
for two types of jurisdiction. The original statutory standard 
was (and is still part of the law) “use of the mails or any 
means of instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in 
furtherance” of a bribery scheme. However, in 1998 Congress 
amended the FCPA to also provide for so-called nationality 
jurisdiction as to U.S. persons. 15 U.S.C. 78dd-1(g) and 78dd-
2(i) specifically state, in pertinent part, as follows: “It shall 
also be unlawful for [any issuer organized under the laws of 
224. Richard L. Cassin, The FCPA’s Long Shadow, THE FCPA BLOG
(Aug. 6, 2012), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/8/6/the-fcpas-long-
shadow.html.
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the United States or for any United States person] to corruptly 
do any act outside the United States in furtherance [of a 
bribery scheme] irrespective of whether such [U.S. person] 
makes uses of the mails or any means or instrumentality of 
interstate commerce in furtherance [of the bribery scheme].” 
x As to foreign “issuers,” the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions 
apply only to the extent there is territorial jurisdiction, in other 
words, “use of the mails or any means of instrumentality of 
interstate commerce” in furtherance of an improper payment 
scheme. The 1998 amendment discussed above does not apply 
to such companies. 
x As to persons other than U.S. persons (legal or natural) or 
foreign issuers, the FCPA was also amended in 1998 to create 
an entire new category of “person” subject to the FCPA’s anti-
bribery provisions. This category applies to non-U.S. actors 
and non-foreign issuers such as foreign private companies and 
foreign nationals. This FCPA prong has explicit jurisdictional 
provisions, and states, in pertinent part, that it shall be 
unlawful for “any person” other than an issuer or domestic 
concern (that is a U.S. “person”) “while in the territory of the 
United States, corruptly to make use of the mails or any means 
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or to do any other 
act in furtherance” of an improper payment scheme. 
Despite the above jurisdictional provisions clearly set forth in 
the FCPA, in recent years the DOJ has advanced broad 
jurisdictional theories in enforcement actions against foreign 
entities and foreign nationals. For instance, in 2006, the DOJ 
brought its first criminal FCPA enforcement action against a
foreign company, Norway-based Statoil, for engaging in a 
bribery scheme in Iran.225 The sole jurisdictional allegation the 
DOJ hung its hat on was that Statoil received an invoice from a 
U.K. consulting company instructing that money “be routed 
through a U.S. bank account in New York to a bank account in 
225. Complaint, United States v. Statoil No. 06 Crim. 960 (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 13, 2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases
/statoil-asa-inc/10-13-09statoil-information.pdf.
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Switzerland” which the company paid. In announcing the $21 
million enforcement action, the DOJ stated:
Although Statoil is a foreign issuer, the [FCPA] applies to 
foreign and domestic public companies alike, where the 
company’s stock trades on American exchanges. . . . This 
prosecution demonstrates the [DOJ’s] commitment vigorously 
to enforce the FCPA against all international businesses whose 
conduct falls within its scope.226
Many DOJ enforcement actions against foreign companies 
have since been brought on expansive jurisdictional theories. In 
fact, the majority of enforcement actions in the FCPA’s “Top 
Ten” in terms of fine and penalty amounts are against foreign 
companies including the Bonny Island, Nigeria enforcement 
actions in which the DOJ (and SEC) alleged that Dutch, French, 
and Japanese companies bribed Nigerian foreign officials.227 The 
jurisdictional allegations in these cases, which resulted in 
approximately $1.1 billion flowing into the U.S. Treasury, all 
hinged on wire transfers through New York based accounts and 
faxes and e-mails to the U.S. Likewise, the sole jurisdictional 
basis for the 2013 Total enforcement was a 1995 wire transfer of 
$500,000 (representing less than 1% of the alleged bribe 
payments at issue) from a New York based account.
The above FCPA enforcement actions against foreign actors 
(and several other examples could also be cited) did not rely on 
extraterritorial jurisdiction – because indeed there is none under 
the FCPA as to foreign actors. However, the enforcement action 
did invoke seeming de facto extraterritorial jurisdiction given the 
scant connection the bribery schemes had to the U.S.
Against this backdrop, in 2013 the Supreme Court issued its 
long-awaited opinion in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell 
226. Press Release, U.S. DOJ, U.S. Resolves Probe Against Oil 
Company that Bribed Iranian Official (Oct. 13, 2006), available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2006/October/06_crm_700.html. 
227. Bonny Island Bribery Statistics, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 26, 2012),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/bonny-island-bribery-statistics.
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Petroleum.228 The precise issue before the court was “whether 
and under what circumstances courts may recognize a cause of 
action under the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), for violations of the 
law of nations occurring within the territory of a sovereign other 
than the United States.”229 The opinion, authored by Chief 
Justice Roberts, held that “the presumption against 
extraterritoriality applies to claims under the ATS, and that 
nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption.” Accordingly, the 
court in a unanimous opinion (several justices authored 
concurring opinions) affirmed the Second Circuit’s dismissal of 
a lawsuit brought by a group of Nigerian nationals residing in the 
United State who filed suit in federal court against certain Dutch, 
British, and Nigerian corporations, alleging that the corporations 
aided and abetted the Nigerian government in committing 
violations of the law of nations in Nigeria.
The jurisdictional issue the Supreme Court addressed in 
Kiobel - whether the canon of statutory interpretation known as 
the presumption against extraterritorial application - was 
necessitated because the ATS was silent on the jurisdiction issue. 
Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts stated that the canon “provides that 
when a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial 
application it has none” (emphasis added).
Given the FCPA’s above-described jurisdictional scope, the 
canon of statutory interpretation at issue in Kiobel is not directly 
applicable in an FCPA enforcement action against foreign actors.
However, the logic and rationale of many justices in Kiobel has 
direct bearing on certain aspects of FCPA enforcement and 
indeed can be viewed as Supreme Court disapproval of certain 
aspects of FCPA enforcement.
228. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662 
(2013).
229. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663, 185 
L. Ed. 2d 671 (2013) (quoting Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 
1738 (2012)). While the ATS and FCPA are separated by 188 years in terms of 
enactment, the statutes have often being viewed by some as siblings, or at least 
distant cousins within the same family.
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For starters, Chief Justice Roberts recognized the delicate 
foreign policy consequences of expansive jurisdiction – an issue 
that is present when the U.S. government alleges that foreign 
companies are bribing foreign officials on foreign lands.
Likewise, the concurring opinion of Justice Alito, joined by 
Justice Thomas, is also instructive in that it states when ATS 
“claims touch and concern the territory of the United States, they 
must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption 
against extraterritoriality.” Applying this to the FCPA context, 
can it truly be said that the above FCPA enforcement actions 
against foreign actors touched and concerned the territory of the 
U.S. with “sufficient force”?
Even the concurring opinion of Justice Breyer, joined by 
Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan, is instructive. This 
opinion did not invoke the presumption against exterritoriality in 
concluding that the claims should be dismissed, but rather found 
that jurisdiction was lacking for another reason. Namely, that the 
foreign corporations, while having shares traded on U.S. 
exchanges, had an insufficient presence in the U.S. such that it 
would be “farfetched to believe, based solely upon the 
defendants’ minimal and indirect American presence, that this 
legal action helps to vindicate a distinct American interest.” The 
parallels are obvious to FCPA enforcement actions against 
foreign actors for allegedly bribing foreign officials in foreign 
lands.
Similar to the above analysis in connection with statute of 
limitations issues, if FCPA enforcement actions against foreign 
actors are based on aggressive and dubious jurisdictional theories 
– why don’t the companies aggressively litigate?
This question highlights a key difference between the ATS 
and the FCPA. Likely the only reason the Kiobel case made it to 
the Supreme Court is because the plaintiffs in ATS cases have 
little leverage against corporate defendants. ATS actions are civil 
actions brought by private plaintiffs and are thus often litigated. 
In contrast, certain courts have held (although by no means is 
the argument that the FCPA ought to have a private right of 
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action a fait accompli) that the FCPA does not have a private 
right of action.230 The FCPA is thus only enforced by the DOJ 
(or the SEC as to issuers). These government enforcement 
agencies, unlike ATS plaintiffs, have big and sharp sticks that 
corporate defendants (and individuals as well) are mindful of in 
deciding how to proceed when subject to FCPA scrutiny.
Indeed, in the FCPA context, when a Japanese company was 
under FCPA scrutiny for making alleged bribe payments to 
Nigerian officials, the company raised jurisdictional issues in its 
negotiations with the DOJ. The DOJ’s response was that the 
company was not cooperating.231 Specifically, the resolution 
document stated: “after initially declining to cooperate with the 
Department based on jurisdictional arguments, [the company] 
began to cooperate.”
Simply put, for a company that doesn’t cooperate with the 
DOJ in an FCPA enforcement, the chances are higher that the 
company will be indicted as opposed to being offered an NPA or 
DPA. Moreover, to challenge a “plaintiff” in an FCPA 
enforcement action, a company first needs to be criminally 
indicted by the DOJ, or in the SEC context to be charged by the 
company’s primary government regulator. As noted in Section 
IIIA above, the impact on the company’s market capitalization 
upon indictment or civil charging is likely to be much greater 
than the FCPA fines or penalties the DOJ and/or SEC are 
seeking. Indeed, in the FCPA’s 36 year history only two 
companies have put the DOJ to its burden of proof at trial and 
both companies ultimately prevailed.232 Add to this calculus the 
230. Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1980).
231. Does DOJ Expect FCPA Counsel To Roll Over And Play Dead?,
FCPA PROFESSOR (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/does-doj-
expect-fcpa-counsel-to-roll-over-and-play-dead.
232. The first instance, involving an issuer, occurred in 1991 and the 
second instance, involving a private company, occurred in 2011. See One Win, 
One Loss, FCPA PROFESSOR (May 16, 2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com
/one-win-one-loss; see also Milestone Erased: Judge Matz Dismisses Lindsey 
Convictions, Says That “Dr. Lindsey And Mr. Lee Were Put Through A Severe 
Ordeal” And That Lindsey Manufacturing, A “Small, Once Highly Respected 
Enterprise … Placed In Jeopardy,” FCPA PROFESSOR (Dec. 1, 2011), 
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prominence of NPAs and DPAs in the FCPA context and the 
practical effect of these cumulative dynamics is to insulate 
FCPA enforcement theories in corporate enforcement actions 
from meaningful judicial scrutiny in all but the rarest of cases.
These dynamics of FCPA enforcement are simply not present 
in ATS cases and for this very simple reason the ATS, unlike the 
FCPA, has been the subject of much litigation over the past 
decade, including multiple Supreme Court cases and many 
appellate court decisions.
Thus, while the judicial logic and rationale of the Supreme 
Court in Kiobel should cause pause as to certain enforcement 
theories relevant to the FCPA, it likely will not as the judiciary 
rarely gets to play a role in FCPA enforcement.
The Kiobel decision is not the only legal development from 
2013 relevant to jurisdictional issues in FCPA enforcement 
actions against foreign actors. Similar to Kiobel, in U.S. v. Vilar
the Second Circuit held, in a case concerning liability under 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, that Section 10(b) 
does not apply to extraterritorial conduct, “regardless of whether 
liability is sought criminally or civilly.”233 In reaching its 
conclusion, the Second Circuit gutted the DOJ’s arguments and 
noted:
[T]he government is incorrect when it asserts that ‘the 
presumption against extraterritoriality for civil statutes . . . 
simply does not apply in the criminal context.
The government contends, relying on [a 1922 Supreme Court 
case - U.S. v. Bowman], that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality has no place in our reading of criminal 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/milestone-erased-judge-matz-dismisses-lindsey-
convictions-says-that-dr-lindsey-and-mr-lee-were-put-through-a-severe-ordeal-
and-that-lindsey-manufacturing-a-small-once-highly-respected-ente.
233. Second Circuit Concludes That Presumption Against 
Extraterritoriality Applies To Criminal Liability Under The Securities Law,
FCPA PROFESSOR (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/second-
circuit-concludes-that-presumption-against-extraterritoriality-applies-to-
criminal-liability-under-the-securities-law.
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statutes. To the contrary, no plausible interpretation of 
Bowman supports this broad proposition; fairly read, Bowman
stands for quite the opposite.
[T]he government provides little reason, beyond its misplaced 
reliance on Bowman, for why the presumption against 
extraterritoriality should not apply to criminal statutes.
The presumption against extraterritoriality is a method of 
interpreting a statute, which has the same meaning in every 
case. The presumption against extraterritoriality is not a rule to 
be applied to the specific facts of a case. A statute either 
applies extraterritorially or it does not, and once it is 
determined that a statute does not apply extraterritorially, the 
only question we must answer in the individual case is 
whether the relevant conduct occurred in the territory of a 
foreign sovereign.
Once again, given the FCPA’s explicit jurisdictional scope, 
the presumption against extraterritoriality is not needed in FCPA 
enforcement actions against foreign actors. Yet, the logic and 
rationale of the Second Circuit in Vilar should also cause pause 
as to certain theories relevant to the FCPA.
C. Enforcement Agency Speeches and Policy Positions
The DOJ’s Criminal Division enforces nearly nine-hundred 
federal statutes and the SEC enforces numerous securities law 
statutes. However, as once again highlighted in 2013, 
enforcement agency officials seem to devote a disproportionate 
amount of time talking about the FCPA. On one level, such 
focus and aggressive talk about the FCPA may serve a deterrent 
effect, yet on another level the focus and aggressive talk is odd 
and often seems misplaced. Perhaps it is because FCPA Inc. is 
where the enforcement agency officials often end up after 
government service, a trend that continued in 2013.234
234. Former Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer Joins FCPA Inc.,
FCPA PROFESSOR (Mar. 29, 2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/former-
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Regardless of the cause or motivation, DOJ and SEC 
officials, employing much of the same lofty and hollow rhetoric 
from prior years, made numerous FCPA speeches in 2013 and 
this section analyzes these speeches and policy positions. This 
section concludes by spotlighting the following irony:
notwithstanding continued aggressive rhetoric concerning FCPA 
enforcement, expansive and controversial enforcement theories 
forming the basis for most enforcement actions resolved in the 
absence of meaningful judicial scrutiny, and escalating fine and 
penalty amounts, in 2013 an SEC FCPA enforcement official 
candidly stated that “FCPA law … is not well developed.”
5. Notable and Quotable
DOJ and SEC FCPA speeches in 2013 were once again 
defined by the following themes: the FCPA remains an 
enforcement priority for the agencies; lofty and hollow rhetoric; 
and a distorted view of “success.”
Enforcement Priority
Regardless of whether actual FCPA enforcement statistics 
support such a position, the DOJ and SEC in 2013 continued to 
remind the business community that FCPA enforcement is a top 
law enforcement priority.
DOJ Acting Assistant Attorney General Mythili Raman 
stated:
x The DOJ’s “efforts to combat corruption around the 
world” is one “of the [DOJ’s] most important enforcement 
priorities.”235
assistant-attorney-general-lanny-breuer-joins-fcpa-inc; Friday Roundup, FCPA
PROFESSOR (Mar. 15, 2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/friday-roundup-71.
235. Mythili Raman, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Keynote 
Address at the Global Anti-Corruption Congress (June 17, 2013), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2013/crm-speech-130617.html.
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x “[F]ighting global corruption is, and always will be, a core 
priority of the Department of Justice.”236
x “Simply put, our global anti-corruption mission is now 
ingrained in the Criminal Division’s DNA, and the FCPA is 
now a reality that companies know they must live with and 
adjust to; and this nation, and the world, are better off for 
it.”237
Likewise, the DOJ’s Deputy Chief of Staff for the Criminal 
Division stated that “we are as active today in this area [the 
FCPA] as we have ever been.”238
Similar to the DOJ, SEC enforcement officials also struck a 
similar theme in 2013. For instance, SEC Chairman Mary Jo 
White stated that “strong and fair enforcement of the [FCPA] . . . 
has been and will continue to be a priority” for the SEC.239
Likewise, Co-Director of SEC Enforcement Andrew Ceresney 
warned the business community that the SEC “will remain the 
vigilant cop on the beat when it comes to the FCPA” and that the 
SEC will “remain aggressive and proactive in enforcing the 
FCPA.”240
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Daniel Suleiman, Deputy Chief of Staff for the Criminal Division 
of The U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Remarks to the Minnesota State Bar Association’s 
37th Annual International Business Law Institute (May 8, 2013), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2013/crm-speech-1305091.html.
239. Mary Jo White, Chairperson of U.S. Sec. & Exchange Comm’n, 
Regulation in a Global Financial System at Investment Company Institute (ICI)
General Membership Meeting (May 1, 2013), available at
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171515952.
240. Andrew Ceresney, Co-Director of the Division of Enforcement of 
the U.S. Sec. & Exchange Comm’n, Keynote Address at the International 
Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, (Nov. 19, 2013), available at
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370540392284.
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Lofty and Hollow Rhetoric
In this new era of FCPA enforcement, the enforcement 
agencies frequently speak in lofty terms regarding FCPA 
enforcement. For instance, in previous years, the DOJ’s 
Assistant Attorney General stated that “we in the United States 
are in a unique position to spread the gospel of anti-corruption, 
because there is no country that enforces its anti-bribery laws 
more vigorously than we do.”241 Likewise, the Assistant 
Attorney General stated that enforcement of the FCPA “is our 
way of ensuring not only that the Justice Department is on the 
right side of history, but also that it has a hand in advancing that 
history.”242
This lofty rhetoric continued in 2013 as DOJ Deputy Attorney 
General James Cole stated before an FCPA audience that “the 
modern world has begun to embrace our fight against foreign 
bribery” and that the “tide of history has turned and is now on 
our side.”243 “Embrace” and “on our side” are certainly 
interesting words to use in connection with the DOJ’s FCPA 
enforcement efforts. In the most recent instances of judicial 
scrutiny of DOJ FCPA enforcement, federal court judges have 
stated, in three separates cases, as follows.
x This appears to be the end of a long and sad chapter in the 
annals of white collar criminal enforcement. 
x The instances of misconduct [by DOJ prosecutors] were so 
varied and occurred over such a long period of time “that they 
241. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney General at the U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Speech at American Conference Institute’s 28th National Conference 
on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 16, 2012), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2012/crmspeech-1211161.html.
242. Id.
243. James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney General at the U.S Dep’t of 
Justice, Speech at the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Conference (Nov. 19, 
2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/dag/speeches/2013/dag-
speech-131119.html.
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add up to an unusual and extreme picture of a prosecution 
gone badly awry.” 
x ‘‘The problem here is that the principal witness against 
[the FCPA defendant] . . . knows almost nothing.” [...] [The 
DOJ] shouldn’t indict people on stuff [they] can’t prove.”244
Despite such end results when DOJ FCPA enforcement is 
subjected to judicial scrutiny, the DOJ continues to say the 
following: “our stellar FCPA Unit continues to go gangbusters, 
bringing case after case” and “our recent string of successful
prosecutions of corporate executives is worth highlighting.”245
Indeed, as highlighted below, the enforcement agencies seem to 
have a distorted view of “success” when it comes to FCPA 
enforcement.
Moreover, the DOJ continues to link its FCPA enforcement 
program to such classical notions of bribery such as “the 
hospitals left unbuilt, the roads still unpaved, [and] the medicine 
undelivered.”246 While it is certainly easy to imagine payment 
schemes in violation of the FCPA resulting in such broad 
societal damage, the reality of most actual FCPA enforcement 
actions is something entirely different. For instance, as 
244. Id. at 827 (quoting Trial Transcript at 248, United States v. O’Shea, 
No. H-09-629 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 16, 2012)).
245. “Our Stellar FCPA Unit Continues to Go Gangbusters, Bringing 
Case After Case ,” FCPA PROFESSOR (May 6, 2013),
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/our-stellar-fcpa-unit-continues-to-go-gang
busters-bringing-case-after-case (emphasis added) (quoting Mythili Raman,
Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Remarks at the Corporate Crime Reporter 
Conference (May 3, 2013)); “We Are Not Going away . . . Our Efforts to Fight 
Foreign Bribery Are More Robust than Ever,” FCPA PROFESSOR (June 19, 
2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/we-are-not-going-away-our-efforts-to-
fight-foreign-bribery-are-more-robust-than-ever (emphasis added) (quoting 
Mythili Raman, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Keynote Address at the Global 
Anti-Corruption Congress (June 17, 2013) [hereinafter Anti-Corruption 
Keynote Address], available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/
2013/crm-speech-130617.html).
246. James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., Address at the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act Conference (Nov. 19, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/
iso/opa/dag/speeches/2013/dag-speech-131119.html.
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previously highlighted in Section IIIA, the $54 million ADM 
enforcement action concerned VAT refunds that even the DOJ 
and SEC acknowledged where owed to the company. Regardless 
of the specific allegations in FCPA enforcement actions, the fact 
remains that most corporate FCPA enforcement actions involve 
companies that are widely viewed as industry leaders that sell the 
best product for the best price with several such companies 
winning awards for being among the “world’s most ethical” 
during the same general time period relevant to the FCPA 
enforcement action.247
Not only is enforcement agency lofty rhetoric undercut when 
one studies the details of actual FCPA enforcement actions, but 
enforcement agency rhetoric also proves hollow in many 
instances. For instance, regarding individual FCPA enforcement 
actions, the DOJ has stated “we are now – more than ever –
holding individual wrongdoers to account,”248 and the SEC has 
likewise stated:
Another area of focus, and recent progress, has been our 
efforts to bring FCPA cases against individuals. To better root 
out corruption, we have ramped up our pursuit not just of 
companies, but of the individuals responsible for the corporate 
malfeasance.249
However, as noted in Section II.B above, the reality is that 
FCPA enforcement in this new era is largely corporate 
enforcement only. As previously highlighted, in 2013 0 of 7 DOJ 
corporate FCPA enforcement actions (0%) have resulted (at least 
yet) in any related charges against company employees and 
going back to 2012, only 1 of 9 DOJ corporate FCPA 
247. Oracle – Another World’s Most Ethical FCPA Violator?, FCPA
PROFESSOR (Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/dag/speeches/
2013/dag-speech-131119.html.
248. Anti-Corruption Keynote Address, supra note 245.
249. Andrew Ceresney, Co-Dir. of the Div. of Enforcement, SEC,
Keynote Address at the International Conference on the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (Nov. 19, 2013) [hereinafter SEC Keynote Address], available at
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370540392284.
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enforcement actions (11%) have resulted (at least yet) in any 
related charges against company employees. In short, between 
2008 and 2013 there have been 60 core corporate DOJ FCPA 
enforcement actions and in 44 of these actions (73%) there have 
not (at least yet) been any DOJ charges against company 
employees.
Likewise, in 2013 0 of 8 SEC corporate FCPA enforcement 
actions (0%) have resulted (at least yet) in any related charges 
against company employees and going back to 2012, 0 of 8 (0%) 
of SEC corporate FCPA enforcement actions have resulted (at 
least yet) in any related charges against company employees. In 
short, between 2008 and 2013 there have been 65 core corporate 
SEC FCPA enforcement actions and in 53 of these actions (82%) 
there have not (at least yet) been any SEC charges against 
company employees.
Distorted View of “Success”
A final issue when it comes to analyzing FCPA enforcement 
agency speeches and policy positions from 2013 is how the 
enforcement agencies define “success.” For instance, the 
enforcement agencies frequently cite statistics in FCPA 
speeches, such as the following from DOJ Acting Assistant 
General Mythili Raman:
Since 2005, the Department has secured close to three dozen 
corporate guilty pleas in FCPA cases. And just since 2009, the 
Department has entered into over 40 corporate resolutions, 
including nine of the top 10 biggest resolutions ever in terms 
of penalties, resulting in approximately $2.5 billion in 
monetary fines.250
Certainly, the DOJ and SEC have had “success” in this new 
era of FCPA enforcement exercising leverage and securing large 
corporate FCPA settlements against risk-averse corporations 
through resolution vehicles often not subjected to any 
250. Anti-Corruption Keynote Address, supra note 245.
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meaningful judicial scrutiny. However, by focusing on the 
quantity of FCPA enforcement, the quality of that enforcement 
is, as highlighted in Section III.A, often left unexplored. The 
simplistic notion advanced by the enforcement agencies seems to 
be that more FCPA enforcement is an inherent good regardless 
of enforcement theories, regardless of resolution vehicles, and 
regardless of actual outcomes when put to its burden of proof.
This logic is troubling and ought to be rejected.
In a legal system founded on the rule of law, a more 
meaningful form of government enforcement agency success is 
prevailing in the context of an adversarial system when put to the 
burden of proof. As to this form of success, in both 2013 and 
more broadly during this new era of FCPA enforcement, the 
DOJ and SEC have had far less “success” in enforcing the 
FCPA.
6. “FCPA Law … Is Not Well Developed”
This section on 2013 enforcement agency speeches and policy 
positions concludes by highlighting the following irony:
notwithstanding continued aggressive rhetoric concerning FCPA 
enforcement, expansive and controversial enforcement theories 
forming the basis for most enforcement actions resolved in the 
absence of meaningful judicial scrutiny, and escalating fine and 
penalty amounts, in 2013 an SEC FCPA enforcement official 
made a candid statement about the FCPA.
Speaking before an FCPA audience, Co-Director of SEC 
Enforcement Andrew Ceresney stated:
“FCPA law . . . is not well developed. Companies typically 
enter settlements in FCPA cases, leading to a paucity of case 
law.”251
It was an obvious statement known and understood by many 
in this new era of FCPA enforcement. Yet, what made the 
statement noteworthy is that it came from an FCPA enforcement 
251. SEC Keynote Address, supra note 249.
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official. Indeed, the statement was arguably the most notable -
and candid – statement by an FCPA enforcement official during 
this new era of FCPA enforcement and it speaks volumes to the 
disconnect that often defines this new era.
D. Certain Uncomfortable Truths and Double Standards
In 2010, the DOJ declared a “new era of FCPA enforcement; 
and we are here to stay”252 and, as highlighted above, the 
enforcement agency officials continue to speak in lofty rhetoric 
concerning its FCPA enforcement program. Yet, when one peels 
away the layers of the U.S. fight against foreign bribery and 
corruption, certain uncomfortable truths and double standards 
emerge.
1. Uncomfortable Truths
The U.S. fight against foreign bribery and corruption is 
defined by certain uncomfortable truths. In most years, including 
2013, FCPA enforcement actions have included allegations of 
the following things of value being given to alleged foreign 
officials: wine, watches, perfume, handbags, cameras, kitchen 
appliances, business suits and dresses, television sets, laptops, 
tea sets and office furniture.253
Against this backdrop, it was reported in 2013, regarding the 
U.S. government’s relationship with Afghan President Hamid 
Karzai, as follows:
For more than a decade, wads of American dollars packed into 
suitcases, backpacks and, on occasion, plastic shopping bags 
252. Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., Address at the 24th 
National Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 16, 2010), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2010/crm-speech-
101116.html.
253. Do Lanny Breuer and Robert Khuzami Actually Read FCPA 
Enforcement Actions? FCPA PROFESSOR (Dec. 13, 2012), 
http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/do-lanny-breuer-and-robert-khuzami-actually-
read-fcpa-enforcement-actions.
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have been dropped off every month or so at the offices of 
Afghanistan’s president — courtesy of the Central Intelligence 
Agency. All told, tens of millions of dollars have flowed from 
the C.I.A. to the office of President Hamid Karzai, according 
to current and former advisers to the Afghan leader. . . . The 
C.I.A. . . . has long been known to support some relatives and 
close aides of Mr. Karzai. But the new accounts of off-the-
books cash delivered directly to his office show payments on a 
vaster scale, and with a far greater impact on everyday 
governing. . . . The cash does not appear to be subject to the 
oversight and restrictions placed on official American aid to 
the country or even the C.I.A.’s formal assistance programs, 
like financing Afghan intelligence agencies.254
Can it truly be said, as DOJ FCPA enforcement officials have 
stated, that “we in the United States are in a unique position to 
spread the gospel of anti-corruption” and that the “tide of history 
has turned and is now on our side”? The conduct at issue in the 
above article pales in comparison to many FCPA enforcement 
actions and is made even more egregious given that FCPA 
enforcement actions invariably involve use of private 
shareholder/owner funds, whereas the CIA’s campaign of 
bribery in Afghan is using public funds.
One of the best statements found in the FCPA’s extensive 
legislative history concerning certain uncomfortable truths 
regarding “bribery” was from Theodore Sorensen.255 As to the 
basic issue of defining bribery, Sorensen observed: 
[T]here will be countless situations in which a fair-minded 
investigator or judge will be hard-put to determine whether a 
particular payment or practice is a legitimate and permissible 
business activity or a means of improper influence. . . . 
Reasonable men and even angels will differ on the answers to 
254. Matthew Rosenberg, With Bags of Cash, C.I.A. Seeks Influence in 
Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/
04/29/world/asia/cia-delivers-cash-to-afghan-leaders-
office.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
255. Sorensen testified at a Congressional hearing as a private lawyer, 
but previously served as President John F. Kennedy’s speechwriter.
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these and similar questions. At the very least such distinctions 
should make us less sweeping in our judgments and less 
confident of our solutions.256
Sorensen’s insight was spot-on when made and still holds true 
today in this new era of FCPA enforcement. In short, when the 
U.S. government sanctions bribery using public funds, we really 
ought to pause and reflect on much in the bribery and corruption 
space.257
2. Double Standard
Pause and reflection is also warranted given the glaring gap 
between enforcement of the FCPA – a U.S. law governing 
business interactions with “foreign officials” – and 18 U.S.C. §
201, a U.S. law pre-dating the FCPA that governs various 
interactions with U.S. public officials.
In this regard, a notable development from 2013 was the 
FCPA scrutiny of JPMorgan for its alleged hiring practices in 
China. The New York Times reported that “federal authorities 
have opened a bribery investigation into whether JPMorgan 
Chase hired the children of powerful Chinese officials to help the 
bank win lucrative business.”258 The article stated, in pertinent 
part:
256. Theodore C. Sorensen, Improper Payments Abroad: Perspectives 
and Proposals, 54 FOREIGN AFF. 719, 723-24 (1976).
257. Indeed, in sentencing an FCPA defendant in 2010, a federal court 
judge stated that given the CIA’s bribing of warlords in Afghanistan that this 
conduct “sort of goes to the morality of the situation.” The judge rejected the 
DOJ’s approximate three-year sentencing recommendation and sentenced the 
defendant to probation. Judge (Again) Significantly Rejects DOJ’s 
Recommendation in Sentencing Bobby Elkins, FCPA PROFESSOR (Oct. 25, 
2010), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/judge-again-significantly-rejects-dojs-
recommendation-in-sentencing-bobby-elkins.
258. Jessica Silver-Greensberg et al., Hiring in China by JPMorgan 
Under Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2013, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2013/08/17/hiring-in-china-by-jpmorgan-under-scrutiny/?hp.
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In one instance, the bank hired the son of a former Chinese 
banking regulator who is now the chairman of the China 
Everbright Group, a state-controlled financial conglomerate . . 
. [after] the chairman’s son came on board, JPMorgan secured 
multiple coveted assignments from the Chinese conglomerate, 
including advising a subsidiary of the company on a stock 
offering, records show. The Hong Kong office of JPMorgan 
also hired the daughter of a Chinese railway official. That 
official was later detained on accusations of doling out 
government contracts in exchange for cash bribes, the 
government document and public records show. The former 
official’s daughter came to JPMorgan at an opportune time for 
the New York-based bank: The China Railway Group, a state-
controlled construction company that builds railways for the 
Chinese government, was in the process of selecting 
JPMorgan to advise on its plans to become a public company, 
a common move in China for businesses affiliated with the 
government. With JPMorgan’s help, China Railway raised 
more than $5 billion when it went public in 2007.259
As to a potential cause and effect relationship between 
JPMorgan’s alleged hiring of children of alleged foreign 
officials, the article noted:
Before hiring [the son of the chairman of the China Everbright 
Group], JPMorgan appeared to do little if any business with 
China Everbright, based on a review of securities filings and 
news reports. Since then, though, China Everbright has 
emerged as one of its prized Asian clients.260
The Ministry of Railways has never hired JPMorgan directly, 
securities filings and news reports suggest. But those records 
indicate that the China Railway Group, the construction 
company whose largest customer is thought to be the Chinese 
government, hired JPMorgan to take it public in 2007. [The 
daughter of the former deputy chief engineer of China’s 
railway ministry] was hired around this time. About four years 
259. Id.
260. Id.
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later, when [the daughter] was an associate at the bank, 
JPMorgan won out again. This time, according to media 
reports, the operator of a high-speed railway from Beijing to 
Shanghai picked the bank to steer it through its own public 
offering.261
As often occurs in this new era of FCPA enforcement when 
one company is the subject of FCPA scrutiny, JPMorgan’s 
scrutiny caused the DOJ and SEC to launch a full-fledged 
industry sweep of the financial services industry and it was soon 
reported:
U.S. authorities are questioning numerous banks and hedge 
funds on their international hiring practices for interns and 
other employees, according to people with knowledge of the 
situation. The Justice Department and Securities and 
Exchange Commission are seeking information to determine if 
there have been any violations of the [FCPA] . . . . .262
The FCPA scrutiny of JPMorgan and the financial services 
industry spawned extensive commentary much of it focusing on 
double standard issues. For instance, an article in the Economist
observed:
Connections also count in the West, of course. Following 
initial reports of the SEC’s investigation in the New York 
Times, a flood of stories have noted the jobs held in politically 
sensitive American firms by the sprogs of American 
politicians. Even when offspring are not involved, the 
revolving door between the public and private sectors raises 
questions about why people are hired. . . . If the regulators 
genuinely fret about why firms make hiring decisions, they 
261. Id.
262. Robin Sidel & Cynthia Koons, U.S. Overseas Hiring Probe Has 
Wide Net, WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1
0001424127887324324404579043382418965094.
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may want to extend their inquiries to Washington, DC, and 
New York as well.263
A New York Times columnist observed:
But hiring the sons and daughters of powerful executives and 
politicians is hardly just the province of banks doing business 
in China: it has been a time-tested practice here in the United 
States.264
Perhaps most notably, former SEC Commissioner Arthur 
Levitt stated in a Wall Street Journal opinion piece as follows.
[A]ccording to financial regulators now looking into the hiring 
practices of major U.S. banks and multinationals in China—
some of which have employed members of influential Chinese 
families—anyone who once hired me [Levitt’s father was the 
New York state comptroller] might have been violating ethical 
and legal standards. [SEC] regulators now suggest that such 
hiring overseas is a form of untoward influence, akin to 
bribing foreign officials to win business. The accusation is 
scurrilous and hypocritical. If you walk the halls of any 
institution in the U.S.—Congress, federal courthouses, large 
corporations, the White House, American embassies and even 
the offices of the SEC—you are likely to run into friends and 
family members of powerful and wealthy people. . . . Whether 
this is right or wrong, unfair or fair, is not the point. It is 
hypocritical of financial regulators to criticize—even 
penalize—practices abroad that are commonplace in 
Washington, New York and other seats of political and 
economic power. Were the SEC to be completely consistent in 
its approach, it would have to come down hard on the same 
practices here in the U.S. And the agency would have a field 
day. Members of Congress and the executive branch regularly 
263. Blood and Money, ECONOMIST, Aug. 24, 2013, available at
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21584033-american-
regulators-investigate-jpmorgan-chases-hiring-china-blood-and-money.
264. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Hiring the Well-Connected Isn’t Always a 
Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2013, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013
/08/19/hiring-the-well-connected-isnt-always-a-scandal/?ref=business&_r=0.
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hire the children of major donors. Regulators would find 
scores of examples of men and women, occupying internships 
and entry-level positions in U.S. corporations, who were hired 
on the say-so of someone much higher up in the 
organization.265
Commenting on JPMorgan’s FCPA scrutiny, former Labor 
Secretary Robert Reich observed:
But let’s get real. How different is bribing China’s 
“princelings,” as they’re called there, from Wall Street’s 
ongoing program of hiring departing U.S. Treasury officials, 
presumably in order to grease the wheels of official 
Washington. . . ?[...]Or, for that matter, how different is what 
JP Morgan did in China from Wall Street’s habit of hiring the 
children of powerful American politicians . . . ?[...]And how 
much worse is JP Morgan’s putative offense in China than the 
torrent of money JP Morgan and every other major Wall Street 
bank is pouring into the campaign coffers of American 
politicians — making the Street one of the major backers of 
Democrats as well as Republicans?266
Reich concluded by asking:
“The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is important, and JP 
Morgan should be nailed for bribing Chinese officials. But, if 
you’ll pardon me for asking, why isn’t there a Domestic 
Corrupt Practices Act?
As highlighted above, there is of course a “Domestic Corrupt 
Practices Act” – 18 U.S.C. § 201. However, as highlighted by 
JPMorgan’s FCPA scrutiny in 2013 and numerous other 
265. Arthur Levitt, ‘Influence Peddling’ Makes the World Go Round,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 25, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240
52702304858104579262624243252560?mod=WSJ_Opinion_LEFTTopOpinio
n.
266. Robert Reich, JP Morgan Chase, the Foreign Corrupt Practice Act, 
and the Corruption of America, HUFFPOST POL. BLOG (Dec. 8, 2013, 10:32 
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-reich/jp-morgan-corrupt-practice-
act_b_4410253.html.
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examples,267 there is little intellectual and moral consistency 
between enforcement of these two laws. In this regard, a notable
statement in 2013 was made by President Jimmy Carter, the 
same person who signed the FCPA into law in 1977. President 
Carter called out a form of bribery and called unchecked political 
contributions in the U.S. “legal bribery of candidates.”268
As President Carter’s statement highlights, why should 
corporate interaction with a “foreign official” be subject to 
greater scrutiny and different standards of enforcement than 
corporate interaction with a U.S. official? Why do we reflexively 
label a “foreign official” who receives “things of value” from 
private business interests as corrupt, yet generally turn a blind 
eye when it happens here at home? The short answer, of course, 
is that there should not be any difference and the questions 
deserve greater attention in this new era of FCPA enforcement.
Indeed, while the U.S. government aggressively expands its 
FCPA enforcement program and enforcement theories, the U.S. 
remains far from the top of lists such as Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (“CPI”), which 
ranks countries on how corrupt their public sector is perceived.269
In this regard, FCPA practitioners shared the following spot-on 
observation from the field:
The paradigm of international anti-corruption enforcement is 
frequently viewed, at least in the United States, through the 
prism of U.S. enforcers determined to root out the illicit 
dealings of corrupt foreign officials. We speak of sovereign 
nations as “risky neighborhoods” in which to do business, 
267. See, e.g., Archive for The ‘Double Standard’ Category, FCPA
PROFESSOR (Dec. 27, 2013), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/category/double-
standard.
268. Ray Henry, Jimmy Carter: Unchecked Political Contributions Are
‘Legal Bribery’, HUFFPOST POL. BLOG (July 17, 2013, 12:52 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/17/jimmy-carter-bribery_n_3611
882.html.
269. For instance, in the most recent CPI, the U.S. ranked 19th out of 177 
countries and below many peer nations such as Canada, Australia, Germany 
and the U.K. TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX
(2013), available at http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/results/.
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denoted by dark shades of red on the ubiquitous Transparency 
International Corruption Perceptions Index (“CPI”). So the 
authors frequently note the quizzical looks on the faces of 
audience members in training sessions when we reveal that the 
United States barely qualifies as a Top 20 country on the CPI, 
tied at 19 with South America’s Uruguay. To be sure, the less-
than-stellar CPI ranking of the United States has as much to do 
with an unparalleled domestic enforcement regime as any 
other factor, but the sad truth is that corruption is not a 
problem unique to government officials outside our borders.270
CONCLUSION
This article captured a moment in time by weaving together 
FCPA and related developments from 2013 into a coherent 
narrative of value to anyone who seeks an informed base of 
knowledge regarding the FCPA, its enforcement, and related 
legal and policy issues. The FCPA is one of the most important 
laws governing business conduct in the global marketplace. For 
this reason, and whether the specific issue is:
x the use of NPAs, DPAs and other means to resolve FCPA 
enforcement actions in the absence of meaningful judicial scrutiny;
x the wide gap between corporate and individual FCPA 
enforcement actions and a relevant data point concerning the quality 
and legitimacy of most corporate enforcement actions;
x various excesses that have come to define this new era of FCPA 
enforcement; or
x certain uncomfortable truths and double standards regarding the 
U.S. fight against bribery and corruption in this new era of 
enforcement.
The FCPA narrative told in this article matters.
270. GIBSON DUNN, 2013 YEAR-END FCPA UPDATE (2014), available at
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2013-Year-End-FCPA-
Update.pdf.
